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ESSAYS 

ON SEVERAL SUBJECTS. 



•=\ 



LONDON : 
IBOTSON AND PALMER, PRINTERS, SAVOY STREET, STRAND. 



ESSAYS 



PERCEPTION OF AN EXTERNAL UNIVERSE, 



OTHER SUBJECTS 



CONNECTED WITH 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSATION, 



BY 

LADY MARY SHEPHERD, 

AUTHOR OF 

An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect. 



C A 

P LONDON: ffiWashl 
JOHN HATCH ARD AND SON, PICCADILLY. 
1827. 



I" 



PART I. 



AN ESSAY 



ON 



THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY AS 
APPLIED BY MR. HUME TO THE PERCEPTION OF 
EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 



PART II. 

ESSAYS CONTAINING INQUIRIES 

RELATING TO 

THE BERKELEIAN THEORY; 

THE COMPARISON OF MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICAL 

INDUCTION; 
THE UNION OF COLOUR AND EXTENSION ; 
THE CREDIBILITY OF MIRACLES ; 
THE NATURE OF A FINAL CAUSE AND OF MIND ; 
THE REASON OF SINGLE AND ERECT VISION. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Page 

PREFACE, &c. xi 

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 

Sec. I. — The Question stated - 1 

II. — Sensation a generic term — Question restated 

— generally answered and sub-divided into three 
parts for further consideration. - C 

CHAPTER I. 

On Continuous Existence. 

Sec, I. — Whence the knowledge of continuous existence 
unperceived? - - - - - - - 13 

Sec. II. — Several Corollaries with the preceding statement 
— The association of the sensible qualities with the ideas 
of their unknown causes — The error of Dr. Reid and 
others in separating primary and secondary qualities — 
The error of Bishop Berkeley — Time, fyc. — The near 
union of popular and philosophical notions on the sub- 
ject — The nature of dreams, and the difference between 
them and realities — The reality of a future life — The 
conclusion that the proportions and relations of unper- 
ceived things are known from the relation of the cor- 
responding sensations they create, and find a fit illus- 
tration in the nature of algebraic signs - - '20 



IV CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER II. 

On External Existence. 

Page 
Sec. I. — Knowledge of external existence, how gained? 
— The nature and differences of external objects, how 
known? — Varieties in the sensations which are effects 
prove their causes proportionably various, fyc. . 39 

Sec. II. — The nature of exteriority further considered — 
Wliat the phenomena are which generate the idea of 
external existence ------ 49 

CHAPTER III. 
On Independant Existence. 

Sec. I. — The notion of the Independancy of external 
objects how gained — The same evidence for the inde- 
pendancy as for the exteriority of objects - - 76 

Change of Qualities proves them to be independant of 
the senses --_____ 77 

Home objects appear both like ourselves, and different from 
us, Sfc. --.____ 78 

CHAPTER IV. 

Objection arising to the foregoing doctrines 
from the Phenomena of dreams, further con- 
sidered AND ANSWERED. 

Page 

Sec. I.— The Phenomena of dreams do not afford a 
valid argument against the proof of independant exist- 
ences external to mind - ST 



CONTENTS. V 

Page 

Sec. II. — Remark on Bishop Berkeley s conclusions 
from dreams, showing a fallacy in his reasoning there- 
on, as affording a doubt concerning the reality of 
objects — application of the doctrine of Cause against 
Berkeley - - - - - - - 91 

Sec. III. — Remarks on Dr. Reid's Neglect of the Con- 
sideration of tlw Phenomena of dreams in his notions 
of extension, fyc. - - - - - - 109 

Sec. IV. — Dreams considered in connection with the 
doctrine discussed in the " Essay on the relation of 
Cause and Effect " viz. How the mind may form a 
judgment antecedently to trial, of future effects from 
present appearances _____ 105 



CHAPTER V. 

On the Nature of Objects when acting as Causes. 

Page 

The action of cause to be considered as external to mind 
— Remark on the vague and popular use of the word 
Cause — Sensible qualities not the causes of other sen- 
sible qualities - - - - - 125 

Two kinds of necessa?y connexion ; that between Cause 
and Effect, and that between successive effects aris- 
ing from tlie union of a common cause, with various 
■senses, SfC ----- 130 



VI CONTENTS, 



CHAPTER VI. 



On the Use of the word Idea in this Treatise, 
and cursory observations on its nature and 
proper use in general. &c. 

Page 

Sec. I. — Ideas used as a distinct class of sensations, and 
signs in relation to continuous existences, not present 
to the mind — Berkeley's ambiguous use of that word — 
Objects in the mind — compounded of Sensations (by 
means of the organs of sense) and Ideas the result of 
their relations perceived by the understanding, thence 
the evidence for the existence of the different parts of 
the same object unequal — Objects of memory how com- 
pounded — The continuous existence of an individual 
mind, or self, an inference from the relations which 
exist between the idea of remembered existence, and 
the sensation of present existence — The idea of exist- 
ence in general how found, as an abstraction from each 
sensation in particular ----- 133 



CHAPTER VII. 

Application of the Doctrine contained in the 
preceding Essay to the evidence of our be- 
lief in several Opinions. 

Page 
3ec. I. — The foundation of our belief in God - - 150 

II. — The knowledge of our own independant ex- 
istence - - ------ 152 



CONTENTS. Vll 

Page 
Sec. III. — Observations on the essential difference 
between body and mind - - - - -155 

Sec. IV. — Cursory Observations on Instincts — pro- 
phetic visions ------- 160 

Sec. V. — On the knowledge of the nature of unper- 
ceived objects - - - - - -162 



CHAPTER VIII. 

Recapitulation. 

The perception of independant, external, and continued 
existences, the result of an exercise of the reasoning 
powers, or a mixture of the ideas of the understand- 
ing with those of sense ----- 168 

External objects unknown as to the unperceived qualities 
which are capable of affecting the senses, known as 
compounds of simple sensations, mixed with ideas of 
Reason, or conceptions of the understanding — Reply 
to an objection concerning extension — There exists 
however one set of exterior qualities, which resemble, 
such as are inward; these are Variety — Independancy 
— Existence — Continued Existence — Identity, Sfc. — 
Exteriorly extended objects cannot be like the idea 
of extension — An appeal to the Phenomena of the 
Diorama, as an evidence for the truth of these notions. 
— The ideas of this Treatise do unintentionally coin- 
cide loith some Mysteries of Religion — Conclusion 17 '5 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Short Essays on Several Subjects. 



ESSAY I. 

Page 

Sec. I. — Consideration of the erroneous reasoning con- 
tained in Bishop Berkeley s Principles of Human 
Knowledge ---__-_ 195 

Sec. II. - 213 

ESSAY II. 

Upon the nature of the five organs of sense, and their 
manner of action ivith regard to external perception 
— against Bp. Berkeley - - - - 221 

ESSAY III. 

That the external Causes which determine the various 
perceptions of sense, are not the immediate actions 
of Deity — against Bp. Berkeley - 230 

ESSAY IV. 

Upon Mr. Dugald Stewarfs, and Dr. Reid's Philosophy, 
as it regards the union of colour with extension ; and 
the perception of the external primary Qualities of' 
matter — against Mr. D. Stewart - 246 



CONTENTS. IX 

ESSAY V. 

Page 
That mathematical demonstration and physical induction 

are founded upon similar principles of evidence — 

against Mr. Dugald Stewart. - - - -271 

ESSAY VI. 

That sensible qualities cannot be causes — against Mr. 
Hume --------296 

ESSAY VII. 
That children can perceive the relation of cause and 
effect, on account of their being capable of a latent 
comparison of ideas — against Mr. Hume - - 314 

ESSAY VIII. 

That human testimony is of sufficient force to establish 
the credibility of miracles — against Mr. Hume - 325 

ESSAY IX. 

On the objection to final causes as ends on account oj 
the efficiency of means — Lord Bacon's ideas concern- 
ing a final cause noticed - 346 

ESSAY X. 

On the Eternity of Mind. 
Each sensation vanishes in its turn - - 374 

Doctrine applied to the immortality of mind - 378 

ESSAY XI. 
On the Immateriality of Mind. 
Sensation itself is inextended, yet has a relation to ex- 
tension - - 386 
The power of mind as an efficient cause - 388 
Application to Deity - - - 389 



X CONTENTS. 

ESSAY XII. 

On the use of organization in animal existence, especially 
as it relates to the existence and operation of mental 
qualities - - - 393 

ESSAY XIII. 

On the association of ideas, and the interaction of mind 
and body* - 403 

ESSAY XIV. 

The reason why we see objects single instead of double, 
and erect instead of inverted — against Dr. Reid 408 



* This and the four preceding essays are against several 
modern atheists. 



ERRATA. 

Page. Line. 

36, 26, for " heaven" read u haven." 
61, 23, for u unknown causes" read " ideas of the un- 
known causes." 
87, 5, for " does " read " do." 
95, In note,/or " sec. 6, ch. 6," read " sec. 7, ch. 5." 
100, After " Recapitulation " read " page 182, and ch. 7, 

sec 5.*" 
102, 22, "* Seep. 54, 55." 
107, 5, " * p. 54, 55, and 'Essay on the Nature of the 

Five Organs of Sense.' " 
109, 5, " * SeeReid's Inquiry, ch. 5, sec. 7." 
126, 12, In the note after " mind " read " Vol. 2, ch. 4." 
203, 6, After " objects " read " * See p. 220, &c." 
215, 11, for " substance" read " a substance." 
229, Last line in note, for " note O " read " note G." f 
247, 24, After Mr. Stewart, read " * Essays," and " Ele- 
ments of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 
vol. 3, addenda," ref. to p. 92, 1st edit. p. 93, 
6th edit. 
249, Last line, for " note O" read " note G." 
277, 9, for " uuiversalle " read " universelle." 
284, 16,/or " whole " read " wholes." 
297, 15, After " doctrine " read " of causation." 
307, 1 7, for " disceptibility" read " discerptibility." 
370, 23, for " consider " read " attribute." 
373, 17, for " conducted " read " concluded."— Note, for 
" Dr. Stewart " read " Mr. D. Stewart." 

f This is an error of consequence as it relates to Mr. D.. 
Stewart's doctrine of External Perception. 



PART I. 
AN ESSAY 

OX THE 

ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY, 
Sec. 



PREFACE TO THE ESSAY 



ON THE 



ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 



It was my intention in a former publi- 
cation * to have introduced an appendix 
containing some inquiry into the nature 
and proof of the existence of matter, 
and of an external universe ; deeming 
it necessary in order to the more en- 
larged comprehension of that manner of 
action exerted in causation which renders 
it "a producing principle" to have a 
right understanding of the idea of an 
external object; but finding the notions 
which suggested themselves would ex- 
ceed the limits of that work, and of 
sufficient interest to be pursued beyond 

* An essay upon the relation of cause and effect. 



Xll PREFACE. 

its immediate purpose, I have ventured 
to unfold them in the following essay. 

Now the question concerning the 
nature and reality of external existence 
can only receive a satisfactory answer, 
derived from a knowledge of the relation 
of Cause and Effect. The conclusions 
therefore, deduced from some of the 
reasonings used in the former essay 
are the instruments employed in con- 
ducting the argument in this ; — never- 
theless it will not be reasoning in a 
circle, if by carefully defining the na- 
ture of internal and external existence 
of objects 'perceived and unperceived, 
we gain thereby clearer ideas of the 
method and action of causation. For 
in this discussion, taking the two essays 
together as one whole, the knowledge 
of Cause is supposed to be first, because 
previous to any belief in exteriority, 
one internal object would appear so ne- 
cessary to another, that without its pre- 
sence it would not arise ; also every 
change of perception would be observed 



PREFACE. Xlll 

as a change of that being which was 
already in existence : — the action of be- 
ginning any existence would therefore 
appear as a quality of self, or the acci- 
dent of a continuing existence ; and 
it would be a manifest contradiction, 
to predicate of such a quality its 
self-existence. Thus, to begin of itself 
would appear to every child under the 
faintest and most indistinct form of 
latent conception, to be a contradiction. 
But that one object is necessary to the 
existence of another, (by some kind or 
manner of action) and that qualities can- 
not begin of themselves, are those pri- 
maeval elements of the doctrine of 
cause, which regulate every opinion 
speculative and practical. 

Then, secondly, those causes of our 
ideas, which are neither our senses nor 
our minds, are deduced by inference 
from a comparison of the ideas which 
experience yields, by that method of ar- 
gument which it is the intent of this Essay 
to show. 



XIV PREFACE. 

Whilst thirdly, the manner of the ac- 
tion of cause, by which it is a pro- 
ducing principle, and has a neces- 
sary and invariable connection with its 
effects, becomes elicited by a separation 
of the ideas of the exterior causes of 
our sensations, and the ideas of the 
sensations themselves. Thus showing 
there are two sets of objects in nature ; 
viz. the exterior objects, the acting 
causes of nature, independant of the 
senses ; the internal objects, the 
sensible effects of these, when meeting 
with the human senses, and deter- 
mining their specific qualities upon the 
mind. 

The exhibition of the justness of this 
last conclusion, although hinted at in 
" The essay on cause and effect" p. 42, could 
not be fully shown, until all sensations, 
all sensible qualities whatever, were ex- 
posed as themselves but a series of suc- 
cessive effects. 

Thus the subjects of the two Essays 
are capable of being considered inde- 



PREFACE. XV 



pendantly, yet of throwing a mutual 
light upon each other. To analyse the 
operations of our minds in such a man- 
ner as shall distinctly show the limit of 
u what we know of body," will mate- 
rially help the mind in forming an idea 
of how it operates when " acting as a 
cause;" as also on the other hand, 
when the mind perceives by what 
passes within itself, that no quality, 
idea, or being whatever, can begin its 
own existence, it not only perceives the 
general necessity of a cause for every 
effect, but also thence deduces, that 
there must necessarily be a continually 
existing cause, for that constantly re- 
curring effect, our perception of extension ;* 
or in other words, the existence of that, 
which though unperceived and indepen- 
dent, merits the appellation of " body." 
The analysis, therefore, of the operations 
of mind from infancy, throws light upon 
the knowledge we have of cause and 
effect; and the relation of cause and 
* " Essay on Cause and Effect," p. 34, 



XVI PREFACE. 

effect when fully known and established, 
affords the only method of proof in our 
power, for the knowledge of external 
existence. 

I propose in this essay as in the 
former one, to consider Mr. Hume's no- 
tions as expressed first of all in his 
" Treatise upon Human Nature" and 
afterwards as resumed in his essay en- 
titled, " On the Academical or Sceptical 
Philosophy ;" yet to conduct the argu- 
ment rather by stating what I conceive 
to be truth, than by a minute exami- 
nation of his reasoning. In doing this 
if any thoughts should appear of such 
a nature as to afford a prospect that the 
doctrine first set up by Bishop Berkeley, 
is capable of being modified in such a 
manner as not to be at variance with 
the common experience of life, much 
less to afford a supply of arguments in 
favour of atheism, the author will be 
rewarded for the labour of thought 
which has been found necessary in the 
consideration of it. 



AN ESSAY, 



INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 

Section I. 
The Question stated. 

The question intended to be investigated 
in the following pages is thus stated in 
the " Treatise on Human Nature,"* 
" Why we attribute a continued existence 
to objects even when they are not present 
to the senses ?" And, " why we suppose 
them to have an existence distinct from 
the mind ; i. e. external in their position, 
and independant in their existence and 
operation?" Mr. Hume argues at great 
length, that it is not by means either of 
the " senses, or of reason;" that " we 
" are induced to believe in the existence 

* Part 4, sec. 2. 

B 



Z INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 

" of body ;" but that we gain the notion 
entirely by an operation of the " imagi- 
nation" which has "a propensity to 
"feignthe continued existence of all sen- 
" sible objects, and as this propensity 
i( arises from some lively impressions on 
" the memory, it bestows a vivacity on 
" that fiction, or in other words, makes 
" us believe the continued existence of 
" body." It is not my intention to analyze 
Mr. Hume's reasoning on this subject, 
which I conceive to be altogether erro- 
neous, and which it would be very tedi- 
ous to examine ; I prefer, therefore, an- 
swering the question as it stands, ac- 
cording to my own views of it, setting 
down what experience and reflection 
suggest to my mind as the operations 
of nature in this matter; and I shall en- 
deavour to point out what complication 
of objects, and what arrangement of 
them is necessary towards that result 
which appears to us from its familiarity 
and constancy of appearance, perfectly 
simple and easy to be understood. But 
first, I shall shortly observe, that Mr. 



INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. d 

Hume's error in general is similar to that 
in the essay on " necessary connexion," 
viz. of substituting " imagination" and 
" vivacity of thought" as a ground of 
belief, instead of " reason" " An idea," 
says Mr. Hume, " acquires a vivacity by 
its relation to some present impression," 
and this at once, according to him, 
forms the whole ground upon which our 
" belief" rests, of the necessity there 
is, that similar effects should flow from 
similar causes, and that objects should con- . 
tinue to exist unperceived. It is my in- 
tention to shew here, as upon a former 
occasion, that as the very act of reason- 
ing consists in drawing out to observa- 
tion the relations of things as they are 
included in their juxta-position to each 
other ; so upon this question, concerning 
our " knowledge of the existence of 
"body," it is reason, which taking no- 
tice of the whole of our perceptions, and of 
their mutual relations, affords those proofs 
" of body" which first generate, and after 
examination will substantiate, the belief 
of its existence. 

b 2 



4 INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 

The question proposed in the treatise 
is resumed in the essay on " the Aca- 
demical or Sceptical Philosophy," thus : 
" By what argument can it be proved, 
" that the perceptions of the mind must 
" be caused by external objects ?" and 
" reason'' is there said also, " not to 
" have it in her power to find any con- 
" vincing argument to prove, that the 
" perceptions are connected with any ex- 
" ternal objects ;" but that on the con- 
trary, " the slightest philosophy teaches 
us, that the senses are not able to pro- 
duce any immediate intercourse between 
the mind and the object ; for that the 
table which we see seems to diminish 
as we remove further from it, but that 
the real table which exists independant 
of us suffers no alteration." 

It will be seen by any intelligent 
reader, accustomed to discussions of 
this sort, that the consideration of the 
question, as stated in Mr. Hume's trea- 
tise, and the notions I have thence de- 
duced will contain a doctrine capable 
of answering any errors of Dr. Berke- 



IXTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. O 

ley's* on the same subject, whose 
opinions, which originally had been in- 
tended as the foundation of the most 
secure belief in Deity, Mr. Hume has 
endeavoured to convert, by an en- 
larged application of them, (by an in- 
duction of the non-existence of mind 
as well as matter,) into a source of uni- 
versal scepticism. 

The incompleteness of Dr. Reid's an- 
swer to these authors, will also be per- 
ceived in the course of the argument 
here used against them ; it will be seen 
that he cuts the knot instead of untying 
it, by referring a belief in the opinion 
" there is body 1 ' only to " natural in- 
stinct" This notion can never satisfy 
us, as affording either the reason for our 
belief, or as detailing to us the manner 
in which it arises. 

* But this part of the subject will be more fully 
entered upon in a separate treatise, where it is in- 
tended to introduce some extracts from Berkeley's 
(t Principles of Human Knowledge," and to apply 
the ideas here suggested as an answer to them. 



INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 



Section II. 

1 . Sensation a generic term, SfC. 

2. Question restated. 

3. Generally answered and subdivided into three 
parts for further consideration. 

I. In the discussion of this subject 
( il as to our knowledge of the existence of 
body,") I mean to follow the example 
of Dr. Berkeley in the use of the word 
sensation chiefly, instead of perception; 
because it is a generic term, compre- 
hending every consciousness whatever. 
Dr. Reid* is most unphilosophical in 
supposing perception to be a power of 
the mind independant of sensation, 
and that it can be contradistinguished 
from it ; whereas, although every sen- 
sation may not be the perception of an 
exterior object, acting on either of the 
five organs of sense, yet there can be 
no perception of such objects without 

* In the beginning of his argument against Mr. 
Hume in his Inquiry of the Human Mind. 



INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. / 

that inward act of consciousness, which, 
as a consciousness, is in truth a sensa- 
tion of the mind. When it is appre- 
hended that all we know must be by 
means of consciousnesses, or sensations, 
then will be the time to analyze their 
various classes, to examine their rela- 
tions, to notice their peculiarities, in 
order to discover by what means it is 
we come to the belief of non-sentient 
existences. I know, indeed, that it is 
usual to apply the term sensation to 
those perceptions only which are un- 
accompanied with the notion of their 
inhering in an outward object, as the 
pain arising from the incision of a 
sharp instrument is a sensation, which 
is not in the instrument. But in reality 
every thought, notion, idea, feeling, and 
perception, which distinguishes a sen- 
tient nature from unconscious exist- 
ence, may be considered generally as 
sensation. Whereas perception, as used 
by some authors, (especially by Dr. 
Reid,) begs the question under debate ; 



O INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 

i. e. of the existence of objects or 
masses of external qualities already per- 
ceived. For under any illusion of the 
senses, a person would say, (as of sight, 
for instance,) " I thought there had 
been a bird in this room ; until I per- 
ceived it was only a painting :" mean- 
ing that he made use of the whole know- 
ledge relating to the subject, then in the 
mind, as an instrument, an inward eye, 
to correct the impressions at first re- 
ceived ; and when the doctrine I pro- 
pose becomes unfolded, the following is 
the conclusion to which I wish it may 
lead, viz. That the relations of various 
sensations generate conclusions, which be- 
come new sensations or perceptions, and 
which, as so many inward objects of sense, 
afford an evidence of the existence of the 
exterior objects to which they refer, equal 
to the evidence there is for any existing 
sensation whatever, in the mere conscious- 
ness of its presence. Mr. Hume uses 
the word perception in the sense I do 
that of sensation, i. e. for any conscious- 



INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 9 

ness whatever. But on account of the 
ambiguity to which that word is ex- 
posed, I prefer the latter term. How- 
ever, when I occasionally use the word 
" perception," I use it in the sense of 
a " consciousness of sensation,'" a sensa- 
tion TAKEN NOTICE OF BY THE MIND, 

and this is the sense in which Mr. Locke 
defines the word. 

2. Having said thus much for the sake of 
clearness, I proceed to state the question 
proposed, with some slight variation of 
expression, thus : Whence is it, that 
many of the sensations with which we are 
acquainted are considered as objects con- 
tinuous in their existence, outward from. 
and independant of our own, when it is 
obvious, they are still upon the same 
footing as those are allowed to be, 
which are considered as interrupted, 
inward, and dependant beings ; being 
all of them equally perceptions, or feelings 
of a mind, which when not perceiving, or 
feeling, cannot take notice of any exist- 
ence whatever ? 

b 5 



10 INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 

3 . I answer that we do not conceive our 
sensations so to exist, but by habit asso- 
ciate them with the notion of some 
sort of corresponding continuous exist- 
ences , and that we gain the knowledge 
that there must needs be some con- 
tinuous ( independant ) existences, beings 
that are not sensations, by the means of 
reasoning, which reasoning itself consists 
of other and superinduced sensations, 
arising from the comparison of the re- 
lations, of simple sensations among 
themselves, thus testifying the existence 
of the external objects it represents, as 
much as the experience of simple sen- 
sations, (of colour, sound, &c.) testifies 
the existence of their respective inter- 
nal objects ; and that, although we be 
only conscious of our sensations, yet 
our whole combined sensations include 
in their relations the necessity, that there 
should be, and the proof that there are, 
other existences than the mere sensa- 
tions themselves. 

In order to discover what these rela- 



INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 11 

tiojis* are, whence this result is de- 
duced, let us inquire, 

First, By what means it is we ac- 

* In dreams and madness the mind is not in a 
state to perceive and examine these relations ; for, 
First, There is no remembrance of the place the 
percipient is in ; therefore, the relation of place in 
regard to all those vivacious images which are 
moving in the fancy is wanting, which, did it exist, 
would show they were merely parcels of sensible 
qualities, independant of the action of the senses 
on external objects, and thus render the mind con- 
scious it was in a delirium ; a very peculiar state of 
mind no doubt, but one which experience proves 
may take place, and which at once renders futile 
that notion of Hume and Berkeley, that the reality 
of things consists only in the superior vivacity of 
their impressions. 

Secondly, The mind is not in a fit state to per- 
ceive, that these masses of sensible qualities are 
not such as can return upon the sense when 
called for ; and so are wanting in that proof of 
continuous existence. 

Thirdly, The mind is not in a state to combine 
with these observations, the knowledge that these 
masses of sensible qualities cannot owe their exist- 
ence to those methods of formation which in nature 
determine objects, independant of each man's 
sense in particular, and, therefore, wholly different 



12 INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 

quire the notion of continuous exist- 
ences, in opposition to the interrupted 
sensations, by which they appear to the 
mind ? 

Secondly, Examine the foundations, 
for considering such objects external 
to, instead of a part of, or included in 
the perceiving mind. 

Thirdly, Further consider, whence 
the notion originates, that such objec f s 
are entirely in dependant of our own 
existence ; although we can only know 
them by our sensations, which them- 
selves depend upon our existence ? 

In the consideration of these three 
branches of the question, I shall take 
notice, how far the method nature takes 
to generate the notions of independant 
existence, proves it, and cursorily ob- 
serve on the errors of Mr. Hume and 
Bishop Berkeley on these points, &c. 

beings from the creatures of one man's fancy in 
particular, the result of a lively, or disordered cir- 
culation of the blood. 

This view of the subject will be further pursued 
in the discussion of this essay. 



13 



CHAPTER I. 

ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 

Section I. 

Whence the knowledge of Continuous Existence 
unperceived ? 

First, I observe, that the method in 
which what are called external objects* 
introduce themselves to the mind, oc- 
casions it to judge, that the cause of 
each sensation in particular, is different 
from the cause of sensation in general, and 
so may continue to exist when unper- 
ceived. For by a general sensation pre- 
sent to the mind, it always possesses 
the notion of the possibility of the exist- 
ence of unperceived objects ; and from 
the facts which take place, it can only 
explain the appearance of objects, by 
the supposition that they actually do 
exist when unperceived or unfelt. For 
the mind perceives that unless they are 

* i. e. The object which meeting with any sense 
excites its action. 



14 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 

created purposely, ready to appear, upon 
each irregular call of the senses, they 
must continue to exist, ready to appear 
to them upon such calls. 

Also the mind knows there must 
necessarily be some sort of continually 
existing beings which are not percep- 
tions, on account of their successively 
vanishing ; for there needs must continue 
sufficient objects to cause a renewal of 
them; otherwise they would each in 
their turn "begin their own existences" 
i. e. a relation of ideas would exist, 
which by the youngest minds is not 
embraced from its involving an intuitive 
contradiction. 

Such is the latent reasoning silently 
generated in the minds of all men, from 
infancy; — by re turning on their steps men 
can again recover the image of the house, 
the tree, they have just passed : Do 
these objects continue to exist in them ; 
and is the eye put in action ; and does 
motion take place in relation only to 
the mind ; or more indefinitely to the 
object called self? (i. e. an individual 



ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 15 



capacity for sensation in general?" 
No, in vain would sight, and motion, 
attempt to call up these images, unless 
as objects different from the mind, or 
object termed self, or simple capacity 
for general sensation, they were ready 
to appear in relation to those appro- 
priate methods for their introduction, 
(viz. motion and the use of the eye); 
which cannot gain any appearance of 
them, by only applying such methods 
as call upon the inward sentient prin- 
ciple, termed mind. The readiness, 
therefore, to appear when called for by the 
use of the organs of sense, mixed with 
the reasoning, that the organs of sense 
and mind being the same, a third set 
of objects is needed in order to deter- 
mine those perceptions in particular 
which are neither the organs of sense 
nor mind in general, forms together the 
familiar reason, (the superinduced sen- 
sation,) which yields to all, — infants, 
and peasants, as much as to wise men, 
the notion of the continual existence of 
objects unperceived. Interrupted sensa- 



16 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 

tions of mind, when the organs of sense 
are not used, are not ready to appear upon 
any irregular call of any power we are 
possessed of. But the mind is conscious 
of the interruptions of its sensations: 
therefore, the ultimate causes which exist 
ready and capable to renew them, must 
be uninterrupted causes, otherwise 
they would " begin their own existences ;" 
a proposition which has at large been 
proved in the former essay to be impos- 
sible, for any being, or any affection of 
being to be capable of. The more re- 
fined kinds of reasoning, I grant, lie 
not in the compass of thinking, of which 
ordinary minds are capable ; and as this 
essay is intended to explain the popular 
notion of all men, and to shew exactly 
what it is, and how far philosophy will 
support it, and how far dissent from it, 
so I shall chiefly dwell upon the me- 
thod nature takes with all men. And, 
therefore, I repeat, that men take notice 
from their earliest infancy, that the call 
of the organs of sense, and the use of 
motion, are related to things constantly 



OX CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE, 



17 



ready to appear in relation to them, and 
that the action of the organs of sense, 
and motion, have nothing to do with, and 
can gain nothing by applying themselves 
to that object they consider their minds. 
But this may easily be translated into 
philosophical language ; and resolves 
itself into the consideration, that that 
class of sensations, called the use of the 
senses, and motion, will by application 
however irregular to some sort of exist- 
ences, introduce the notice of them to 
the mind, and that these existences, 
being always ready to appear upon these 
irregular calls of the senses, and mo- 
tion, must continue to exist when not 
called upon, in order to be thus ready to 
appear. But the sensations in which 
they appear to the mind, are by con- 
sciousness known to be interrupted; 
therefore, the existences which are u?i- 
interrupted and continue to exist, and 
which are in relation to the senses and 
motion, do not continue to exist perceived 
by the mind, but continue to exist un- 
perceived by the mind. Moreover, the 



18 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 

capacity for sensation in general being 
given with the use of any particular 
organ of sense, certain perceptions be- 
longing to that sense do not arise ; there- 
fore, when these remain the same, and 
the perceptions in question do arise, 
they must be occasioned by unperceived 
causes affecting it, the existence of 
which causes is known, and is demon- 
strably proved by these their effects. 
These observations and reasonings when 
compounded together, give evidence for 
the continued and unperceived exist- 
ences which are in relation to the 
senses, as much as the exhibition of 
any simple sensation whatever affords 
an evidence of the existence of that 
new being in the universe, in which the 
sensation consists. For colour, sound, 
&c. may be considered as so many be- 
ings ; and every variety of them, as so 
many various beings, whose existence can- 
not be disputed, after a consciousness of 
their appearance to the mind. In like man- 
ner the relations of the simple sensations 
are equally true in their existence. 



ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 19 

The existence of the notion of four units 
is not more certain under the immediate 
consciousness of it, than all the relations 
that are included in that number ; and 
if in the examination of these relations, 
any negative ideas present themselves, 
these negations are upon the same footing 
also ; and as non-existences are proved 
not to exist, as much as positive ones are 
proved to exist. Now the only objec- 
tion that can be made to this reasoning, 
is the possibility of an imperfect or false 
view of the relations in question — and 
this I grant. But upon the supposition 
that the mind in this matter observes 
carefully enough the relation of its simple 
sensations, then the evidence for the 
existences which depend on them, is 
upon the same footing as are the simple 
sensations, and must render an equal 
confidence in it. 

Now all that is wanted for the argu- 
ment is to shew, that reason, (or the 
observation of the relation of our simple 
sensations,) does as a new sensation of 
the mind, give evidence of unperceived 



20 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 

existence, and therefore affords a solu- 
tion to the difficulty which appears to 
be in the question — Whence we know of 
any continued existence, when we can 
immediately know nothing but our sensa- 
tions, which are obviously only inter- 
rupted existences ? 

Section IT. 

1 . Several corollaries with the 'preceding statement 
— The association of the sensible qualities with 
the ideas of their unknown causes. 

2. The error of Dr. Reid and others in sepa- 
rating primary and secondary qualities. 

3. The error of Bishop Berkeley. 

4. Time, fyc. The near union of popular and phi- 
losophical notions on the subject. 

5. The nature of dreams, and the difference be- 
tween them and realities. 

6. The reality of a future life. 

7. The conclusion that the proportions and rela- 
tions of unperceived things are known from the 
relations of the corresponding sensations they 
create, and find a fit illustration in the nature of 
algebraic signs. 

1. Hence it arises first, that it is owing 
to the intimate union and association of 
the sensible impressions, with the ideas 



ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 21 

of their causes, that these causes, (or 
objects,) can never be contemplated, 
excepting under' the forms of those unions ; 
by which it comes to pass, that the 
whole union is considered in a popular 
way as existing unperceived : and it re- 
quires a philosophical examination to 
separate that natural junction of thought. 
This explains, I think, by an easier as 
well as truer method, than that of the 
"feigned imagination" to which Mr. 
Hume has recourse, whence it is, that 
colour, sound, &c. as well as extension 
and solidity ; i. e. all our perceptions of 
primary and secondary qualities, are 
thought to exist unperceived, when yet 
a perception certainly cannot exist unper- 
ceived, nor a sensation unfelt. It also 
explains why even philosophy does not 
readily give up the notion of the separate 
existence of primary sensible qualities 
unperceived ; for, first, it is too great a 
stress for the imagination to separate all 
sensible images from the ideas of their 
causes ; that which is left seems as 
nought, and the mind cannot bear that 



22 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 

vacuity of thought : and, secondly, a num- 
ber of arguments are lost, as men think, 
for Creation, for Deity, &c. which is really 
not the case ; and if with minds equally 
removed from unfounded fears on the 
one hand, and insidious intentions on 
the other, men would pursue logical 
deductions, and rise above the Weakness 
of keeping up a false philosophy in or- 
der to avoid the consequences of truth, 
they would come to clearer notions of all 
important truths, and establish them 
more firmly than they possibly can do, 
by the retention of any popular preju- 
dice, however it appears to favour them. 
Popular prejudice, it is true, leads 
frequently to a belief in those results, 
which reason, by different steps, may 
assure us to be correct. But the vicious 
mixture of philosophical analysis, with 
some erroneous notions, only gives birth 
to monstrous opinions ; the old and 
common habits of thought are disturbed 
by it ; the road, which before seemed 
so plain and direct, assumes a different 
appearance under the partial lights of a 



ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 23 

temporising philosophy, which are only 
sufficient to disclose the dangers through 
which we managed before to walk, 
blindly indeed, but with sufficient se- 
curity for every ordinary purpose of life. 

2. Dr. Reid's philosophy is not ex- 
empt from the fear alluded to, nor, in 
consequence, from error. It is the 
clearest and most logical reasoning pos- 
sible, as long as he descants upon the 
nature of the secondary qualities, " ob- 
serving, that the causes for them being 
named by the sensations they create, 
occasions an ambiguity of thought as 
well as of expression, and that the na- 
ture of the causes is wholly unknown in 
their unperceived state."* But he can- 
not regard the primary qualities as sub- 
ject to the same reasoning ; that there is 
an essential difference between them, for 
that the mind has clear conceptions of 
their external nature,^ and therefore he 

* Inquiry into the human mind, 
f Essay on the intellectual powers. 



24 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 

yields in an instant all that would render 
his philosophy most valuable, by those 
contradictions which would endeavour 
to show, that extension, figure, hard- 
ness, softness, i. e. all primary qualities 
may be known distinctly as they exist 
when unperceived ; that these percep- 
tions are suggested by sensations; but that 
the perceptions themselves are not sen- 
sations, and though clearly " conceived of ]" 
"do not resemble any sensation whatever;" 
thus making the perception of primary 
qualities in their independant state, to be 
the result of the sensations which those 
primary qualities convey to the mind, 
whilst the perception itself is not a sensation 
of mind : — Considering perception of visible 
figure, to be capable of existing without 
such conscious vision being either an 
idea, impression, or sensation ; conceiving it 
possible, " immediately and objectively,'" to 
perceive extension, hardness, figure, &c. 
when yet the organs of sense are to be used 
as a means of perception, and by whose 
use, and in whose conscious living feel- 
ing, there must be a modification of the 



ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 25 

objects, which must at least add some- 
thing unto them, or in some way alter 
them from the state in which they were, 
when existing unperceived ; overlooking 
entirely a certain fact in his appeal to 
the notions of the vulgar, concerning 
their immediately seeing " the real sun 
and rnoon," (and not an image, impres- 
sion, or idea of those objects,) namely, 
that the sun being blotted from the universe, 
would still be seen eight minutes after its 
destruction. 

3. Hence may be seen the error of 
Bishop Berkeley, who perceiving that 
the sensations of qualities, (commonly 
termed sensible qualities,) could not ex- 
ist unfelt, concluded that " nothing ma- 
terial could exist unfelt" so that " all the 
"furniture of heaven and earth were no- 
* ' thing without a mind ; " and as his follow- 
ers conceive after him when they say, 
"Time is nothing" "extension nothing, 
solidity and space equally nothing /" That 
such propositions are professed is not 
a fancy, for 1 have heard the notions 

c 



26 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 

maintained in the conversations of the 
day, especially with regard to time, 
which as it was concluded to be only a 
quality in reference to a perception of 
mind, so it could not, (it was contended,) 
be a measure, adequate to the allotment 
of any peculiar portion of existence, as 
necessary to the attainment of certain 
ends ; such as the possibility of the 
events of a long life taking place in the 
short space of a moment, of that twink- 
ling of an eye, in which the eastern 
prince, with his head beneath the water, 

COULD MARRY, AND BECOME THE 
FATHER OF A NUMEROUS FAMILY. 

I have heard it maintained by able 
men, that this Arabian fable is strictly 
philosophical ; and in consequence of 
such contradictory ideas, it is supposed 
proved, that the author of it perfectly 
understood, in that early age, the nature 
of time, to be what these philosophers 
consider it, a mere succession of ideas in 
a mind* 

* Bishop Berkeley's doctrine will be spoken of 
afterwards. 



ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 27 

4. Hence may be seen, that the popu- 
lar and philosophical notions nearly 
meet, for there must be a cause for every 
effect, and therefore continually existing 
causes for all the qualities ready to ap- 
pear to the mind, upon the call of the 
organs of sense and motion ; and these 
causes must have the same proportions, 
in relation to each other among themselves, 
as the effects have to each other ; for the 
senses and mind, (or powers adequate to 
sensation in general,) being the same, 
the cause for the sense of extension can- 
not be the same as for the conception 
of inextension. The sense and mind 
being the same, the cause for a long 
period of time, cannot be the same with 
the cause for a short period of time ; and 
time must be capable of being measured 
externally to the mind, by whatever 
could measure equality, such as the 
beat of a pendulum, &c. ; and such a 
measure in relation to other things, than 
the succession of ideas, would measure 
off what portions of it were necessary to 
the existence of those things, in their 

c 2 



28 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 

formation and continuance, whether 
animate or inanimate ; and even were 
there no creatures in existence, still this 
capacity of admeasurement must exist as 
a possible quality, capacity, or object in 
nature. Thus the existence of time, like 
every other existence in nature, is per- 
ceived by some quality it determines to 
the mind, but has not its whole exist- 
ence merely in that individual perception. 
It is the existence of things, and there- 
fore of time, which enables them to be 
perceived, not the perception of them 
which enables them to exist. Never- 
theless, it is the latter most absurd and 
contrary proposition, (namely, that in 
the perception of objects their existence 
is contained,) which is the basis of a 
modern philosophy ; which, however 
contradictory even in its grammatical 
statement, does not seem likely to be 
overturned by observation and detection 
at the present day. The very words, 
perception of a thing, state a relation be- 
tween two existences : whereas our 
modern philosophers consider one exist- 



ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 29 

ence as created in that relation, which 
truly is a contradiction in terms ; and 
one which Dr. Reid taking notice of, 
felt thereby an offence offered to his 
common sense; and one which he knew 
would have the same effect upon the 
minds of others, although he did not 
succeed in detecting the fallacy by 
which such offence was given. 

5. It may here be seen, whence it is 
that in dreams, we mistake the qualities 
which present themselves for the qualities 
belonging to the continuously existing ob- 
jects of sense — it is because they are com- 
bined in the same forms in which they 
appear in a waking hour ; but on account 
of our ignorance of remaining in the 
same place during the time of the dream, 
the relation of place is wanting to enable 
us to correct the false inferences from 
these vivacious imaginations, and view 
them in their true character. They are 
considered therefore as owing their ex- 
istences to causes, which will respond to 
every future call of the senses, A waking 



30 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 

moment shews, that on account of our 
being in the same place during the time of 
the dream, these objects will not be able 
to fulfil their whole definitions; i. e. be 
ready to appear upon the irregular call of 
the senses, or be taken notice of by more 
minds than one, &c. ; and therefore are 
not the same objects which thus appear, 
are not the objects of sense, but of 
the imagination. The circumstance of 
objects fulfilling their definitions, or not, 
is what renders them real, or the con- 
trary. It is not on account of the su- 
perior order, variety, and force in which 
they appear to the mind, as Berkeley 
and Hume contend to be the case ; for a 
real object is that which comprehends 
all the qualities for which its name 
stands. And dreams do not present 
real things, because they cannot answer 
all the qualities expected of them after 
waking. Now because we perceive, 
when awake, that sensible qualities are 
no more than one set of the conjoined 
effects flowing from exterior objects, 
which when meeting with various other cir- 



ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 31 

cumstances, are known to be capable of 
determining the remainder of their qua- 
lities ; we therefore refer them to such 
compound objects as their causes, and 
as capable of their further effects ; and 
this reasoning is the step the mind takes 
in arguing from the present sensible 
qualities of things to their future proper- 
ties, and that which Hume eagerly en- 
quires after,* denying the possibility of 
finding it. 

It is not as Mr. Hume says, in the 
case of bread, that the sensible qualities 
of its colour and consistency lead us im- 
mediately to expect nourishment, or are 
its causes ; sensible qualities are effects, 
and are always considered as such, and 
antecede, no doubt, other effects, which 
invariably follow, when the exterior 
causes and objects are put in action to 
that end.')' In dreams and insanities, 
&c. this reference is made by the mind ; 

* See Hume's Essays. 

f See Essay on cause and effect, p. 121. Short 
Essay, " Sensible Qualities," &c. of this publication. 



32 OX CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 

tor the sensible appearing qualities, the 
vivacious images of things, are considered 
to be what they usually are, in a waking 
state : i. e. one set of the effects which are 
determined by compound objects, equal to 
fulfilling the remainder of their defini- 
nitions, and therefore real, or usual ob- 
jects, for which certain names hrst stood. 
At the moment of waking, the under- 
standing regains its ascendency ; and, 
perceiving that during the time of the 
dream, the mind had only been in one 
place, it justly concludes, that therefore 
the vivacious perceptions of sensible qua- 
lities could not be .similar effects from 
similar objects or causes, but partial 
effects from partial causes, and therefore 
must necessarily be mere delusions. 
Wherefore new sets of sensible qualities, 
which rush in upon the mind, are also 
justly considered to be the true effects 
from real, usual, continually existing 
things, which now shall be capable of 
fulfilling their whole definitions ; for they 
do not appear to lie open to any objec- 
tion to the contrary, whilst also the 



ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 33 

superior accuracy of the whole sensations, 
when compared with the former ones, 
gives the mind immediate security. 

And if in any other state of being than 
this, all our knowledge of outward and 
independant things could be proved to 
have arisen only from an action of the 
brain, and so this life should be shewn 
to have been but a waking dream, (i. e. 
the perceptions to have been in relation 
to other causes than those imagined,} 
still whatsoever should renew the me- 
mory of past life, with the then present 
sense, would continue the notion of our 
own continuous existence, although we 
might require further proof than what 
we had enjoyed for the assurance of 
the existence of other beings than 
ourselves. But I can conceive no me- 
thod possible of conveying the assur- 
ances of other existences besides our- 
selves, than such as is analogous 
to what we enjoy ; for such assur- 
ances must come through some means, 
some notions in the soul, some reason- 
ings, some probabilities. And if we will 

c 5 



34 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 

always say, the notions are the things, 
and the things separate from the notions 
are not proved, it appears to me to ex- 
clude the possibility of proof upon the 
subject; for I hardly can conceive how 
the Deity himself, in granting proofs to 
us finite creatures, can go beyond afford- 
ing us such sensations, and such relations 
of sensations, as are capable of the in- 
ference, that " in order to support the phe- 
nomena, there must needs be other continuous 
existences than ourselves ;" and that there 
must necessarily be continually existing 
causes, for every variety of sensation, which 
continues either to exist or to appear. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that objects are 
real, or the contrary, independantly of 
any speculations concerning the cause of 
our perceptions; they are real, if they 
fulfil the whole qualities for which their 
names first stood — those are delusions, 
which fall short of this, but which, on 
account of their first appearances, are 
taken to be the present qualities of such 
objects, as will realize all the others, 
upon trial : whilst the mind is in that 



ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 35 

state which prevents it from detecting 
the fallacy, by perceiving the circum- 
stances are such, that it is utterly im- 
possible they can be the original objects 
for which certain names were originally 
formed. In dreams, we detect these 
circumstances on waking — in madness, 
after recovery. 

Now the qualities wanting for the 
proper definitions of the objects, the ab- 
sence of which prevents their being 
continued, and external existences, may 
be many ; but the chief one is, that 
those objects called other men, do 
not testify to their existence ; therefore 
they do not fulfil the quality of out- 
wardness, or the capacity of being 
taken notice of by more than the per- 
ception of one mind; and therefore these 
cannot be the same kind of objects as 
those deemed real, because they do not 
possess all the qualities expected of 
them. 

6. Sixthly, in religion, those notions 
which either alarm or console, are real, 



36 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 

or the contrary, according to their capa- 
city of fulfilling their definitions, and 
can only be proved so, when a future life 
shall come ; because it is not enough to 
prove them false, that their birth and 
decay, the vigour, or faintness, depends 
upon the organization and action of the 
brain. The action of the brain is the 
exponent of the powers of the soul ; 
but every sensation of the soul is in it- 
self simple ; and whatever in futurity 
shall be sufficient to unite memory with 
the then present sense, will render reality 
of objects to its contemplation. It is of 
no consequence what are the signs of 
our ideas, or what ideas are the signs of 
objects, provided they fulfil the qualities 
for which their signs stand. The point- 
ing of the compass is not itself the north 
in the heavens, yet we know which way 
to steer the, ship; and there is a real 
north if upon the wide ocean, (notwith- 
standing the inadequacy of our ideas 
upon the subject,) we have so guided 
our vessel as to find ourselves at last 
" at the heaven where we would be.' 



ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 37 

Thus if our notions here shall lead 
us to a state of happiness hereafter, it 
is immaterial whether the action of the 
brain is partly the cause of our notions ; 
or whether the future happiness shall be 
inspired without a brain. 

The objects are real, if they either 
fulfil the positive hopes of virtuous 
minds ; or inspire happiness by ways, 
" such as the heart of man cannot con- 
ceive." 

7. It may therefore be concluded, in 
contradiction to the idealists, who say, 
that we can have no notions but of our 
sensations or perceptions, and that exte- 
rior objects not being sensations, we can 
therefore have no notions of them ; that 
by our sensations, (i. e. by our reasonings, 
which are a certain set of sensations,) we 
do have the notions of existences or objects, 
which are unperceived or unfelt — nay, 
we can have the notions of things which 
have it not in their capacity to yield a 
sensation ; such as of sound sleep and 
death, neither of which was ever felt by 



38 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 

any one ; yet the meaning of which we 
perfectly understand, by the negative 
ideas which stand as their signs, and by 
the words which stand as the signs of 
those ideas. And although it be true, 
that " nothing can be like a sensation but 
a sensation ;" yet by perceiving that ob- 
jects unperceived cannot be like perceived 
objects, by that very notion we do predicate 
something concerning unperceived objects ; 
and concerning our knowledge of them in 
their unperceived state ; viz. that they are 
not similar to our perceptions. And this 
knowledge arises from a reflection, which 
reflection is itself a sensation : and thus 
it may be hereby seen that the whole of 
our sensations does include our know- 
ledge of continuous existences, which 
are unperceived. For all our ideas are as 
algebraic signs, which give evidence both 
of their own existence, and the quantities 
also signified; whose proportions among 
themselves are known thereby, as well as 
their positive values. 



39 



CHAPTER II. 

ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

Section I. 

1. Knowledge of external existence, how gained, 8fc. 

2. The nature and differences of external objects, 
how known ? 

3. Varieties in the sensations, which are effects, 
prove their causes proportionally various, fyc. 

L We now enter upon the second 
part of the question proposed, viz. 

Whence is it that a judgment is formed 
by the mind, that some of its sensations 
or perceptions are exterior to, instead of 
included in the mind, when it is manifest 
that sensations are and can be only in 
the mind — as for instance, a coloured, 
figured, and extended object, is con- 
sidered, by the generality of mankind, to 
continue to exist after being perceived, 
(although it should be obliterated from 



40 OX EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

the memory, or left at a great distance,) 
in its coloured, figured, and extended 
state — although its colour, figure, and 
extension be perceptions, and perception 
be the affection of a sentient being? 

I answer as before, that by reason 
the mind judges that the causes of those 
sensations in particular, which come 
under the definition of external objects, 
must needs be out of, and distinct from 
the mind, or the cause of sensation in 
general ; for the notion of outward exist- 
ence does not suit the definition given to 
inward existence : Inward existence is the 
capacity for sensation in general; outward 
existence is the exciting cause for some 
sensation in particular. The one is the 
very mind itself, or the power of thought 
and feeling; the other is a motive, or 
cause for a 'particular kind of it, and 
therefore out of, and distinct from, the 
continually existing essence of it. That is 
inward existence, of which the individual 
only is conscious ; that is outward, which 
is in relation to the organs of sense, 
and to motion, in order to be apprehended, 



ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 41 

and must be met by them before it 
becomes inward; and which is so situ- 
ated as to meet the organs of sense, and 
reply to the motion of others, (others 
being supposed possible,) as well as our 
own. But the peculiar sensations which 
outward existences can create as their 
effects, are the only forms under which 
the mind can contemplate them in ab- 
sence, or expect their reappearance after 
separation ; which circumstance forms so 
strong and indissoluble a connexion, or as- 
sociation, between the ideas of the causes 
and their effects, that they cannot be easily 
disjoined from the fancy ; and never are 
disjoined until philosophy brings in some 
new light; shewing, that "perceptions 
can only be in a perceiving mind," &c. ; 
then an effort is made by the mind ; 
and it readily allows, that colour, 
warmth, &c. i. e. the secondary qualities 
of bodies, cannot be outward', and for 
the most part, goes on to a false conclu- 
sion, that all for which those words 
stand must be only in the mind ; where- 
as, there must be causes for them, and 



42 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

for every variety of them, exterior to the 
mind's essence; and though when unfelt, 
or unperceived, not like their sensations, 
or perceptions ; yet incapable of being 
conceived of, except under the images 
of sensations, and as named by the 
names given to these appearances. For 
that which we call ourselves, and that 
which forms any individual mind, is a 
continued capacity in nature, which 
yields a liability to sensation in general. 
Then those we justly deem inward ob- 
jects of thought, which are such, as give 
no symptoms of being the qualities of 
continued existences, capable of yielding 
the same images to other minds than our 
own, (such being supposed ;) and those 
are outward objects, which, having nothing 
in common with the capacity to sensa- 
tion in general, must be out of, and not 
included in it.* 

* All these merely consist in being successive 
effects; successive consciousnesses, which are but 
changes resulting from prior and unconscious ob- 
jects, uniting their qualities with those necessary 
for sensation, in order to their formation — for inas- 



ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 43 

Inward thoughts are also beings, 
which when not thought of, and not 
contained in any given state of the mind, 
are nought ; but continually existing 

much as the changes, must be changes on that 
which continues to exist, (for any sensation passed 
into oblivion cannot be changed,) so continuous 
existence is known by inference, not by sensation ; 
for every sensation passes away, and another is 
created — but none of these, in its turn, could "be- 
gin its own existence ;" therefore they all are but 
changes upon the existences which are already in 
being — they are effects requiring causes. But as 
each mind could not change, unless interfered with, 
therefore the interfering object is exterior to the 
mind: — I have subjoined this remark, since writing 
the above, on account of having met with M. de 
Condilliac's et Traite des Sensations," which is at 
once, one of the most profound and poetic produc- 
tions. Nevertheless, I consider his argument as 
not supporting his conclusions — for he supposes, 
that during the period in which the statue contem- 
plates the first and most simple impressions arising 
from successive and various ideas, that the notion 
of self will be generated from the perception of the 
memory of successive scents merely. Now if the 
statue considered self to exist in any memory, 
or in any sensation merely, he would consider 
self to be capable of being annihilated, and again 



44 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

causes, ready to appear, upon the appli- 
cation of the organs of sense, efficient 
to the production of certain sensations 
in particular, when operating upon the 
capacity for sensation in general, are out 
of, and distinct from, that is to say, not 
included in that capacity. 

If a mirror were conscious, then it 
might know of its own constant exist- 
ence, as separate from the objects 
brought for reflection on its surface ; 
and by comparing the method and order, 
the appearance and re-appearance, &c. 
of the rays on its surface, might under- 
stand well enough, whether or not, they 
belonged to continuous outward existences; 
although it might argue, that it knew of 
nothing but of incident and reflected rays ; 
and that incident and reflected rays, 

beginning of itself ; which would appear to it a con- 
tradiction — for whenever it became capable of 
reflecting on its sensations, it would consider self 
as continuing to exist, and not to vanish for one 
single moment during whatever change might arise, 
and therefore as an existence independant of each 
scent in particular, and so not included in odour 
in general. 



ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 45 

were not continued outward existences. 
The primary qualites, are subject to the 
same reasoning as those which are se- 
condary ; and cannot be like the sensa- 
tions their causes create. Every sen- 
sation of mind whatever is an effect, 
and may be considered as a quality. 
It begins to be, and its cause which is 
not a sensation cannot be like it, and 
yet can only be conceived of under the 
image it creates as its effect, whilst the 
cause and effect being united by the 
mind, the compound is named as one 
object by one name. 

Is it matter of surprise, therefore, 
that a coloured, figured, extended ob- 
ject, is considered as existing out- 
wardly ; when the continually existing 
causes, which are " ready to appear" to 
the mind, under these forms, must in 
order to account for certain existing 
phoenomena, be judged to exist out- 
wardly ? Is it matter of surprise when 
the mind discovers, that although the 
effects cannot exist outwardly, yet the 
causes must, that it should be so startled 



46 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

at the discovery as not to know how 
to settle and arrange its belief on the 
subject, and is filled with a thousand 
fears concerning the consequences of 
it? Hence various and inconsistent 
theories all supported by names of au- 
thority. 

Thus some philosophers make God 
create all the images at the moment they 
appear in every mind.* Others conceive 
there is a pre-established harmony be- 
tween the qualities of the external ob- 
ject, and our inward perception of it?f 
One considers the sensations arising 
from some of the senses, to exist out- 
wardly ; but not those of others, arising 
from the rest of the senses. J 

Another gives up all outward exist- 
ence whatever of objects and quali- 
ties. § And some suppose that if there 
be such things, that unless they be like 
our sensations, they are not worth talk- 
ing about. || 

* Malebranche. f Leibnitz. 

X Reid. § Berkeley. 

II Hume. 



ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 47 

Whereas it is evident, that in order 
to the formation of all the effects pro- 
duced on the mind, through the senses, 
there must be efficient causes, not in- 
cluded in the general essence of the mind ; 
and these are " ever ready to appear" 
and that in so clear, vigorous, and uni- 
form a method, and fashion, as to the 
appearances of figure, colour, and resist- 
ance; or of sound, and taste; or of 
beauty, and deformity; or of warmth, 
and cold; or of happiness, and misery ; 
or of vice, and virtue; that whatever 
they may be, however unknown, they 
may well be termed objects, outward ob- 
jects, which the organs of sense, and 
their associations reveal, according to 
their peculiar bearings upon the mind. 
I repeat it, therefore, that the unknown 
causes of all our perceptions, are as the 
unknown quantities in algebra, which 
yet may be measured, valued, reasoned 
on by their signs ; and the signs of 
these outward objects are the sensations 
they can create ; and they may always 
be spoken of, and compared together, 



48 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

as though they did truly exist, in these 
forms in which they appear to the mind. 
For as the power of sensation is simple, 
and yet its kinds and degrees various, 
when the kinds and degrees relate to 
outward continually existing objects, fitted 
to create them, they may be compared 
in their bearings to each other, under 
the " ideas and sensations" they appear 
to the mind. Thus while the sentient 
principle observes scarlet, and blue ; 
these two colours may be compared 
together as existences. Empty space, 
and solid extension, are two sensations, 
whose causes must have a proportional 
variety, and may, therefore, as outward 
beings, be examined as space, and so- 
lidity. The same with every other 
essence in nature ; for the organs of 
sense and the mind being always the 
same ingredients thrown into the com- 
pound qualities presented to it, these 
varieties may be argued on as they 
appear, and are known to us when joined 
with them. The senses and mind, also, 
may be considered as measures of the 



ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 49 

proportions of exterior objects, and the 
measures being always the same, and 
the quantities and proportions being- 
considered as measured, the faculties 
need not be strained to conceive of them 
still as unmeasured. Thus it may be 
seen the notions of the vulgar are not 
so far removed from truth as it is sup- 
posed. All men consider objects, as 
continually existing outward beings, ap- 
pearing to the mind through the senses. 
Their only error is, their considering 
them to exist outwardly under the in- 
ward forms of the " ideas and sensa- 
tions" they create, through the strength 
of the associations. 

Section II. 

The notion of exteriority further considered. What 
the phenomena are which generate the idea of 
external existence. 

But we must examine a little further 
in what consists the notion of outward- 
ness, how it is generated, and what 
are those phenomena, which make us 

D 



50 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

conclude, that the continually existing 
causes of our sensations are outward, 
and not included in that object whose 
definition we name mind ? Now, I ob- 
serve, that having the word " outward" 
we must have the ideas the word stands 
for; and the ideas are negative ones. 
For outward existence means, existence 
not contained in the mind ; and nega- 
tions of being in any circumstance, 
when the relations of existing things 
will not admit of the existence of the 
being in question, are proved as a conse- 
quence from these relations, as much as 
the affirmations of the existence of be- 
ings, are proved on account of other re- 
lations. The sum, or consequence of 
5 plus 5, is in the place of the units ; 
to shew there are no units expected in 
their place ; and the idea of " no being," 
conducts our expectations aright with 
respect to the total sum ; and the mark 
the zero, conducts our ideas aright 
respecting the particular difference, be- 
tween this and any other number. In 
like manner, from the phenomena it is 



ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 51 

judged, that the continually existing 
causes of those sensations called ob- 
jects, are not in the mind, and so must 
be out of it. But this piece of rea- 
soning to justify the phenomena, is an in- 
ward sensation, which testifies of the 
existence of those things which are not 
sensations, viz. " outward beings." 



Section III. 

The notion of exteriority further considered. The 
phenomena which generate the idea of outward- 
ness. 

1. The consciousness of sensation being uninter- 
rupted. 

2. The comparison of motion with a state of rest. 

3. That tangible objects are beyond the limit of the 
skin of the body. 

4. Exteriority as a sensation itself requires a cause 
of which it is the effect — observations on Berke- 
ley, Reid — the application of the doctrine of 
cause and effect. 

1. But what are the phenomena al- 
luded to, which require outward exist- 
ence in order to explain them 1 

d 2 



52 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

First, the consciousness before spoken 
of, concerning the interruption in fact of 
all the sensations of the mind, and yet 
the necessity there should be some conti- 
nually existing causes, ready to renew them ; 
(else they would begin of themselves ;) 
and which must, therefore, be external 
to each sensation in particular, and its 
cause.* 

For although the images produced in 
a certain associated train, which do not 
require in order to their exhibition the 
use of the organs of sense, we deem in 
the mind, and present to the mind 
during their exhibition ; yet the causes 
of each of these previous to their ex- 
hibition, are as much exterior to the 
sensations themselves, and to the capa- 
city of sensation in general, as are the 
causes of sensible qualities, previous to 
the sensation of sensible qualities. All 
things not in any given state of sensa- 



* It may be perceived that the notion of exter- 
nality is not an hypothesis merely as Priestley sup- 
poses, but is a conclusion the result of reasoning. 



ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 53 

tion of mind, but capable of having 
their appearances determined there, 
must truly have their causes exterior 
to each sensation in particular, and to 
every cause which may be necessary 
and efficient to each particular differ- 
ence. 

The question, therefore, concerning 
the reality of things, if put rigidly, 
should be : — With respect to those things 
which are out of the mind's conscious- 
ness, whence is the proof of the con- 
tinual rather than of the external exist- 
ence of the objects, which are in rela- 
tion to the five organs of sense ? 

For the causes of the determination 
of the illusions of dreams, &c. are out 
of the mind, but they do not continue to 
exist ; nor after an orderly and regular 
manner remain ready to reply upon the 
application of any regular instruments 
whatever. 

Now the organs of sense, (although 
these powers should be considered as 
merely a class of particular sensations,) 
yet are the causes of introducing these 



54 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

objects, which consciousness acquaints 
us were previously not present to, and 
in the mind. Also these externally 
existing objects are the same upon com- 
parison, as those which must conti- 
nually exist on account of their regular 
reply to the irregular calls of the organs 
of sense, and thus are justly regarded 
as continually existing outward objects, 
ready to appear and to be introduced by 
the organs of sense to the perception of the 
mind. Inasmuch also, as the organs of 
sense themselves are ready upon the 
call of the mind to act as such causes, 
so are they regarded as continuous 
existences, and justly and reasonably 
are so regarded ; and although their 
immediate action be perceived, yet they 
are known necessarily to continue to 
exist unperceived, as instruments fitted 
to their office, and ready to answer the 
demands of the mind. So that the 
whole reasoning of the first chapter in 
behalf of continuous unperceived exist- 
ences affords a like proof in behalf of 
the continuity of the existence of the 



ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 55 

organs of sense themselves ; and so 
does the reasoning of this chapter in 
behalf of their exteriority. 

The organs of sense are by all au- 
thors spoken of in a very vague 
manner, and their external, continued, 
and independant existence taken for 
granted.* 

Berkeley speaks of the " senses" in 
the popular use of that word, and em- 
ploys it very conveniently, in a man- 
ner calculated to support a theory 
contrary to his own ; for it is neces- 
sary, indeed, in order to support 
any theory whatever, to consider them 
as something more than either " im- 
pressions or ideas ;" or " ideas and sen- 
sations in a mind perceiving them;" for 
although their action be perceived, yet it 
is not in this consciousness that they 
exist as instruments of sense or by 
which they act as causes. It is not 
the feeling as if we were using the eye 
which gives vision. It is the eye as a 
mechanical instrument in relation to con- 
* See Essay VI. 



56 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

tinually existing external objects. The 
same with respect to the rest of the 
organs of sense as well as motion. It 
is not the sensible qualities of any thing 
which can be causes.* The sensible 
qualities are always effects in the mind, 
and cannot, therefore, stand out again, 
and intermix with other objects as na- 
tural causes ; and if it should be asked, 
whence the mind knows itself to be ex- 
terior to each sensation in particular, 
and continued in its existence, I an- 
swer from the same principle which 
enables it to judge other things as 
exterior to itself; namely, from that 
perception of the understanding which 
forces upon it the conclusion, that be- 
cause each sensation in its turn va- 
nishes, and new changes spring up, so 
there must necessarily be some conti- 
nued existence the subject matter of 
these changes ; otherwise, " each change 
would begin of itself.'" 

Therefore the mind must be a conti- 
nued and exterior capacity fitted to each 

* See Essay IV. 



ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 57 

change, upon any present state being 
interfered with by another object; and 
thus the pronoun / is ever abstract : and 
stands for a being exterior to, and in- 
dependant of all the changes of which 
it is conscious. 

Now the mind always referring the 
sensible action of any sense, to the me- 
chanical action of its respective organ, 
(as an effect to its cause), and consi- 
dering this mechanical action as exist- 
ing in relation to those other objects, or 
causes, which are likewise needful to 
introduce the ideas of sensible qualities 
into the mind, does thereby truly per- 
ceive and detect the presence of such 
other objects as are external to, and 
independant of mind in general. 

It is thus by a union of observation 
and reason, coalescing with the con- 
scious use of the senses, that we are 
enabled justly to affirm, that " outward 
objects are perceived immediately by 
sense." 

Secondly, I consider another (and 
that perhaps the chief) method which 

d5 



58 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

nature takes to impress the notion of 
outwardness, to be by means of motion. 
For the intimate sentiment of our own 
existence, separated from the ideas of 
our bodies, (which idea of body, again 
includes the idea of motion along its 
surface from point to point), has no re- 
lation to space, or place ; thought, sensa- 
tion merely, never suggests the occupation 
of space as essential to its existence ; 
the need of room, or of the distinction 
of here and there. A dead body and a 
living one, take up the same portion of 
space. But the very impression of mo- 
tion consists in the impression of pass- 
ing through extended space, and as a 
corollary with it suggests to the mind, 
here, and there ; and whilst the mind re- 
quires no place, nor space, to comprehend 
it, the sensation of passing through 
different points of space, suggests the 
notion, or rather inspires the immediate 
feeling of the extension of space, (or of 
an unresisting medium,) but never that 
of the extension of the sentient principle, 
the self This space or unresisting me- 



ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 59 

dium appears continually to exist, and 
to respond regularly to motion, as other 
objects do to other senses.* It is hence 
the immediate consequence of motion 
also to suggest the corollary that must 
be included in its essence, that is, the 
reality of distance or outwardness from 
the sentient being, the self; which has 
an equal relation to rest, and motion; 
and, therefore, knows of outward exist- 
ence, as it does of continued existence, by 
a piece of reasoning ; viz. that it needs 
must be in order to justify the possi- 
bility of motion when in a state of rest, 
as well as regularly to respond to its ac- 
tion upon demand. 

Therefore, the soul has the idea (or 
conclusion from reasoning) of distance, 
mixed with the sensible impression of 
rest; which mixture gives occasion to 
that just result and consequence, the 
notion of outward and inward existence. 

* Kant imagines time and space to be only modes 
of the mind, which is mistaking the causes which 
determine a mode of the mind with the effect, viz. 
the mode of the mind. 



60 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

Moreover, motion introduces sensations 
of touch concerning objects, only seen 
when at rest, and which are the same 
as those which " continually exist ready 
to appear upon the irregular call of the 
senses." 

But it must be observed further, that 
the cause of motion, or unperceived 
motion, is the essence of what motion 
is in nature ; and in its unperceived 
state, we know that it cannot be like its 
effect, a perception ; all we know is, 
that it is in its unperceived state, in 
which it must act as a cause, and that 
the perception of it must be an effect, 
and owe its existence to a prior cause ; 
because it is a dependant being, and be- 
gins to be, even when wwrelated to us ; 
for we know our sensation of it does not 
cause it, therefore, something else does. 
I shall here observe, once for all, that 
all sensations, and all their varieties, 
must have causes or objects in nature 
as various as themselves which are the 
effects of those causes, or the qualities 
they occasion to the mind's perception. 



ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 61 

Contrary qualities also must have con- 
trary causes. Thus the cause for mo- 
tion cannot be the same as that for 
rest ; nor for one place, (whatever 
place may be,) as that for a different 
place. 

Now the names for the qualities, may 
indifferently be applied to the causes, or 
external objects, or to the effects the in- 
ward perceptions ; or to both together, as 
compound beings. It is in the latter 
sense they are always popularly applied, 
and on account of which circumstance 
there has been so much confusion in the 
minds of philosophers upon the sub- 
ject. Especially as it seems to me in 
that of Dr. Reid. 

It is, however, unavoidable that it 
should be so ; for it is impossible to 
name unknown things so well by any 
other names, as by those given to their 
constant and invariable manifestation. 
The constant junction of the unknown 
causes, and their known effects, forms the 
reason why the compound is supposed 
to be placed externally, and distant from 



62 OX EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

the mind, as well as supposed conti- 
nually to exist ; and in that compound 
state, "to be readytobe called upon;" — 
which, although the whole world should 
think it, cannot in nature be the case. 
For objects are minus the senses and 
mind, and cannot be the same with 
that state, or sum, in which they exist 
when plus the senses and mind. 

Thirdly, The notion of outwardness is 
gained by the observation, that the 
causes of such sensations, as require 
the use of the organs of sense in order 
to let their specific impressions enter 
the mind, are out of, (i. e. not included 
in,) the definitions and limitations of our 
own bodies : and we consider that as 
our own body, which is within a bound, 
or certain limit, and is the source of 
conscious pleasure and pain, and this 
limit we call the skin, within which, is 
contained all we call ourselves, and being 
summed up, is the notion of the con- 
scious sensation of the extension of the 
body, and of a sufficient cause for life 
and sensation in general. Because 



ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 63 

without any impression from what are 
called external things, or the use of the 
organs of sense, the general sensation of 
life can go on. But for 'particular kinds 
of sensation the organs of sense are to 
be used ; which organs are in relation 
to things that appear beyond the skin of 
the body, and which also require motion, 
in order to apprehend their tangibility. 
Now if the mind does not here reason 
amiss, this method which nature takes 
to impress the notion of outwardness, 
also contains a proof of its reality. 
For if a certain number of amassed 
causes are sufficient for a portion of 
sinsation in general, (say a mere sense 
of life,) and some other causes are 
wanted in order to excite particular 
definite kinds of it, then these become 
independant of each other ; and the 
use of the organs of sense and the me- 
chanical action of motion, being requi- 
site to enable them to intermix with 
each other, are such circumstances as 
place them in that relation to each other, 
as may be deemed distance. For it 



64 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

must be ever remembered that words are 
arbitrary, and we may name distinct 
classes of sensations and their causes, and 
the apparent limit of their causes, by any 
name we please ; and they can be no- 
thing else but what we do so name them ; 
and such we may say shall be called 
inward, and such other outward exist- 
ence. Then the whole mass properly 
put together again, (after all this excru- 
ciating analysis,) becomes our own, and 
other existences. It is owing to this 
circumstance of the causes of particular 
sensations being considered outward, 
that we look to them as capable of being 
useful or hurtful to us ; that for in- 
stance, we consider there is a quality 
in water by which we may be drowned, 
instead of considering drowning, as only 
a sensation of mind, (a necessary con- 
sequence of an unmodified ideal system,) 
whilst the perception of the mind by 
which it fails not to take notice that it 
can continue to exist, although this qua- 
lity for drowning, which is a quality 
tending to death, still continues to exist 






ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 65 

in water, (ready to appear, if called 
upon,) proves that the causes or objects 
of these two existences must be external 
to each other. 

Fourthly. Also outwardness is repre- 
sented in the mind as a sensation, (a 
perception of a quality,) which as a 
capacity in nature, admits of motion, 
through an unresisting medium, towards 
objects at a distance; and a power of 
seeing this medium, by the difference of 
its colouring in comparison of those ob- 
jects. In this sense, it is a quality 
common to all continually existing ob- 
jects ; and although the inward sense 
o£ it be a sensation, yet it must have 
its cause ; and if it regularly return up- 
on the senses as other qualities do, 
must be concluded also like them " con- 
tinually to exist " Moreover, things must 
appear to the judgment and the senses 
as outward, although inwardly conceived 
of, and that in respect both of pri- 
mary and secondary qualities ; because, 
when unperceived, the proportions and 
relations of things, must have their own 



66 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

position to each other ; and these, when 
meeting with a sentient nature, must 
inspire the sensation of proportional po- 
sitions. Now the limit of the conscious 
feelings of pleasure and pain, marked 
out by what is termed the skin of the 
body, will be taken as a centre, or at 
least as a certain defined point or stand- 
ard to which other things will foe re- 
ferred ; for the sentient nature itself 
must, in the perception or imagination 
of its own existence, become one of the 
objects it surveys ; thus forming an in- 
ward perceived knowledge of the relative 
position of unperceived things. And 
when the unperceived cause of a certain 
quality called extension, is combined 
with another for hardness, a third for 
colour, a fourth for sound, a fifth for a 
certain relation deemed distance, in re- 
spect to the combined causes, for other 
masses of extension, figure, hardness, 
and colour ; a sixth, for a different degree 
of distance, to what we deem or term 
our own body : it necessarily follows, 
that all qualities of continually existing 



ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 67 

objects, taken notice of by the senses, 
must be perceived outwardly, i. e. com- 
bined together in select masses, sur- 
rounded by that common quality called 
outwardness, which quality continues 
to exist, extern ally to the capacity of sen- 
sation in general. Now I repeat there is 
one sense in which it may be said that ob- 
jects are perceived immediately, as ex- 
isting outwardly, by the senses. It is this ; 
the conscious powers of the understanding, 
and the senses, are blended together in 
man ; we are analysing them, but in na- 
ture they are united as intimately as are 
the prismatic colours in one uniform mass 
of light. This being the case, they are 
acting in concert when any object 
affects the senses. Therefore the un- 
derstanding knowing the simplicity of 
mental sensation, it follows, that the 
varieties of the causes, (which create 
varieties in the effects,) are instantly 
perceived and detected, and that immedi- 
ately with the conscious use of the 
senses ; whilst also the mind as imme- 
diately mixes that idea of which the un- 



68 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

derstanding is aware ; viz. that these 
varieties, as complex objects, continue 
to exist unperceived and independant, 
when unnoticed by the senses. The 
vulgar also, and all men in a popular 
way, unite with these notions, the con- 
stant and equally present sentiment, 
that the varieties are like what the 
senses render them, by a very natural 
and almost indissoluble association of 
ideas. Berkeley never affixed the names 
of objects to any thing, but the com- 
bined sensible qualities which the or- 
gans of sense helped to form ; omitting 
the idea of their constant ability, to 
return upon the sense when called for, 
and of outwardness being equally a 
regular attendant upon their appearance, 
and a capacity in nature necessary to 
their existence in relation to us, and to 
our own in relation to them ; which 
circumstances are included in their names. 
He wrote his theory of vision to obviate 
an objection that might be made on the 
score of "visible distance," in order to 
prove it to be a sensation of mind only, 



ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 69 

suggested by tangibility, &c. ; but this 
would not do to explain away that con- 
dition of being, which, when unperceived, 
must be a proportional relation and va- 
riety amongst unperceived objects, and 
capable of affecting the touch, sight, 
and other senses in its own way. This 
he omitted purposely, in order to have 
nothing to do with the causes and objects 
which create sensations, until he came to 
explain them after his own notions, as 
necessarily active, and therefore spirit. 
His method of incomplete definition, 
and naming only the combined sensible 
qualities the effects of things, when all 
men name them as united with the per- 
ceptions of the understanding, and the 
observations of experience, is the reason 
why his philosophy seems at once plau- 
sible, contradictory, and unanswerable. 
Hume denied that " reason" could prove, 
by the relation of our ideas, the know- 
ledge of continued existences, and re- 
solved all into " custom and imagina- 
tion." Whilst Dr. Reid, when he 
asserted, that the primary qualities are 



70 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

conceived by clear ideas of them as they 
exist when unperceived, and unlike any 
sensation they yield, was not aware that 
he explained these conceptions of un- 
perceived qualities, by other qualities 
which still require the senses, in order 
to their formation ; and therefore such as 
could only exist in a sentient being. 
Thus he explained " hardness," as " a 
firm cohesion of parts ;" "figure" as 
"the relation of parts to each other;" 
— " visible figure," as "the relation of 
parts in respect to the eye;" "sound" 
by " the vibrations of the air," &c. &c. — 
as though these things, after being per- 
ceived, could be planted as they appear 
to the inward sense and consciousness 
of the soul, outwardly again, as inde- 
pendant modes of existence, and ob- 
jects of contemplation ; as though the 
very system he is arguing against does 
not suppose cohesion, parts, vibrations, 
figure, &c. &c. &c. to be perceptions, 
which are inward ; because all percep- 
tion is conscious, and all consciousness 
is inward and sentient ; thus assuming 



ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 71 

as his premises the very idea which is 
in question ; and which premises involve 
the difficulty his argument is raised to 
answer. 

It is matter of surprise to me that 
Mr. D. Stewart should call this "lumi- 
nous and logical reasoning." Dr. Reid 
all along considers " extension, figure, 
and motion, as instinctive simple con- 
ceptions of understood qualities of ex- 
ternal matter."* Now the doctrine of 
the relation of cause and effect, as I have 
considered it in my former essay, throws 
light upon this part of the subject, and 
would, I think, if it once became fami- 
liar to the mind, explain the whole mys- 
tery of external and internal existence. 

The union of the three following 
things are required to form the prox- 
imate cause for that great effect, the 
formation and combination of those aggre- 
gates of sensible qualities usually called 
objects ; namely, first, the unknown, 

* See '< the Essay on Cause and Effect," p. 42. 



72 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

unnamed circumstances in nature, which 
are unperceived by the senses ; secondly, 
the organs of sense, whose qualities mix 
with these ; and thirdly, the living, 
conscious powers necessary to sensation 
in general. 

In this union, and with it, is the cre- 
ation and production of all sensible complex 
qualities called objects, such as we know 
them. These objects are what Berkeley 
calls " ideas," and " sensations in the 
mind " what the ancients perhaps called 
species or phantasms ; what the moderns 
call images, ideas, &c. And they all, 
as I think, err in this, in considering 
them as first formed, and then contem- 
plated, and taken notice of afterwards. 
Whereas, the sensible qualities of things 
are only formed by being taken notice 
of. This is what Berkeley means when 
he says, " what are objects but the 
things we perceive by sense;" and so 
far I perfectly agree with him. But 
then he has omitted the consideration of 
that circumstance, which is necessary to 



OX EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 73 

our belief in the existence of objects in- 
dependant of ourselves ; and that is the 
quick suggestions of the understanding ; 
the reasoning, that as sensation does 
not itself form the essence of those ex- 
istences Which CAUSE PARTICULAR 

kinds of sensations ; therefore there 
must be existences without it; that 
sensation not causing the variety of its 
own perceptions, therefore there must 
be variety without it; that various ex- 
istences must be ready in order to be 
perceived, and that these must lie under 
various positions in relation to each other, 
as well as to the mind ; that sensation 
is but as a thin gauze, through which 
things are seen in their native propor- 
tions, although it imparts to them a 
similarity of colouring. 

Nor let it be thought that children 
and peasants, &c. are not capable of such 
observations ; nature translates these 
operations of mind into easier language 
than I have used, and mixes them from 
a very early age, as joint powers with 

E 



74 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 

the senses ; by which the practised senses 
may perceive, (as I have explained above,) 
that objects are not only inward sensible 
qualities, but exist unperceived conti- 
nuously, outwardly, and independantly 
under the imagination of their appearances 
to the senses ; — thus forming that com- 
plete whole, which is termed the per- 
ception of outward and inward existence. 
If it be possible indeed that in nature 
the causes for sensation in general, 
should be mixed up with those parti- 
cular kinds of them which yet need the 
aid of the organs of sense and of motion 
for their exhibition, then indeed, when 
that we call ourselves shall fail, the exter- 
nal universe shall also fail ; and as such 
a proposition is wholly without proof, 
so is it beyond the utmost stretch of 
imagination to conceive : whilst by 
keeping these causes separate and inde- 
pendant of each other, the understand- 
ing, the senses, and the imagination, 
the notions from infancy to age, and 
those of all men, without one dissenting 



ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 75 

voice agree, — philosophy and ignorance 
equally agree, — that all objects are to be 
considered as outward of, and distinct 
from each other, and that they may 
indifferently be changed, without effect- 
ing the destruction of the whole mass. 



e 2 



76 



CHAPTER III, 

THE NOTION OF THE INDEPENDANCY OF 
EXTERNAL OBJECTS, HOW GAINED? 

1 . The same evidence for the independancy as for 
the exteriority of objects. 

2. Change of qualities proves them to be inde- 
pendant of the senses. 

3. Some objects appear both like ourselves and dif- 
ferent from us, Sfc. 

1. But it is time to enter upon the 
third and last member of our question. 
Whence is it that we consider objects 
as independant of the mind, when we 
can only know them by our sensations, 
which sensations are beings dependant 
upon the mind's capacity ? 

I answer, first, That those circum- 
stances which go to prove that there 
must be truly outward causes, for par- 
ticular sensations, prove them to be 
independant causes of those sensations. 



EXTERNAL OBJECTS. 77 

For such causes or objects as are entirely 
exterior to the cause or capacity for sen- 
sation in general, must be independent 
of such capacity. 

But, secondly, those objects which are 
in relation to the five organs of sense 
and to motion, are considered inde- 
pendant of each individual capacity for 
sensation, because such alter their qua- 
lites, and seem some of them to suffer 
pleasure and pain without our observa- 
tion of the change of qualities, and 
without our consciousness of these sen- 
sations. If we endeavour to regain a 
thought by reflection which has been 
out of the mind, such thought never 
exhibits any quality which renders it 
probable to have existed in an unob- 
served state. — But with respect to those 
objects which are " ready to appear to 
the senses," we observe they have gone 
through changes of qualities, the process 
of which was not observed by us, and 
which changes therefore, must be in- 
dependant of any part of ourselves ; and 
not being perceived, cannot be caused 



78 INDEPENDANCY OF 

by our perception, and must therefore, 
be wholly independant of it. 

Thirdly, Objects are reckoned inde- 
dendant of ourselves, because they ap- 
pear like ourselves plus or minus the va- 
rieties of qualities ;* and we to ourselves 
are independant of others, and are 
minds, beings, capable of sensations. 

And this I consider as the chief 
ground of all our belief in a plurality 
of minds, as well as other objects from 
infancy ; for similar sensations are similar 
objects, and the varieties make the va- 
rieties; and we, in the sensation of our- 
selves perceive continuous existence, that 
might exist independant of others : then 
we have sensations of other objects like 
ourselves, but have not conscious conti- 

* Bishop Berkeley has this idea when applied to 
the existence of other minds than our own. The 
reasoning is equally forcible when applied to any 
kinds of beings and their qualities. This shall be 
further taken notice of elsewhere. See Essay 1st. 
of the shorter essays. 

I find an unexpected coincidence of thought 
here with Mr. Mill in his pamphlet on Education, 



EXTERNAL OBJECTS. 79 

tmous sensation of their existence. We 
do not feel their pleasure and pain, but 
they give symptoms of feeling like our- 
selves conscious continuous existence, 
pleasure and pain, Sec. Therefore, we 
look upon them as masses of qualities 
like ourselves, other human beings in 
existence, and so on, according to the 
varieties of sensation, i. e. various causes, 
equal to, and commensurate with various 
effects. 

If it should be objected, that lost 
thoughts which reflection recovers, are 
not considered as independant beings ; 
I answer, thoughts recovered bv reflec- 
tion, are perceived to be in the mind at 
the moment they are seeking for ; and 
by following a train of associations, we 
only clear away any confusion respect- 
ing them, and they never indicate by 
any circumstance whatever, that they 
continue to exist when not perceived by 
the mind ; — therefore, they are not like 
ourselves, but seem to be only relations 
or accidents of others of our thoughts 
which are objects within ourselves : 



80 INDEPENDANCY OF 

So the organs of sense modify objects 
continually existent, ready to appear upon 
the irregular calls of these organs, and 
which are outward from the body, and 
whose causes are independant of the cause 
for sensation in general : — But reflection 
helps to form clearer ideas of confused 
thoughts, which are not " ready to ap- 
pear upon irregular calls of the organs of 
sense" are not exterior to the body, re- 
quire not motion to be apprehended as 
tangible, and whose causes seem inter- 
woven with the general cause for the 
associations of our ideas ; which asso- 
ciations and their causes, are dependant 
upon the whole being deemed ourselves, 
ceasing in sound sleep, and reviving 
with the waking hour. Thus the in- 
struments of the five organs of sense re- 
late to outward, independant, continually 
existing beings ; but reflection relates to 
inward, dependant, interrupted beings. 

Fourthly, We gain the notion of the 
independancy of objects, from the ob- 
servation of one object affecting many 
minds in a manner which renders it im- 



EXTERNAL OBJECTS. 81 

possible there should be as many ob- 
jects as minds. If five men see a pond, 
and can only walk round one pond, then 
there is one pond seen five times over, 
not rive ponds ; so the pond whatever 
it may be when unperceived, must at least 
in its unperceived state, be independant 
of, and I may add external to all the 
minds ; for if the pond were only in the 
mind, there would be five ponds, and 
every person who perceived a pond 
would create another pond, and yet 
this multitude of ponds in perception, 
would in many respects but merit the 
definition due to one pond. Thus there 
would be such a contradiction among 
the " ideas and sensations," that the 
mind must come to the belief of only 
one pond, seen by five persons; that is, 
in other words, an independant cause for 
particular sensations. This objection to 
his doctrine Berkeley answers, in a very 
unsatisfactory, hesitating manner in his 
dialogues. 

Fifthly, The relations of abstract 
ideas are upon the same footing as out- 

e5 



82 INDEPENDANCY OF 

ward objects with respect to their re- 
maining when unperceived, independant 
for their existence, of the existence of 
the mind itself. This continuance of 
the relations of ideas, ready to be per- 
ceived when called upon by the intel- 
lect, and independant of its powers for 
either forming, or perceiving them, al- 
though contained in the juxta-position 
of the simple ideas themselves, (whether 
perceived or not, or whether called for 
or not,) is what must ever render the 
pure idealists, most inconsistent in their 
doctrine. Because the very position, 
" We know nothing but our per- 
ceptions," is, if only a truth when per- 
ceived, of no force as an axiom that is 
to govern our understanding when not 
adverted to ; when not a sensation or 
perception, it would be nought, — leaving 
thereby all objects of the understanding 
and the senses equally unproved as 
to their existence ; and therefore still 
liable to be disputed and argued upon 
according to the different impressions 
they make in a perpetual circle, with- 



EXTERNAL OBJECTS. 83 

out the mind ever being able to come 
to any settled determination concerning 
them. — For we must observe concern- 
ing abstract propositions, that we gain 
the notion of their truth being inde- 
pendant of the immediate perception of 
them by observing, that our discovery 
of their truth does not cause them ; 
they are discovered, and perceived, 
because the relations exist ready to be 
perceived : It is their existence enables 
them to be perceived, not the perception of 
them which enables them to exist; and 
whenever the relations are as clear as 
are the original simple impressions, their 
existence is upon the same footing of 
certainty, and is demonstratively equal 
with them. 

It is such a perception of the relation 
of ideas as this, which affords us the 
abstract notion of existence in general 
whether sentient, or insentient ; — for 
we knowing that each sensation as it 
springs up passes as shortly away, and 
being equally convinced that it cannot 
have begun its own existence, but must 



84 INDEPENDANCY OF 

have been a change of some existence 
which already is j and yet that each 
particular sensation is not always de- 
termined to the mind ; we judge rea- 
sonably there must needs be some existence 
which is ?ieither any sensation in par- 
ticular, nor yet a mere capacity for 
sensation in general, in order to' be 
the cause of each particular sensa- 
tion. Therefore, by such comparison 
of ideas we gain the notion of indefinite 
unknown existence ; whether as a ca- 
pacity for sensation in general, (not yet 
under a state of sensation,) or as va- 
rieties of qualities capable of exciting 
that capacity, through the organs of 
sense. Indefinite existence, as contrary to 
the iston existence of which we have 
the notion by our ideas successively 
passing away, thence becomes the genus, 
of which each class of the sensations we 
experience is the species or variety. 

This is an observation which to my 
mind completely answers the difficulty 
some at present make, when they say ; 
" that sensation is the only existence 



EXTERNAL OBJECTS. 85 

of which we have experience, and 
therefore we cannot separate any ex- 
istence from the idea of sensation" 
For we can always separate or abstract 
the most general quality of an object from 
the rest, whether that quality be sup- 
posed among them by the imagination, 
known to be among them by the senses, 
or concluded to be among them by reason, 
as a result from their mutual bearings. 

By such means it is, that the idea of 
independancy is generated : an idea, 
which as a new and superinduced sen- 
sation, stands for the thing signified by 
it ; and for which we have formed the 
word independancy ; and by such means 
it is, that the curious workmanship of 
nature has enabled us from thoughts 
which are necessarily interrupted, in- 
ward, and dependant beings, to gain 
the knowledge of continued, external, 
and independant existences. 

Thus, I hope, I have answered satis- 
factorily the original question,* by shew - 

* " Why we attribute a continued existence 
" to objects even when they are not present to the 



86 INDEPENDANCY OF OBJECTS. 

ing that in the sum of our combined 
sensations (viz. the perception of our sim- 
ple impressions, and their relations,) 
there is contained the knowledge and 
proof of the existence of " body" and 
of the external universe. 

" senses ;" and, " Why we suppose them to have 
" an existence distinct from the mind, i. e. exter- 
" nal in their position and independant in their 
" existence and operation." 



87 



CHAPTER IV. 

OBJECTION ARISING TO THE FOREGO- 
ING DOCTRINE FROM THE PHENO- 
MENA OF DREAMS, FURTHER CONSI- 
DERED AND ANSWERED. 

Section I. 

The phenomena of dreams does not afford a valid 
argument against the proof of independant 
existences, external to mind. 

If the phenomena of dreams and mad- 
ness be objected to the foregoing theory, 
on account of their objects being sup- 
posed by the mind, to be continuous, 
external, independant existences, dur- 
ing their exhibition ; let it be remem- 
bered, that these objects are not capable 
of fulfilling their definitions, and that 
the very reason they are considered in 
a sane and waking state as delusions, 
is, because the mind perceives that its 



88 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS 

powers of comparison were not during 
the dream in a state to observe such an 
incapacity. 

These powers being restored, the 
mind immediately takes notice that on 
account of several relations of ideas, 
which had been obliterated presenting 
themselves, these objects must be inca- 
pable of shewing all their qualities ; — 
they will not affect any more minds 
than one with the notions of their ap- 
pearance ;— those which are objects of 
food will not satisfy hunger ; — of injury, 
will do no hurt ; — of good, will afford no 
pleasure ; &c. — It is when objects fulfil 
their whole definitions, that they are 
real; and when they do, it does not 
appear to me possible, but that their 
causes, (or the objects which are neces- 
sary for the formation of those sensations, 
and to which the senses and motion are 
relative), must be wholly independant of 
mind ; — for when similar objects are per- 
ceived at the same time by more than 
one mind, they must necessarily be ex- 
ternal to each. The only difficulty is 



FURTHER CONSIDERED. 89 

to gain a demonstration, that in our 
perception of any of the relations of our 
ideas concerning the existence of other 
men, their absolute existence is in- 
cluded. 

I consider however the arguments 
I have used, approaching as nearly to 
it as possible if rightly understood. 
For it is not enough that the causes for 
sensation in general, continue to exist 
and to be independant of the parti- 
cular causes which excite particular 
notions; because these latter might ne- 
vertheless be dependant on them; and 
this is the case in dreams : But the 
particular exciting causes, for particular 
sensations (termed the perception of 
qualities,) must prove themselves ca- 
pable of continuing to exist, inde- 
pendant of the other powers of sensa- 
tion in general. 

Now this condition, men as well as 
other objects fulfil, by replying to the 
irregular calls of the senses and motion ; 
and we perceive that such a circum- 
stance affords a proof of such indepen- 



90 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS 

dant continuous existence ; because as 
the absence of our minds, whether 
during sleep, or on a journey, &c. makes 
no difference with respect to " the rea- 
diness of those objects to appear if called 
for ;" so neither could the supposition 
of our death. And this relation of our 
sensations is so obvious, that all men 
perceive it, and act on it from infancy ; 
and there is no occasion to have re- 
course to " instinct" or " primary laws 
of belief/' &c. to account for their faith 
in outward continued existences. 

The objects therefore (unlike the sensa- 
tions they create, whether fitted to ex- 
cite the complex ideas of other men, or 
any other set of perceptions,) which are 
capable of regularly answering to the irre- 
gular call of any of the organs of sense, 
must continue to exist unperceived, 
and independant of the causes of per- 
ception in general. 

Dr. Berkeley concludes more from 
the phenomena of dreams than they will 
bear out, and what he says is too re- 
markable not to be transcribed. On 



FURTHER CONSIDERED. 91 

the other hand, Dr. Reid's notion of 
extension, seems to me unfounded, am- 
biguous, and vague, from apparently 
taking no notice of the exact similarity 
there may be, (even as to vividness and 
every other attendant circumstance,) 
between our sleeping and waking per- 
ceptions of sensible qualities. 



Section II. 

1 . Remark on Bishop Berkeley's conclusion from 
dreams, shewing a fallacy in his reasoning thereon, 
as affording a doubt concerning the reality of 
objects, 

2. Application of the doctrine of cause. 

1. Bishop Berkeley says, (sec. 18.) 
" What happens in dreams, frenzies, 
" and the like, puts it beyond dis- 
" pute, that it is possible we might be 
" affected with all the ideas we have 
" now, though no bodies existed with- 
" out resembling them." " Hence it is 
" evident, the supposition of external 
" bodies, is not necessary for the pro- 
" ducing of our ideas, since it is granted 



92 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS 

' they are produced sometimes, and 
( might possibly be produced always 

* in the same order we see them in at 
' present, without their concurrence." 

(Sec. 20.) " Suppose, what no one 
' can deny possible, an intelligence 
' without the help of external bodies, 
' to be affected with the same train of 
' sensations and ideas that you are, 
' imprinted in the same order, and 
' with like vividness in his mind. I 
' ask whether that intelligence hath 
' not all the reason to believe the 
' existence of corporal substances re- 
' presented by his ideas, and exciting 
*' them in his mind, that you can pos- 
f sibly have for believing the same 

* thing." I answer to this, that I do 
not consider it as possible for a person 
to be affected with the same train of 
sensations, and in the same order in a 
dream, or frenzy, as out of them ; pre- 
cisely similar effects must have precisely 
similar causes, and in any case where 
not only resembling sensible qualities 
take place, but an order occurs which 



FURTHER CONSIDERED. 93 

enables them to return regularly; — and 
the mind is in a state to compare and 
observe upon the senses, then the ar- 
gument holds good, which shows that 
^e causes of the sensible qualities exist 
independantly of the senses and mind, 
and continue to exist nnperceived ; — and 
neither such an use of the organs of 
sense, nor such returns upon them, nor 
such an order, nor such comparison of 
ideas takes place in dreams, and fren- 
zies. In short, the sensible qualities 
form the sensible objects ; but it is a 
reasoning arising out of a perception 
of the relation of these qualities ; — of 
the different position of colours in re- 
lation to motion ; — of the knowledge of 
the place where we are, &c. by which 
external continuous existences are prov- 
ed ; a reasoning which Bishop Berkeley 
uses in proof of the independant exist- 
ence of separate minds, and which rea- 
soning and which minds he does not 
think can belong to dreams and fren- 
zies, &c. It is by unobserved and ap- 
parently slight changes of words and 



94 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS 

their meanings, that so great a writer 
and reasoner as Berkeley could deceive 
either himself or others. — Let us however 
analyse a little more accurately the re- 
markable sentences above quoted, " It is 
possible we might be affected, with all the 
ideas we have now, though no bodies ex- 
isted without resembling them ; what 
happens in dreams and frenzies puts 
it beyond dispute." 

Now the reason it is put beyond dis- 
pute that there are no external bodies 
resembling our ideas in dreams and 
frenzies, is because what happens in 
those states of mind, proves there are 

no CONTINUOUS INDEPENDANT Objects, 

either resembling, or unresembling the then 
ideas of sensible qualities ; and which 
can therefore be capable of fulfilling 
their definitions. According to Berke- 
ley's own theory, they do not arise even 
"from the actions of a spirit, according to 
that set of rules deemed the laws of nature." 
But nevertheless, it does not follow that 
even for these ideas, external qualities 
must not originally have been in need ; 



FURTHER CONSIDERED. 95 

a man born blind may never have that 
action of the brain and mind deemed 
colour ; yet after the use of the eyes, 
colour may return, though blindness 
take place ; and this would hold, whe- 
ther external colour were a resemblance 
or a non-resemblance to inward colour. 
But Dr. Reid errs on the other side ; 
for that all the sensible qualities whe- 
ther primary, or secondary, can in 
dreams be the exact counterparts of the 
sensible qualities in the waking hour is 
a circumstance, which to my mind 
yields a complete conviction, (and in it- 
self contains an absolute proof,) that they 
are equally upon the same footing as 
being " ideas of sensation ,"* when holding 
a place in the mind's consciousness ; 
and that our knowledge of their causes 
as continually existing as well as our 
future expectation arising out of that 
knowledge, depends upon a reasoning 
which cannot take place in dreams and 
frenzies ; for those other ideas such as 
place, <§*c. which ought to be compared with 

* See Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind, 
sec. vi. chap. vi. 



96 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS 

them are not in the mind; they a?\ 
as it were, J:hey are not in being.' The 
sensible qualities are therefore taken for 
the real things ; i. e. as some of the 
effects arising from such external can 
whose aggregates will be capable of de- 
termining their remaining qualities. 

The phenomena of dreams touch upon 
the difficulty there lies in the mind de- 
tecting the presence of exactly similar 
objects when it perceives only some of 
their qualities,* and is not in a state to 
unite the ideas of the understanding 
with the perception of sensible quali- 
ties, which union alone renders objects 
worthy of bearing their names. Hence 
it is. that if men reasoned as Mr. Hume 
says they do from sensible qualil 
merely, they would be or maim 

Young children, very ignorant perse 
men m dreams or frenzies consider the 
conscious ^sensible qualities of things, as 
effects indicative oi similar objects, be- 
cause they have not present in their 
minds those notions of the understand- 

* See the shorter Essay. " That Sensible Q. 

ties cannot be Causes." 



FURTHER CONSIDERED. 97 

ing, those ideas of their methods of for- 
mation, of the place in which they are, &c. 
and which being compared with the 
consciousness of the sensible qualities, 
shew whether they are masses of like 
effects from like ultimate causes, or not. 

The true reason why external resem- 
bling objects cannot be necessary for pro- 
ducing ideas, is because it is impossible 
that the external object, which is al- 
lowed not to be an idea, can resemble an 
idea, in that particular quality of its 
conscious sensation. 

But again, Bishop Berkeley says, — 
" Hence, it is evident the supposition of 
external bodies is not necessary for 
the producing of ideas." This is not 
evident, for the word, " resembling " 
being dropt, alters this inference from 
being &just conclusion from the premises. 
Objects — external objects ; i. e. objects 
not one with the mind, nor included in 
any particular state of its sensation, 
may, and according to my theory, must 
be necessary for producing those ideas 



98 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS 

which are exhibited as changes upon such 
a state. Nay the real, plain, matter of 
fact is, that objects external to mind are 
needed even for illusory ideas ; for all ideas 
whatever, and their causes, are external 
toj (i. e. not included in,) any particular 
given state of sensation, and its cause. 

For any particular given state of sen- 
sation, mixed with the consciousness of 
our own continued existence, and the idea 
of its continually existing cause, forms 
the compound idea called self; but the 
particular causes for new ideas, are not 
contained in these, and so are out, and 
distinct from th em . 

And hence it appears that the essential 
difference between the particular causes 
for illusions, and the particular causes 
for realities consists only in the latter 
being continually existent: for both 
must be external, and neither can be re- 
sembling. 

Therefore it is required that objects 
should be not only external, but continu- 
ally existent, in order to be in relation 



FURTHER CONSIDERED. 99 

to the organs of sense, and to produce 
such ideas of sensible qualities, as in a 
sane and waking state of mind proceed 
in a regular " order," and by different 
laws than the irregular fancies of dreams 
and frenzies. It may thus be demon- 
stratively proved, that it is " impossible 
to be affected with the same train of 
sensations, in the same order as a sane 
waking person experiences them, and 
yet these be conducted after the same 
manner, and by the same causes as 
dreams and frenzies are." Like effects 
must have like causes ; either the organs 
of sense are not wanted, or they are 
wanted for the regular exhibition of 
qualities ; in dreams and frenzies they 
are not wanted for the formation of the 
irregular fancies of sensible qualities ; 
but upon the supposition that the organs 
of sense are used, they must be used in 
relation to some objects which are cor- 
relative to them, and which Bishop 
Berkeley clearly shows cannot be like 
the qualities they are the means of form- 

f2 



100 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS 

ing.* This answer is further supported 
by the following considerations. 

1. That it is more than probable that 
such dreams, &c. could not exist, unless 
outward objects had acted previously 
on the senses. 

2. Because we cannot imagine, that 
to a mere lunatic illusory call of the 
organs of sense there could be a regular 
reply, unless God were to work a mi- 
racle for the purpose, which it is absurd 
to suppose. 

3. Such an illusive order of ideas in 
one man's mind, could not render them 
capable of appearing to more minds than 
one, if more than one were but supposed in 
the universe. 

4. Because physically and physiolo- 
gically speaking, there is upon the per- 

* That they can resemble ideas in some general 
qualities, which are independant of the organs of 
sense. See Recapitulation. 



FURTHER CONSIDERED. 101 

ception of every lively forcible image, 
a peculiar action of the circulation, which 
is natural and consistent with health, 
when arising from what are called out- 
ward objects. Whilst the perceptions 
last, their proximate causes may be con- 
sidered as a set of temporary, but 
strong excitements ; — but when their 
ultimate causes are removed, the per- 
ceptions vanish, and with them the 
excitements. Now if the desires of the 
mind which seek their objects irregu- 
larly, were during a dream to be an- 
swered as vividly, forcibly, and regu- 
larly as when awake ; some circum- 
stances would be equivalent to the fol- 
lowing contradictory action in the sys- 
tem ; namely, to an irregular demand of 
the organs of sense, and yet the capacity 
for a constant ready reply to them ; that 
is, a quiet, healthy action of the system, 
and an intranquil, inflamed action, both 
in unison together. 

In other words, it does not seem pos- 
sible and consistent with health, that 
the circulation should be capable of car- 



102 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS 

rying on such an action of the system, 
as should be equal to render life a 
waking dream ; i. e. that within its own 
powers it should be capable of acting 
regularly, as well as vividly; and of 
performing without disturbance the 
stimulus, of which outward objects are 
supposed the occasion. 

5. Because it appears impossible in the 
way of dreams and frenzies, that "all" 
the ideas we have, and all the "order" 
of them, could take place ; the appe- 
tites of hunger and thirst not being capa- 
ble oj satisfaction in this way : — at any 
rate, the ideal theory, and its contrary, 
are always understood, to be argued 
upon the supposition, that the organs of 
sense and motion are truly used, and that 
they afford by means of their conscious 
use, the evidence termed, perception Z>y 
sense. 

It is not sufficient therefore for the 
exhibition of the phenomena of waking 
life, that there should merely exist some 
irregular sensible qualities, resembling 



FURTHER CONSIDERED. 103 

those which may result from the action of 
the organs of sense and motion. Their ac- 
tion must be truly used ; there must be the 
true and unperceived mechanical action of 
the five organs of sense ; and there must 
be a mechanical, unperceived passing of 
the sentient principle, the self from 
place to place ; and this action of the or- 
gans, and this motion must be in rela- 
tion to those things which fulfil their 
whole definitions. And it is of no conse- 
quence what place, space, motion, and 
external things are when unperceived ; 
they are conditions necessary to a result 
— therefore the real action of the organs, 
and the true motion of an individual mind 
must create a change of self, in relation 
to objects which continue to exist as the 
exciting causes for certain sensations or 
perceptions in particular ; independant 
of, and distant from, the powers of sen- 
sation in general. 

The detection of such an action be- 
tween the organs of sense and the objects 
of nature, arises from the conscious use 
of the organs mixed with the powers of the 



104 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS 

understanding; for a stream of conscious 
life, however many, and separate and 
independant causes may be necessary 
in order to supply it, yet would appear 
merely as the idea of self; such causes 
would properly and truly determine an 
individual self, and the consciousness of 
self as their single combined effect. But 
whatever conscious applications were 
made to any other existence, power, or 
quality in nature, as necessary regularly 
to introduce new ideas and sensations 
upon this conscious self, would prove, 
that such qualities, powers, and beings, 
were wholly unnecessary to the existence 
of, and therefore no part of self. The five 
organs of sense, and motion, are such 
means of application, and therefore, the 
use of them, and regular returns upon 
them, afford the criterion of the presence 
of other exterior and continuous objects 
than self; and is the only way in which 
the phrase " evidence of sense," can with 
propriety be used. Motion is thus a sort 
of sense ; for motion will ever appear from 
infancy upwards to be an action in rela- 



FURTHER CONSIDERED. 105 

tion to that space which is outward; i. e. 
an existence not included in the perceiv- 
ing mind : the child will consider its arms 
and legs as part of self; but the place 
in which he moves, the capacity of na- 
ture which allows him to move, which 
he by consciousness knows is not 
always in him, but is always ready to 
return upon the use of his arms and 
legs, he rightly reasons or perceives is no 
part of himself, his mind, or conscious 
existence ; but yet must necessarily be 
always existing in order to be ever ready 
to respond to his motions, and to enable 
him to use his members without re- 
sistence.* I say, the infant perceives 

* Since writing this essay, I find that Mr. Destutt 
de Tracy has many ideas which I am happy un- 
consciously to have hit upon ; but his argument is 
more confined than mine ; — for whereas he consi- 
ders body to be known as a result of that sensation 
of mind called a judgment, from the comparison of 
the ideas of will, and resistance to will; so 
I enlarge the number of such sorts of judgments, by 
the comparison of many other ideas, which I think 
it is clear are made from the earliest infancy, 
and even perhaps by the foetus before birth. 

FO 



106 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS 

this relation amidst his " ideas and sen- 
sations " though he cannot analyse or 
express it, any more than some others 
who are far removed from infancy. 

Therefore, it is the unperceived ac- 
tion or use of the organs of sense which 
relates to exterior and continually exist- 
ing objects, and is the means of deter- 
mining their qualities to the sentient 
principle ; and it is the consciousness of 
their use which forms an argument by 
which men justly infer such permanent 
existences, and renders valid the phrase, 
" perception by sense;' for the conscious 

Added to this, none of the notions are the result 
of any circumstance which proves the continuity, 
and independancy of existences, as well as their 
exteriority. The former quality must be blended 
with the other two, in order to the formation of 

REALITIES. 

Condillac and De Gerando fall into the same 
mistake ; none of these show any thing beyond the 
action of such accidental circumstances as deter- 
mine will and its sense of resistance — even in 
dreams. 

These authors contain therefore no efficient an- 
swer to Berkeley. 



FURTHER CONSIDERED. 107 

use of the organs of sense is rightly to be 
considered as the effect of their unper- 
ceived mechanical action, and this action 
as in relation to the appropriate objects 
which affect them : Therefore when the 
mind is conscious of the use of the eyes, 
the hands, &c, and of regular replies to 
their use, — it knows that there are other 
external continuous existences than it- 
self present ; and thus the immediate 
action of the understanding uniting with 
the conscious use of the organs of sense, 
together form " the perception by 
sense," and that of a different " order" 
of beings from those of dreams and fren- 
zies. 

If the organs of sense (and motion) 
were not truly used, Berkeley's own 
theory would fall to the ground, because 
they are, according to him, " necessary 
for the spirit to work on by set rules and 
methods." But if the order could go on 
as in dreams, they could not be needed. 

" In the manner of dreams and fren- 
zies" therefore, there is no use for 
organs of sense, neither are they used. 



108 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS 

There exists, indeed, some sensible ap- 
pearances upon the mind, as if the 
senses had been in use ; but in that 
state there is a deficiency of the ideas of 
the understanding, so that images of 
sense, appear together confusedly with- 
out order in the mind, which is not in a 
state to perceive that they can be but 
fancies. 

But in a waking and sane state of 
mind, the harmony of its ideas, their 
relations and conclusions, force them- 
selves upon it with a superior and con- 
vincing evidence ; which in ordinary 
life is not weakened by those sceptical 
suggestions, which a consideration of 
the strength of the delusion in dreams, 
prompts to the more curious enquirer. 
A scepticism only to be corrected by 
the reflection, that it is not justified by 
reason,, or by that comparison and rela- 
tion of our ideas, which of whatever 
difficulty in the performance, can but 
remain the only method in our power of 
finding truth, or of forming any propo- 
sition whatever. 



FURTHER CONSIDERED. 109 



Section III. 

Remarks on Dr. ReioVs neglect of the consideration 
of the phenomena of dreams in notions of ex- 
tension, fyc. 

Now on the other hand to return to 
Dr. Reid, when he asks, " if extension, 
" figure, and motion, are ideas of sensa- 
" tion" (saying he gives up the material 
world, if the question be answered 
in the affirmative,) he forgets that in 
a vivid dream these ideas may take 
place as perfectly as when the mind is 
awake ; — he forgets that every percep- 
tion of sensible qualities whatever must 
be a species, of which sensation is the 
genus, and can only be the attribute of 
a sentient being. By an illusion arising 
from the association of ideas, he joined 
the notions of the sensations of the 
sensible primary qualities, (of our sense 
or consciousness of extension, figure, 
and motion,) with the idea of their con- 
tinually existing external causes, as ex- 
isting together outwardly. For although 



110 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS 

he explains himself in some places as 
concerning external objects not to be like 
sensations ; — yet he still keeps the notion 
by saying, that perceptions, or conceptions 
are not sensations ; and that he knows the 
external nature of a primary qua- 
lity, as well as its inward sensation ; as for 
instance, in extension, where the sensa- 
tion of moving along a surface, is unlike 
" the hard cohesion of parts sticking to- 
gether." Now paints, hardness, and 
sticking, are three " ideas of sensa- 
tion" also, and can never explain 
the nature of the external* quality, any 
more than does the moving along a sur- 
face. 

Thus he considers extension, figure, 
motion, and solidity, to be qualities of 
bodies, which are not sensations; of 
whose real nature when unperceived, we 
have a distinct and clear conception : — 
Now, there are perceptions of sensible 
qualities ; and perceptions of their re- 
lations by reasoning, yet both ere but 
species of sensations. The perceptions 
of sense, neither immediately, nor me- 



FURTHER CONSIDERED. Ill 

diately as signs of conceived qualities, 
can ever tell us of their positive nature 
when unfelt, whether they be primary 
or secondary. The perceptions of reason, 
will tell us, that there must necessarily 
be exterior objects, and that these must 
be as various as the sensations they 
create. But this notion was certainly 
not that, under which Reid contemplated 
extension, figure, and motion; for he 
never hints at it. No ; he truly thought 
the senses could suggest the conception 
of the nature of the real essential pri- 
mary qualities of matter, without such 
conceptions becoming sensations, whilst 
the understanding was satisfied it was 
legitimate so to do, because " instinct" 
compelled the mind to such a conception, 
and resolved the notion into a " pri- 
mary law of human belief" which could 
not be disputed without disputing a 
first principle.* — Yet the material world, 

* Against such a doctrine as this, there are few 
perhaps who might not find a conclusive argument, 
derived from the experience that every quality what- 
ever (however considered in a waking state as be- 



112 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS 

the universe need not be annihilated, 
although primary qualities {after the 
senses have taken notice of them) should 
be " ideas of sensation ;" as long as 
the whole " furniture of heaven and 
earth" (whatever that furniture may be 
unperceived,) fits out all its variety of 
causes and of unperceived objects, to 
coalesce with the organs of sense and 
with the powers of sensation in order 
to its production. 

Thus, what Dr. Reid calls common 
sense, and considers erroneously to be a 
sense or instinct, is no more than an ob- 
servation of the simplest relations of our 
ideas. — It is but a simple inference of the 

longing to external things,) equally appears in 
dreams. There will arise extension, figure, motion, 
hardness, and softness ; heat, and cold ; colour, and 
sound : Will, and the resistance to will, whether 
by the resistance of solidity, or the wills of other 
men. 

It is this observation which shews that no con- 
clusive evidence can arise from the arguments of 
M. de Condillac, and M. Destutt de Tracy, De 
Gerando, &c. for the reality of an independant, con- 
tinually existing universe. 



FURTHER CONSIDERED. 113 

understanding, after the observation that 
the use of any organ of sense is needful 
to let new ideas into the mind, that the 
mind itself was not the object of those new 
ideas, and that necessarily a third object 
must be the occasion of them. There- 
fore, together with the perception of the 
coxscious sense, (which takes notice 
when it is affected,) there is the percep- 
tion of the understanding, which ob- 
serving that the sense not being affected 
by what is properly termed our mind, or 
the mere capacity for sensation in gene- 
ral, the things which are affecting it, 
must necessarily be some other beings, 
extraneous to both : but this inference 
which by habit immediately accompa- 
nies the conscious use of the senses, is 
knowledge rather than instinct. 

Now those beings which do not yield 
any signs of mind or capacities of sensa- 
tion, but exhibit upon our minds solid 
extension and other qualities in parti- 
cular, are termed material things ; — 
whilst such beings as yield the notion 
of their possessing life and understand- 



114 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS 

ing, are termed immaterial things. As 
far as these conclusions go, philosophy 
or the scrutiny of the most rigid analy- 
sis will support " common sense," or the 
simple relations arising from our original 
impressions ; — but since added to these 
conclusions, ordinary understandings 
conceive by a very natural association 
of thought, that the ideas of sensible qua- 
lities after the organs of sense have com- 
bined with exterior objects to their for- 
mation, are the very external material 
objects themselves; it is the business of 
an analytical philosophy, which intends 
to shew the entire method of the gene- 
ration of our notions, to break up this 
association. For an association of ideas 
merely, will never prove the existence 
of objects. A notion the fallacy of 
which some philosophers seem not to be 
sufficiently aware of. 



FURTHER CONSIDERED. 115 



Section IV. 

Dreams considered in connexion with the doctrine 
discussed in " the Essay on the relation of cause 
and effect;" viz. How the mind may form a judg- 
ment antecedently to trial of future effects from 
present appearances ? 

Upon the whole, therefore, although 
the appearances in dreams afford a 
ground for scepticism concerning the 
reality of external objects, yet this is 
only on account of the difficulty there 
is in answering the question, " By what 
" means we can know antecedently to 
" trial, how bodies shall fulfil the ex- 
" pectations raised by their appear- 
" ance." This question is agitated and 
answered as well as I found myself 
capable of doing, in the Essay on Cau- 
sation ; where it is discussed, " by what 
" means we can detect the presence 
" of like compound causes ?" for the 
objects in dreams and madness, appear 
the same in all present qualities, as real 
ones ; but they will not fulfil the ex- 



116 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS 

pectation of the future qualities their 
appearance is calculated to create. The 
same difficulty presents itself in all with 
which we have to do ; for as truly similar 
objects would necessarily appear the 
same, so where there is an appearance of 
similarity, we always consider it as a 
guiding circumstance by which to form a 
judgment of the future. In a sane and 
waking state, we compare such a cir- 
cumstance with many others, of which 
when in a dream or frenzy we are in- 
capable.* In the forming of our judg- 
ments upon this head, there is displayed 
every variety of intellect, through every 
gradation, from that of an almost total 
absence of it, to the wisest determina- 
tions, resulting from the soundest under- 
standings. 

But it is equally left for the idiotcy 
which is deficient in ideas, and that 
kind of philosophy which purposely sets 
them aside, to conceive the sensible qua- 
lities of things to be other than " signs 
of those secret powers' which may be 
* See Essay on Cause and Effect. 



FURTHER CONSIDERED, 117 

capable of exhibiting their further qua- 
lities, provided they appear to have 
been formed by such methods, as must 
necessarily determine objects similar to 
those, which have been heretofore so 
formed. 

The only notion which can create a 
scepticism upon this head when applied 
to the objects of our waking ideas, is 
the impossibility of knowing by ex- 
perience, whether the exterior causes of 
our ideas are so completely independant 
of our minds, that they will continue 
when these fail ; i. e. whether they are 
capable of the qualities of such com- 
plete exteriority and continuity of exist- 
ence, that there be no common bond of 
unperceived union in their respective 
essences. 

And if, indeed, the causes for specific 
sensations in particular, were necessarily 
mixed up with those which determined 
all sensations in general, in any one indi- 
vidual, the universe would be dissolved 
in the dissolution of such individual, 



118 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS 

which is inconceivable; although I 
hardly dare say we can perfectly demon- 
strate the contrary. 

In that case something would bear 
that relation to our waking and sound 
state of mind, which the brain does to 
a sleeping or insane one. Still we can- 
not in the least apprehend it ; and we 
are forced upon a dilemma, something 
analagous to what the mind frames in 
order to judge of the cause for the ro- 
tation of the seasons ; either, we say, 
" The sun moves round the earth, or, 
the earth round the sun;" the mind 
chooses to believe in the latter member 
of this dilemma, and never doubts 
after. So, the universe is contained 
in the existence of a single mind, or 
there are many minds, and many ob- 
jects which form the universe, and 
which have means to exhibit their 
existences on each other.* The latter 

* I find this idea is coincident with one of Priest- 
ley's, but I was not aware of his treatise until after 
the writing of this. 



FURTHER CONSIDERED. 119 

member of this dilemma, the philoso- 
pher chooses equally with the peasant, 
and never for one moment conceives, 
that on his death, an universal blank 
and non-existence will succeed. 

Mr. Hume, who perceived that Bishop 
Berkeley's doctrine led to so monstrous 
a conclusion, owned however that it did 
so ; and although he embraced it, yet 
he freely confessed that he never acted 
as if he believed it, " for that the spe- 
culations of the closet were forgotten in 
the world, and that he behaved as if he 
thought things were truly external to 
him." This confession adds no strength 
to their doctrine, and may well embolden 
one who pretends not to their learning 
or genius, to shew where was the omis- 
sion unknown to themselves in the 
course of their reasoning. 

But, however this subtle part of 
the question may be answered, it does 
not, in any degree, lessen the demon- 
strative conclusions of the foregoing ar- 
guments, namely, 



120 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS 

1st. That things must continually 
exist in order to be ready constantly to 
appear. 

2ndly, That the causes for particular 
kinds of sensations, must be external 
to the causes for its general essence or 
power. 

3rdly, That what is termed the mind 
is a continually existing essence, capa- 
city, or power in general. 

4thly, That what is deemed in the 
mind, is any particular state of sensa- 
tion at any given period. 

5thly, That the causes of things not 
in any given state of the mind, and yet 
capable of exhibiting certain qualities 
upon it, are out of it, whether fitted to 
create ideas of sensible qualities, or any 
other ideas. 

Gthly, That consideration is the appro- 
priate method to regain the ideas of 
memory, &c. but 

7thly, That the organs of sense are 
the instruments by which to regain the 
ideas of sensible qualities. 



FURTHER CONSIDERED. 121 

8thly, That of all those things which 
are out of any particular state of mind, 
those which regularly exhibit sensible 
qualities upon the use of the organs of 
sense prove themselves continually exist- 
ing, by such exhibitions. 

9thly, That in dreams, &c. there are 
no such regular returns upon the organs 
of sense; therefore, though the proxi- 
mate causes of sensible qualities exhi- 
bit their effects, yet there is wanting 
the proof of the continual existence of 
such causes, by which means they are 
discovered to be illusions, or objects, 
different from those for which their 
names were formed. 

lOthly, That the independancy which 
the causes of the objects of sense have 
of the capacity to general sensation, is 
proved by their affecting changes of 
qualities, of which the mind has no 
conscience. — But I shall finish this long 
discussion by remarking that this, and 
similar essays are not intended to prove, 
that there is but one method which God 
and Nature could employ, to arrive at 

G 



122 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS, &C. 

the same ends ; but rather to analyse the 
complex operations of our minds, with 
such care and nicety, as may show what 
possibly consistent method has been 
used in the generation of our belief of 
external nature ; and afterwards to exa- 
mine if reason will support the notions, 
which have been formed concerning it. 
I shall therefore now proceed to draw 
that inference from the whole doctrine, 
which was originally the foundation of 
the observations in this treatise; and 
which although so long deferred, must 
at length claim that share of our notice 
its importance demands. 



123 



CHAPTER V. 

ON THE NATURE OF OBJECTS WHEN 
ACTING AS CAUSES. 

The action of cause to be considered as external to 
mind. — Remark on the vague and popular use of 
the word Cause. — Sensible qualities not the causes 
of other sensible qualities. — Two kinds of neces- 
sary connexion. 

I resume the subject therefore by call- 
ing upon the reader's attention to ob- 
serve, that objects, when contemplated 
singly as the efficient causes of nature, 
are to be considered in their outward 
unperceived state, and as yet uncon- 
joined with each other. 

2. That although numbers of objects 
may be needful towards any result, yet 
in a popular way, each may be called 

g 2 



124 ON THE NATURE OF OBJECTS 

the cause of an event, when each is ab- 
solutely necessary in order to that result. 
Philosophy does not get rid of an incom- 
plete manner of thinking on this sub- 
ject, and thus talks of cause and effect 
following each other, &c. &c. ; whereas it 
is the union of all the objects absolutely 
necessary to any given end, which forms a 
new object, whose new qualities are the 
effects, ox properties of those objects when 
uncombined ; and which must be syn- 
chronous with the existence of the newly- 
formed object; and only subsequent to 
the existence of the previous objects, 
when in their uncombined state. — But 
the entire union of the objects, is always 
considered, and is the proximate cause of 
any event ; and therefore is one with it. 
Now all the exterior and uncombined 
objects, whose junction is necessary to 
an event, may be considered as one 
grand compound object ; and may, un- 
der that idea, be termed and spoken of 
in the singular number : and when con- 
templated previously to their union may 
also be considered to be prior in the 



WHEN ACTING AS CAUSES. 125 

order of time, as the cause of a future 
object.* 

In all our reasonings, the word cause 
is rendered ambiguous, by applying it 
equally to a part of what is necessary to 
an end, as well as to the whole of what is 
necessary ; and to existing objects 
united to that end, as well as disunited 
to it; a fruitful source of much unsound 
reasoning in some of the best authors. 

3. The ideas and sensations of the 
sensible qualities of things, can never be 
the causes of other sensible qualities of 
things.-^ It is not the sensible qualities 
of fire which burn, of bread which 
nourish ; it is not the idea or conception 
of the cohesion of parts which cause the 
sensation of hardness; — it is a certain 
number of amassed, unknown, external 
qualities, which determine to the senses 
different qualities as conjoined effects — 
" The sensation of hardness is not a 
" natural sign of an external quality of 

* This I do presently, in speaking of identity. 
f See Essay VI. 



126 ON THE NATURE OF OBJECTS 

" firm cohesion of parts unlike a sensa- 
" tion."* — It is a sign only of another 
coexistent effect with itself determined 
from the same unknown, external object. 
This impossibility of sensible qualities, 
being the productive principle of sen- 
sible qualities, lies at the root of all Mr. 
Hume's controversy concerning the man- 
ner of causation ;| for he, observing that 
such ideas could only follow one another, 
resolved causation into the observation of 

* See Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind, c. 5, 
sec. 5, " Let a man press his hand against the 
table," &c. 

f It is this view of things which explains the 
reason of all the difficulty, inconsistency, irresolu- 
tion, and unsatisfactory discussions upon cause, 
laws of nature, &c. in the writings of Stewart, Reid, 
and others — Even Mr. Prevost, who clearly per- 
ceives Stewart's ambiguity in assigning the same 
meaning to the word cause, as to other antecedents, 
fails to perceive wherein lies the true nature of 
power ; wherein consists that manner of action be- 
tween objects, by which there arises " the producing 
principle" of other objects. See Stewart's Philoso- 
phy of the Human Mind, c. 4, sec. 1, to p. 333. 
Note O, to ditto, vol. 2, Appendix to ditto, art. 2. 
Reid's Inquiry, c. 6, sec. 24. 



WHEN ACTING AS CAUSES. 127 

the customary antecedency and subsequency 
of sensible qualities. But objects, when 
spoken of and considered as causes, 
should always be considered as those 
masses of unknown qualities in nature, 
exterior to the organs of sense, whose 
determination of sensible qualities to 
the senses forms one class of their effects; 
whereas philosophers, (with the excep- 
tion of Berkeley,) and mankind in 
general, look upon the masses of sensi- 
ble qualities after determination to 
the senses as the causes, the antecedents, 
the productive principles of other masses 
of sensible qualities, which are their 
effects or subsequents ; a notion naturally 
arising from the powerful style of the 
associations in the mind, and which 
our Maker has ordained for practical 
purposes ; — but monstrous when held as 
an abstract truth in analytical science. 

In a loose and popular way, men un- 
doubtedly conceive the sensible qualities 
of a loaf of bread for instance, which 
are determined to the eye and the 
touch, (through intimate association,) 



128 ON THE NATURE OF OBJECTS 

as existing outwardly, along with the 
natural substance or particles of bread ; 
and consider, that that whole will nou- 
rish them ; but this notion is very dif- 
ferent from conceiving that whiteness and 
solidity will nourish ; they never do thus 
think ; they never consider the sensible 
qualities alone as the true causes of 
nourishment ; and if allowed to think 
and explain themselves upon the sub- 
ject, would show that they supposed the 
same mass which outwardly determined 
by its action on the eye a particular 
colour, and to the touch a certain con- 
sistency, would, on meeting with the sto- 
mach, satisfy hunger :— In short, concomi- 
tant, or " successive sensible qualities," 
are considered by all men when they 
come to analyse their notions, (and 
ought to be so held by philosophers,) 
as concomitant or successive effects, 
arising from the different actions of an ex- 
ternal independant object, meeting either at 
the same time, or successively, with different 
instruments of sense with which it unites. — 
Thus, the antecedency and subsequency 



WHEN ACTING AS CAUSES. 129 

of certain respective aggregates of 
sensible qualities, must necessarily be 
invariable in like circumstances ; for 
they are successive and similar effects, from 
successive and similar causes, instead 
of the succession itself forming essential 
cause and effect. Whiteness, consistency, 
and nourishment, are as many invariable 
and successive effects, arising from an 
unknown object, exterior to the instru- 
ments of sense, and independant of 
mind ; which, formed after a certain 
fashion, and meeting successively with 
the eye, the touch, and the stomach, 
determines its successive sensible qua- 
lities. # 

Thus it is in like manner through- 
out all nature ; — and such a view of the 
subject would cure the error, which 
has of late crept into the works of sci- 
ence ; namely, the considering con- 
joined or successive effects from a com- 
mon cause, as possessing the nature of 
the connection of cause and effect. 

" When things are found together, an 
* See Locke. 

g5 



130 ON THE NATURE OF OBJECTS 

" ultimate law of nature is * supposed 
"to be found/' and an enquiry after 
cause as a productive principle, proves an 
ignorance of that new and improved light 
which the labours of Mr. Hume, Dr. 
Browne, and others, have thrown upon 
the doctrine of causation. Whereas, 
causes, or objects, previous to their 
union with the instruments of sense 
and the powers of sensation, from whose 
junction are created the very sensible 
qualities themselves, must be exterior 
to, and independant of both ; whilst 
the regular successions of sensible qualities, 
are in their turn entirely dependant 
upon the regular successions of such 
junctions. 

4. The necessary connection therefore 
of cause and effect, arises from the obli- 
gation, that like qualities should arise 
from the junction, separation, admix- 
ture, &c. of like aggregates of external 
qualities. But the necessary connec- 
tion of invariable antecedency and subse- 

* See Lawrence's Lectures, from p. 80 to 84. 



WHEN ACTING AS CAUSES. 131 

quency of successive aggregates of sensi- 
ble qualities, arises from the necessity 
there is, that there should be invariable 
sequences of effects, when one common 
cause (or exterior object) mixes suc- 
cessively with different organs of sense, 
or various parts of the human frame, 
&c. 

Of this obvious and important distinc- 
tion, between these two kinds of neces- 
sary connection, the authors alluded to 
take no notice. 

But I must now advert to an observa- 
tion of another description, it being not 
only necessary for the sake of clearness, 
but also immediately relevant in this 
place, where we are speaking of the 
different notions we form of objects ; 
i. e. when we consider them as masses 
of unknown, exterior qualities. 

I allude to the proper definition and 
use of the word idea — upon which the 
whole of the foregoing treatise has an 
influence;* and the understanding of 

* M. de Condillac most justly observes, " that 
" there is a great difficulty in finding a fit place for 



132 ON THE NATURE OF OBJECTS, &C. 

which will greatly facilitate the compre- 
hension of the mystery intended to be 
unfolded to whoever has sufficient zeal, 
curiosity, and patience, to undertake a 
second perusal of these pages. 

" important definitions — If they are entered upon 
" too early, it is before their analysis proves their 
" propriety — If too late, the just views they may 
" include, are wanted in vain for their purpose." — 
This is precisely the case in which I find myself 
with respect to the definition of the word idea. 



133 



CHAPTER VI. 

OX THE USE OF THE WORD IDEA IN 
THIS TREATISE, AND CURSORY OB- 
SERVATIONS ON ITS NATURE AND 
PROPER USE IN GENERAL, &C. 

Section I. 

The word idea is used as signifying a distinct class 
of sensations ; as a sign in relation to continuous 
existences not present to the mind ; — Berkeley's 
ambiguous use of the word. — Objects in the mind 
compounded of sensations, {by means of the or- 
gans of sense,) and Ideas the result of their re- 
lations per xeivedby the understanding. — Evidence 
for the existence of the different parts of the same 
object unequal. — Objects of memory how com- 
pounded. — The continuous existence of an indivi- 
dual mind, or self, an inference from the relations 
which exist between the idea of remembered exist- 
ence, and the sensation of present existence. — The 
idea of existence in general, how found as an ab- 
straction from each sensation in particular, 

I use the word idea, as signifying a distinct 
class of sensations, being the result of that 
reasoning or observation which shows 



134 ON THE USE OF 

that under certain conditions, there must 
needs be an existence when we cannot 
perceive it. In such is included the 
evidence for memory of the past ; of such 
is compounded expectation of the future. 
Thus we have an idea of continual, un- 
perceived, independant existence ; — but 
only have a consciousness or sensation of 
dependant, interrupted, and perceived 
existence ; whenever I have used it in 
any other sense, it is in a popular man- 
ner signifying notion or object of thought, 
&c. 

Berkeley used the word idea ambigu- 
ously, for the perception of combined 
sensible qualities called an object; and 
for a result of reasoning which yielded 
him an idea that there must be causes 
for his perceptions ; which causes he con- 
sidered the actions of a spirit. Thus the 
word idea has been indiscriminately used 
both by him and others, for the conscious- 
ness of the sensible qualities, which arise 
from the use of the organs of sense, in 
relation to external beings, and for the 
conclusions of the understanding, after 



THE WORD IDEA. 135 

surveying the various relations and cir- 
cumstances, attendant on these sensible 
qualities. Now objects in our conscious 
apprehensions are compounded of each 
of these kinds of ideas; or rather of 
sensations of sensible qualities, and sensa- 
tions of ideas. — They are not only blue 
or red, sweet or sour, hard or soft, beau- 
tiful or ugly, warm or cold, loud or low ; 
but the ideas of their causes are included 
in their names as conti?iually existing, and 
that even when the organs of sense are 
shut. 

Had I not been fearful of interrupting 
the main and important object of this 
Essay, by diverting, and perhaps en- 
grossing the reader's attention in enter- 
ing on the scholastic and unsettled dis- 
pute concerning the meaning of the word 
idea, I should have followed the sug- 
gestions of a strict philosophy, by more 
fully developing the notion, that all con- 
sciousnesses whatever ought to be ranked 
under the one generic term, sensation; 
and that these should be divided into 
the sensations of 'present sensible qualities ; 



136 ON THE USE OF 

sensations of the ideas of memory, sensa- 
tions of the ideas of imagination, sensations 
of the ideas of reason, §c. 

Thus simple sensation has many vari- 
eties of kinds. When it refers to no 
other existence than itself, it should be 
considered as sensation properly and im- 
mediately. In this sense we have the 
sensation of an idea; but then idea 
refers to an existence always considered 
independant of sensation ; which idea is 
only its sign, representative, image, or 
whatever name it may please philosophy 
to term it. Therefore our sensations in- 
clude the notion of existences, which 
have existed, may exist, will exist, must 
needs exist, but whose qualities are not 
presently determined upon the mind.* 

* A strict Idealist who really will not admit the 
knowledge of any thing but his own sensations, 
and thus refuses to believe in insentient qualities, 
ought, if consistent, to reject memory of the past 
and expectation of the future, and to admit nothing 
but each sensation as it rises as an existence ; for the 
existences (i. e. the sensations) which are past, and 
to come, are as much and entirely exterior to, and 
independant of, present sensations, as any insen- 



THE WORD IDEA. 137 

Objects of memory are compounded 
of the fainter sensations of sensible qua- 
lities, mixed with the idea that the 
causes of the original impressions are 
removed ; (the which idea is the re- 
sult either of observation or reasoning ;) 
these again are united with the per- 
ception of the lapse of time, or of our 
own continuous existence going on be- 
tween the original moment of the im- 
pressions, and the existence of the pre- 
sent faint sensible qualities. Therefore 
the objects of memory are, masses of sensible 
qualities plus the idea of past time, plus the 
idea of having been caused by causes now 
removed. And thus the idea of tim e is not 
itself a mere sensible quality ; for although 
the present moment be but a sensation of 

tient existence whatever can be of sensation in 
general. Both may be known by receiving the 
evidence arising from the comparison of ideas, but 
they must stand or fall together. — I insert this note 
in consequence of a late conversation with a modern 
Idealist, who carries the notion so far as to assert, 
that there is no evidence for any existing sensations 
but his own. 



138 ON THE USE OF 

immediate existence ; yet the past mo- 
ment is only remembered in the present ; 
and the memory of it is its idea, and not 
the very sensation itself: and this me- 
mory o£ past existence, and this sensation of 
present existence, includes in their union a 
corollary, which is the result of a relation 
that exists between the idea of remem- 
bered existence, and the sensation of 
present existence ; namely, that there 
"must needs be" a continued capacity 
in nature, fitted to unite memory to 
sense, and fitted to continue existence, 
which itself is neither memory nor sense ; 
for each particular memory, and each 
particular sense passes away — but the 
powers of memory and sensation in ge- 
neral continue to exist, of which each 
particular memory and sense arises as a 
change, and " a change could not begin 
of itself."* — " Thus the notion of time 

* It is this primeval truth, " That no quality 
can begin its own existence/' which is the key to 
every difficulty that concerns the sources of our 
belief or knowledge. 

M. de Condillac's system, (which I have read 



THE WORD IDEA. 139 

is an idea the result of reasoning ; but 
time itself is a capacity in nature fitted 
to the continuance of any existence." 

Again, ideas of imagination are faint 
images of sensible qualities unmixed with 
any notions concerning time ; whose causes 
are considered as at present removed 
from their operation on the senses ; and 
variously compounded by the influence 
of fancy, or rendered more or less viva- 
cious by its power. 

Thus the objects of memory and 
imagination differ as to the nature 
of their component parts, and not 

since writing these papers,) notwithstanding its 
extreme beauty of conception, and close reasoning 
in general, falls in my judgment very early to the 
ground ; for he supposes the statue " to generate 
the idea of self by the perception of the succession 
of faint and strong scents only." This is a most 
important oversight — Self is always considered 
as a continuity, and is generated by the sense of 
continuous life, and the idea of its continued object 
which is the subject matter of all the changes. — So 
well was M. de Condillac aware that this notion 
was necessary to prove exteriority, that he shifts his 
ground in the chapter upon touch. 



140 ON THE USE OF 

merely as to the comparatively higher 
vivacity of those of imagination: — A 
puerile notion, on which however Mr. 
Hume has reared the whole fallacy of 
his system with respect to that belief 
by which expectation of similar future ef- 
fects arises upon the presence of similar 
causes. — He argues, that because what 
are called real things yield vivacious 
images, therefore the mind considers all 
vivacious images as real ; and thus be- 
lieves in those future qualities of things, 
which are associated in a lively manner 
by memory with present impressions. 

Berkeley has also this fallacy in an- 
swering the objection made to his doc- 
trine when his adversary advances, that 
mere ideas cannot be real things, namely, 
" That the superior order and vivacity 
" of some ideas above others make the 
" whole distinction between what the vul- 
" gar deem real, or illusory objects" 

Now vivacity being one of the qua- 
lities usually accompanying the objects 
which impress the sense, it must neces- 
sarily belong to such, as a component 



THE WORD IDEA. 141 

part of their whole effects, and there- 
fore, other things being equal which 
influence the judgment, vivacity of sen- 
sible qualities, will as one of their 
effects be ever referred to such objects ; 
and the remainder of their qualities 
will be expected to be fulfilled in con- 
sequence. Belief, therefore, (in this 
case,) and expectation in consequence, 
arises, 1st. From the necessity that like 
effects should have like causes ; and 
2ndly, From the probability that such 
should be conjoined with such apparent 
causes as those with which nature usually 
unites them ; and therefore will fulfil 
the remainder of the definitions, which 
the complex exterior objects bear: and 
this trust in the regularity of nature in 
forming her compound objects alike, is 
on account of regularity itself being an 
effect which must have its equal cause. 
So little is merely a vivacity of image 
trusted to in a sane and waking state 
of mind, as indicative of the real pre- 
sence of the exterior objects which in- 
fluence the sense, that the mind, in 



142 ON THE USE OF 

many cases, perceiving surrounding cir- 
cumstances differ, justly doubts upon this 
matter. 

Then thirdly, the ideas which are the 
result of reasoning testify, as mere signs, 
the existences of things, which are not 
sensations. 

Now objects in the mind are aggre- 
gates of the sensations of sensible qua- 
lities, and of the sensations of the ideas 
of memory, reason, imagination, ex- 
pectation, &c. variously compounded : 
And hence there arises a reason why the 
evidence of the certain existence of different 
parts of the same object must necessarily 
be unequal. For the sensible qualities 
have an immediate incontrovertible evi- 
dence, from the consciousness of their 
immediate presence. — They are felt — 
and the feelings are themselves the very 
existences. — But the evidence from me- 
mory, and reason, can never rise higher 
than memory and reason are capable of 
testifying. 

These sensible qualities equally exist 
in an hallucination of mind, as in its 



THE WORD IDEA. 143 

sane state, and however incongruous 
they appear they do and must exist; 
but if a conclusion be drawn amiss in 
reasoning, if the memory be treacherous, 
or the judgment erroneous, then in such 
cases, these false ideas being mixed 
up and associated even with the most 
clear and orderly set of sensible qua- 
lities, would render the evidence for the 
existence of such an object, (or aggregate of 
various qualities,) ambiguous and unequal. 
Thus it cannot be denied but that the whole 
objects present to our consciousness, 
contain parts of unequal evidence as to 
their existence; some of which some- 
times failing, yield a just ground of 
scepticism ; — a scepticism, which how- 
ever, should never rise higher nor ex- 
tend further than the irregularity of na- 
ture justifies ; for as is the effect, so is 
the cause — the balance of regularity, 
and irregularity, we hold in our hands ; 
these are effects, and their causes must 
hitherto have been equal to them, and 
unless some interference is observed, 
or supposed possible, should reason- 



144 ON THE USE OF 

ably beget in the mind a proportional 
reliance for the future. But if in any 
instance whatever, there had been hi- 
therto perfect regularity, yet it would 
not thence follow there were an equal 
demonstration for the future ; and that 
because we are ignorant of the cause 
for the regularity ; and cases might be 
supposed in future to occur, where a 
difference would be absolutely neces- 
sary in the apparent course of nature, or 
providence to take place. We have 
very strong evidence which goes to 
prove that single varieties, to otherwise 
universal experience, have taken place 
with respect to both kinds. That is, 
there have been single exceptions to uni- 
versal experience, which seem to have 
had no precise end in view, nor to have 
contributed to any end whatever; and 

THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN OTHERS 
WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE USE OF, AS 
MEANS TO AN END, AND WHERE MOST 
MATERIAL EVENTS HAVE ENSUED IN 
CONSEQUENCE. 

The former kind, when well attested, 



THE WORD IDEA. 145 

men seem not to find any difficulty in 
believing ; — of the latter they are in- 
finitely more incredulous and jealous 
in receiving the testimony. — Indeed, 
it must be allowed that a marvel- 
lous event becomes a very different object 
of attention when it presents itself to 
our notice, not merely as singular of its 
kind, and one whose causes are not obvi- 
ous, but, also as one which by its manner 
of 'production, forces the mind upon the 
inference, that as the apparently imme- 
diate cause is inadequate, therefore cer- 
tain other alledged causes both adequate 
and necessary are the true ones.* In 
each of these cases there are true miracles; 
i. e. marvellous events, singular exceptions 
to nature's course ; but the latter only 
affords what ought to be termed mira- 
culous evidence to a doctrine ; or in other 
words a similarity in the course of nature, 
ivith respect to the necessity and action of 
efficient cause, but a variety from its ap- 
parent regularity, in order to be used as a 
means towards a specific end. 

* See further, the Essay on Miracles. 

H 



146 ON THE USE OF 

This difference between the singu- 
larity of an event and its intention; be- 
tween an insulated and surprising fact, 
and the object to be gained by it, is 
not shown (that I know of) by writers 
on this head. That there are such facts 
without any doctrine being in question, 
which are attested and reasonably be- 
lieved in (and that " with full assurance 
of faith,") at once dissolves the whole 
fabric of Hume's argument on the 
matter; and that whether a doctrine 
be true or false, — whether there be reli- 
gious miracles or not : because he points 
his force against the absurdity of ad- 
mitting evidence which testifies to the 
occurrence of an event, different/to??* 
the course of experience ; out of the order 
of the apparent train of cause and effect, 
and which he terms the course of nature. 
Whereas men very well know that 
nature, whatever her apparent course 
may be, still keeps them (( at a great 
" distance from all her secrets ;" from the 
knowledge of the precisely efficient cause 
acting in any particular case, and there- 



THE WORD IDEA. 147 

fore, that there is nothing contrary to her 
real course, (by means of some secret 
efficient cause) that singular varieties 
should take place ; and for this reason 
they conceive that evidence ought to be 
admitted on the subject. The examina- 
tion, reception, or rejection of evidence 
on it, tries the intellects of men much in 
the same way as other things do, but 
their hearts still more when it concerns 
the subject of religion. 

It thence follows that a regularity 
with respect to certain events in one 
country, does not prove there must be 
the same regularity in another. Nor 
does that which is a regular appearance 
at one age of the world, prove the same 
must exist in all ages of the world. 

Nor do the usual actions of God's pro- 
vidence which are most wise in order to 
our reliance on his modes of opera- 
tion, prove that he will never alter his 
action, if he should intend to convince 
us in any case of his immediate pre- 
sence. But to return to the more im- 
mediate object of this chapter, it follows 

ii 2 



148 ON THE USE OF 

from the reasoning adduced in it, that 
both Mr. Hume and Dr. Reid are 
wrong in their notions arising from the 
observation " that the real table can suffer 
" no alteration, as we recede further from 
" it, although it appears to diminish"* 
Mr. Hume hence argues, that we can- 
not see a real table, but the image or 
idea of a table only; and that thus 
" we can have no absolute communication 
" by the senses with external objects" 

And Dr. Reid answers, " that we 
" have such communication, because a real 
" table would by the laws of optics, thus 
" diminish upon the sight" Now the 
truth is, that no real table is formed, 
no image of a table is formed, unless 
the whole united mass of the unknown 
objects in nature exterior to, and in- 
dependant of the instruments of sense, 
(not yet worthy of the name of " table,") 
unite with the mechanical action of 
these, and by their means with the 
sentient principle, in order to create in 

* See Reid " on the Intellectual Powers/' for 
Hume's objection, and Reid's answer. 



THE WORD IDEA. 149 

such an union that object which alone 
can properly be termed " table." 
Yet after experience, ^Ae outward ob- 
jects, the CONTINUALLY EXISTING 

parts of the whole causes necessary 
to the creation of a table, must be 
named by the name by which the whole 
is named ; for there is no other name 
whereby they can be called, nor any 
other ideas by which the memory of 
them can be introduced into the mind, 
save by the appearance of " the faint 
images of those sensible qualities" which 
their presence originally created.* 
*See page 137. 



150 



CHAPTER VII. 

APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE CON- 
TAINED IN THE PRECEDING ESSAY 
TO THE EVIDENCE OF OUR BELIEF 
IN SEVERAL OPINIONS. 

Section I. 
The foundation of our belief in God. 

Assuming I have proved to the satis- 
faction of the reader, the existence of 
' ' body " and of the " external universe/' 
it remains to point out a few inferences 
from the doctrine, of sufficient import- 
ance to justify a further intrusion upon 
the patience of the reader ; and which 
have always equally interested the 
minds of the learned and the unlearned. 
These principally relate, — 

1 . To the existence of Deity. 

2. To our own identity ; and the na- 
ture of body and mind. 



BELIEF IN GOD. 151 

3. To that intimation which the mind 
receives of outward objects not yet sup- 
posed to exist, but with respect to 
which all ideas of delusion are rejected, 
such as prophecies, instincts, &c. 

4. To the comprehension of the na- 
ture of the unperceived causes of our 
sensations. 

1. As to the existence of God, let it 
be remembered that all our belief con- 
cerning every proposition, is the result 
of what we conceive to be the consistent 
relations of ideas present in the mind. 
Now I have shown, that these relations 
force our minds to believe in continuous 
existences unperceived. It is upon 
similar premises that we build the 
foundation of our belief in Deity. For 
after some contemplation upon the phe- 
nomena of nature, we conclude, that in 
order to account for the facts we per- 
ceive, " there must needs be " one con- 
tinuous existence, one uninterrupted 
essentially existing cause, one intelli- 
gent being, " ever ready to appear" as 
the renovating power for all the depend- 



152 BELIEF IN GOD. 

ant effects, all the secondary causes 
beneath our view. To devout minds, 
this notion becomes familiar and clear ; 
and being mixed with the sensible im- 
pressions of goodness, wisdom, and 
power, begets those habitual sentiments 
of fear, trust, and love, which it is 
reasonable to perceive and to enjoy. 
Our constantly familiar friend, whose 
presence we speak of, and whose qua- 
lities we love and admire, affords us no 
further proof for his existence and his 
qualities, than the reasoning adduced in 
this book : — He must needs be another 
being than ourselves, having qualities 
which are not our own, but his, that are 
sufficient to engage our sympathy, or 
the relations of our thoughts would be 
rendered inconsistent with each other. 

Section II. 

The knowledge of our own independant existence — 
how gained* 

Again, the idea of our own independ- 
ant existence is generated by observing, 
that the compound mass we term self 



IDENTITY. 153 

can exist when we do not observe 
it; and we have thus the idea of our 
own existence, in that it needs must 
continue to exist when unperceived, as 
well as during the sensation of it when 
perceived. Besides, on this subject, as 
every other, it is to the causes for the 
constant effects, (the objects whose union 
shall bear out similar results,) to which 
there is a tacit reference as the true and 
continued existences in nature : — ■ 

Now the causes for the general powers 
of sensation cannot be the same as those 
for any particular sensation, and so must 
be independant of each ;* and indeed 
each sensation is always felt as an effect, 
as " beginning to be ;" therefore what we 
allude to as self, is a continued ex- 
isting capacity in nature, (unknown, 
unperceived,) fitted to revive when sus- 
pended in sleep, or otherwise, and to 
keep up during the periods of watchful- 
ness the powers of life and consciousness, 
especially those which determine the 
union of memory with sense. For as sen- 

* See p. 83, 84, " It is such a perception," &c. 

H 5 



154 IDENTITY. 

sation is interrupted, and is an effect ; the 
original cause must be uninterrupted ; and 
such an uninterrupted cause as is equal 
to keep up the life of the body, or mass 
deemed our own body, and to unite it 
under that form with the powers of me- 
mory and sense : Identity, therefore, 
has nothing to do with sameness of parti- 
cles, but only has relation to those 
powers in nature (flowing from that con- 
tinuous Being the God of Nature,) which 
are capable of giving birth to that con- 
stant effect, the sense of continuous exist- 
ence ; which sense, when analysed, is 
the union of the ideas of memory, with 
the impressions of present sense. Should 
it be objected that the causes for such 
an union might be interrupted ; then 
as these would " begin their existences" 
and would only be effects, the mind would 
go backwards till it reposed in some un- 
interrupted cause, and would consider 
such, and such only, as an independant 
capacity in nature, fitted to excite the 
union of memory with present sense, 
and as the complicate being self; which 



BODY AND MIND. 155 

when conscious, could take notice of its 
existence, and when unconscious, (as 
in sound sleep) could exist independantly 
of its own observation. 



Section III. 

Observations on the essential difference between 
body and mind. 

Hence also may be seen all the essen- 
tial difference between body and mind ; — 
Body is the continually exciting cause, 
for the exhibition of the perception of 
extension and solidity on the mind in par- 
ticular; and mind is the capacity or 
cause, for sensation in general. And 
these two must be different in "then 
proportions among themselves," (in 
their unperceived state,) as well as in 
their "positive values" in their perceived 
state.* Now whether these causes or 
capacities can exist separate from each 
other, is the question which is always 
asked, and still remains unanswered in 
* See p. 38. 



156 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 

philosophy. Abstractedly there seems 
no hindrance for such separate exist- 
ence. Practically, sensation in general 
is never known, but in company with that 
which excites the sensation of extension 
in particular, and which seems so much 
a part of the whole causes necessary for 
sensation in general, that under the 
form and action of the brain, it only 
seems capable of being elicited. Still 
we know not whether in many other 
beings, sensations may not go on with- 
out brain, and whether, where ideas 
have once been generated through its 
means, some other causes in nature may 
not be equal to keeping them up — ana- 
logous to the power there is in this state 
of being, by which we recollect the 
images of colours, and sounds ; of be- 
ings, or virtues, &c. &c. without the 
use of those organs of sense, which were 
at first necessary to the formation of 
such notions. It is here Mr. Lawrence 
is illogical, for he assigns a "false cause," 
an unproved cause as the foundation for 



BODY AND MIND. 157 

sentiency, when he ascribes it as the 
quality of the living nerve only ; for we 
do not know by any experience we have, 
that all and only, what we mean by 
nerve, will elicit sentiency.* We can- 
not produce it by any means in our 
power ; it has been begun and is con- 
tinued, without our having had any part 
in the consultation which took place when 
God said, " Let us make man in our 
image after our likeness." 

I confess I think the farther we extend 
our views into the regions of metaphysics, 
the more possible and probable does the 
resurrection from the dead appear ; or at 
least an existence analogous to it. For 
it is evident, more is wanted for the ca- 
pacity for sensation in general, than that 
exterior cause which is necessary for 
the exhibition of extension in particular ; 
which extension in many varieties ap- 
pears insentient. Various effects must 
have proportional causes, and therefore 



* See Locke's Essay on Human Understanding, 
b. 4, c. 6, s. 17. 



158 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 

there must be some extraneous reason 
for sentiency, beyond what is absolutely 
necessary for mere insentient extension ; 
— Yet it has been said, extension seems 
to form a part at least of that combina- 
tion of powers which elicits sentiency. 
Now if the causes for sentiency, minus 
the brain, find in the great womb of na- 
ture, any other cause equal to the brain, 
a finer body, an ethereal stimulus, or 
any thing which may help to unite me- 
mory with sense, then the difficulty at- 
tending the notion of the resurrection 
vanishes. 

It would appear therefore equally in- 
conclusive for man to argue against the 
possibility of a future life on account of 
the dispersion of the particles of the 
present gross body by death, as for the 
worm to suppose it could not again live 
because its outside crust wholly pe- 
rishes : — He might resist every notion 
(however prompted by his instinct or 
his wishes,) of an existence beyond the 
range of his present experience, beyond 
the extent of the leaf on which he is 



BODY AND MIND. 159 

born to die; yet the time would equally 
arrive, when as a winged insect he 
would roam through boundless space in 
comparison of the circumscribed spot to 
which his former existence was con- 
fined, and chase the brilliant image of 
himself, through a live-long summer's 
day, amidst the sweets of a thousand 
flowers. 

Man in his present state, feels occa- 
casional aspirations towards another, 
prompted by the craving want of some 
unknown unimaginable good, of which 
he has no intimation but from the con- 
sciousness of an unsatisfied capacity : — 
Let him not then too easily reject the 
belief that this capacity has a corres- 
ponding object, that his nature is ca- 
pable of a nobler modification, a higher 
flight in more exalted regions than this, 
and enlarged as to every power of ac- 
tion, thought, and enjoyment. 



160 INSTINCTS AND 



Section IV. 

Cursory observations on instincts and prophetic 
vision. 

Instincts # give notions of real beings, 
if the objects to which they point fulfil 
their whole qualities. It is consistent 
with the previous doctrine, that instinct 
be an action of the brain excited inde- 
pendant of impression, in the first in- 
stance from external objects, but after- 
wards capable of being kept up by their 
means. For as the brain is the expo- 
nent of the soul, so any of its actions 
whatever, being either the effect of an 
impression from an outward object, or 
brought about by any other cause ade- 
quate to a given action, would equally 
give rise to the idea of the corresponding 
object; as in dreams, &c. But in dreams 
the objects do not fulfil the whole qua- 

* As for instance, the instincts of birds give them 
notions of the materials requisite for making 1 their 
nest previously to a first formation. 



PROPHETIC VISION. 161 

lities expected of them, from the first 
impressions made upon the mind : in 
instincts it is otherwise — for after the 
first impressions begin to fade, the 
images can be renewed by the acquaint- 
ance made with those external objects, 
which are not only capable of fulfilling 
the first expectation formed of them, 
but also of affording a regular and con- 
stant reply to the demands of the organs 
of sense. 

In like manner, prophecy is also true 
prophecy, if a lively action of the brain, 
does through any cause whatever which 
produces it, testify the future existence 
of such things as do really happen after- 
wards, in such fulness, and order, and 
perfection as renders it improbable that 
the coincidence of the prophecy and 
the events which arrive, could take place 
by chance. The probable evidence be- 
fore the accomplishment of a prophecy 
that it will be accomplished, must arise 
from a number of collateral circum- 
stances, which, after accomplishment, 



162 NATURE OF 

have much to do in rendering it of inte- 
rest, veracity, and importance. 

Section V. 

On the knowledge of the nature of unperceived 
objects. 

With respect to the nature of unper- 
ceived objects I shall take notice, that 
we can form some ideas of their natures 
by subtracting from them equally that 
which is common to all, viz. the action 
of the instruments of sense and the mind. 
For although it be true that nothing can 
be like any sensation, but a sensation ; 
yet it does not follow, but that there 
may be qualities connected with our 
sensations, and arising out of them, 
which we perceive have not sensation 
for their essence, and so may belong 
to insentient natures. Now it is - by- 
separating the idea of sensation in gene- 
ral from the ideas of particular sensa- 
tions,* that we gain the notion of exist- 

* See the short essay, That sensible qualities 
cannot be causes. 



UNPERCEIVED OBJECTS. '163 

ence which need not necessarily be 
sentient;* for as the capacity for sensa- 
tion in general, or mind, cannot be 
contained in any one sensation in par- 
ticular, so it cannot in all ; and therefore 
in like manner, as there is one eye, but 
many colours and figures, so there must 
be one capacity, but many sensations — 
one continually existing power, of which 
these are but the changes. f 

Again, as variety does not depend 
upon sensation as its essence, so we per- 
ceive that variety may take place among 
any supposed existences whatever; and 
not only so, but that the quality itself 
of variety when unperceived, will be 
like perceived variety, in as far as it is 
variety; and that such a quality must 
necessarily exist amidst that set of won- 
derful objects which is neither contained 

* See the note page 42 of the essay on cause and 
effect, and pp. 42, 83, 84, 182 of this essay. 

f It is supposed here that the reader has acqui- 
esced in the Doctrine of the foregoing Essay, 
" That qualities cannot begin their own existence," 
and that the union of qualities or objects is neces- 
sary to form new existences. 



164 NATURE OF 

in the uniform capacity called mind, or 
the uniform action of the organs of 
sense, and which therefore we justly 
consider as forming an universe inde- 
pendant of both. 

Thus the ocean must be vast, in compa- 
rison of a drop of water, when both are 
unperceived. Time, in union with the 
powers of sensation, may be measured by 
a succession of ideas in the fancy ; but 
time in nature, and unperceived, measures, 
and is not measured by, the succession 
of events, whether sensations or not; 
as the revolution of seasons ; the birth 
and fall of empires ; the change of har- 
mony to chaos, or of chaos to harmony. 
— Again, subtract the organs of sense, 
from the most minute divisions of mat- 
ter, and they are only little in compa- 
rison with what is large ; and the ques- 
tion concerning the infinite divisibility 
of matter, resolves itself into the impos- 
sibility of the imagination conceiving 
and not conceiving of a thing at the same 
time — -for the conditions of the problem 
are, that something is to be imagined 



UNPERCEIVED OBJECTS. 165 

too small for the imagination to con- 
ceive ; and to imagine it under the forms 
of an extension, which extension is 
not conceivable when unperceived either 
by the senses, or the imagination ; 
whereas we know not what extension 
unperceived is, although I am willing 
to concede a mite cannot be the same as 
the globe, not only with respect to that 
condition of being which, when exhibited 
upon the eye or touch, yields the notion of 
extension, but which, when subjected to 
calculation, manifests that in its un- 
known state, it must be liable to that 
variety, which when perceived, is called 
size or figure, and becomes altered in 
its dimensions : still when that unknown 
being matter is in its unperceived state 
subject to that condition or state called 
divisibility, when fancy has done its ut- 
most, and attempted a conception of 
inconceivable subdivisions, perhaps such 
a portion of matter is a world, and is an 
unknown quantity of " something," (as 
Hume calls it) supporting the means of 
life to millions of beings under no man- 



166 NATURE OF 

ner of relation either to our senses or 
minds. 

It is here that it would be proper to 
show more fully and distinctly than has 
yet been done, what is the error of 
Bishop Berkeley's doctrine, concerning 
the knowledge we have of external ob- 
jects, and to call upon that which has 
been laid down in these pages, to point 
out where the fallacy lies in his reason- 
ing, which at once is considered as 
unanswerable, and nevertheless at vari- 
ance with the common experience of 
life.* But it is impossible to place his 
curious system in a proper light, or ren- 
der the argument against it apparent, 
without some extracts from his Essay 
on the Principles of Human Knowledge. 
I would rather do this in a detached 
manner, than introduce it here, and 
then take the opportunity of showing a 
little more at length than would now be 
convenient, the manner in which the 

* Mr. Hume calls it a doctrine which equally 
fails to enforce conviction, or to suggest an answer 
to its fallacy. 



UNPERCEIVED OBJECTS. 167 

foregoing doctrine enables me distinctly 
to point out, how obvious an answer 
presents itself to those points of his doc- 
trine, which from a lapse in the reason- 
ing fail to produce conviction ; and how 
truly consistent, and philosophical, and 
accordant with experience, is the rest of 
his matter, however much it may vary 
from commonly received notions. I 
shall therefore throw these paragraphs, 
with the observations annexed to them, 
in a short and distinct essay ; and shall 
conclude, for the present, this subtle, 
complicated, and, I fear, fatiguing sub- 
ject, with a concise summary of the 
doctrine. 



168 



CHAPTER VIII. 

RECAPITULATION. 

The perception of independant, external, and con- 
tinued existences, the result of an exercise of the 
reasoning powers, or a mixture of the ideas of 
the understanding, with those of sense. — Exter- 
nal objects unknown as to the qualities which are 
capable of affecting the senses. — Known as com- 
pounds of simple sensations, mixed with ideas of 
reason or conceptions of the understanding . — Re- 
ply to an objection concerning extension. — There 
exists, however, one set of exterior qualities, 
which resemble such as are inward; these are 
variety — independancy — existence — continued ex- 
istence — identity, SfC- Exteriorly extended ob- 
jects, cannot be like the idea of extension. — An 
appeal to the phenomena of the diorama as an 
evidence for the truth of these 7iotions. The 
ideas of this treatise do unintentionally coincide 
with some mysteries of religion. — Conclusion. 

The perception of external, continually 
existing, independant objects, is an 



RECAPITULATION. 169 

affair of the understanding ; it is a men- 
tal vision; the result of some notions 
previously in the mind, being mixed 
with each sensation as it arises, and 
thus enabling it to refer the sensations 
to certain reasonable causes, without 
resting merely in the contemplation of 
the sensations themselves ; by which it 
comes to pass, that names stand for 
these compound mixtures ; and that 
the organs of sense are the instruments 
which immediately detect the presence 
of those things which are external to, 
and independant both of the organs of 
sense and the mind. 

I consider the chief proposition, thus 
used as a mean of quick and constant 
reasoning, applicable to, and immediately 
associated with, certain exhibited sen- 
sations, to be that which comprehends 
the relation of cause and effect. 

By these means, there is the reference 
of similar effects to similar causes, and of 
differences of effects, to proportional differ- 
ences in causes. 

That class of ideas which Dr. Reid 



170 RECAPITULATION. 

terms instinctive, and Mr. D. Stewart 
considers as composed of simple ideas 
not formed by the senses, but generated 
upon certain jit occasions for their pro- 
duction, I consider to be the conclu- 
sions of a latent reasoning;* as the 
mere results and corollaries, included 
in the relation of those ideas and sensa- 
tions already existing in the mind, and 
which were previously formed by the 
senses. The idea is very soon learned, 
that it is a contradiction to suppose things 
to begin of themselves ; for this idea is 
occasioned by the impression, (the ob- 
servation,) that the beginning of every 
thing is but a change of that which is 
already in existence, and so is not the 
same idea, (the same quality,) as the 
beginning of being, which is independant 
of previous being and its changes. The 
two ideas are therefore contrary to each 
other ; and the meanest understanding- 
perceives them to be so, as easily as it 

* Since writing the above, I find M. Destutt de 
Tracy of my opinion. 



RECAPITULATION. 171 

perceives that white is not black, &c. 
Changes therefore require beings already 
in existence, of which they are the 
affections or qualities ; and children, 
peasants, and brutes know and perceive 
these relations, though they cannot 
analyse them.* The mind therefore 
taking notice of changes, refers them to 
objects of which they are the qualities. 

Thus a very young and ignorant per- 
son will soon perceive, that the various 
sensations of which he is conscious, are 
mere changes in relation to some other 
objects in existence. 

Such an one on hearing himself 
speak, or sing, will not consider the 
sensation of sound apart from its cause, 
or the object of which it is a change, 
and on hearing another voice than his 
own, will refer such variety in the effect, 
to a proportional variety in the cause ; 
for here his consciousness tells him, 
that the sound is not formed by the 

* M. D. de Tracy considers children as capable 
of perceiving a relation between two ideas, as of 
their original perception. 

i 2 



172 RECAPITULATION. 

same means which formed the first 
sound, yet it appears in many respects 
a similar effect ; therefore, he concludes 
that in as many respects there are simi- 
lar causes, i. e. similar objects of which 
there has been sound as a change : 
and in some respects the effects are 
diverse, therefore, the causes are equally 
diverse ; i.e. are uttered by another be- 
ing than himself, thus concluding another 
being like himself to be present. The 
same method regards the perception of 
every sense, and the objects in relation 
to it ; and I consider primary qua- 
lities of matter, in this respect, to be 
upon the same footing as those which 
are secondary : Objects are therefore, be- 
ings like ourselves, plus or minus the differ- 
ences ; in as much as they are the propor- 
tional causes of the sensations which they 
create. Thus we can but virtually touch 
causes, and that is by reasoning. And 
as the knowledge of external nature is 
but an inference from reason, either 
from the relation of cause and effect, 
analogies, probabilities, &c. so its abso- 



RECAPITULATION. 173 

lute independancy of each mind, can 
have no further certainty than such in- 
ference, however strong it may be, can 
afford. Indeed, in one point of view, 
such complete independancy as should 
suppose the annihilation of any one es- 
sence in nature would appear impos- 
sible ; one change is independant of 
another change, a man may die, and 
his child continue to live; but I con- 
ceive the frame of nature so completely 
one whole, and all its changes but such 
constituent parts of it, that either, on 
the one hand, it must be wholly impos- 
sible for a true annihilation to take 
place of the essential and permanent 
existence of any part ; or on the other, 
that if it were possible, the whole must 
be destroyed together. 

Now, although the reference of like 
effect to like cause be absolute demon- 
stration, yet it may be, that in some 
instances, we consider effect partially ; 
referring some like effects not only to 
like causes, but to compound objects 
with which they are usually associated ; 



174 RECAPITULATION. 

and which objects will exhibit other 
effects, for which there may not be suf- 
ficient proof or likelihood; also the 
very comparison of what is like, to like, 
supposes an ability to perfect compa- 
risons, a subject on which we frequently 
make mistakes. Independant existence 
is then, however, a conclusion of rea- 
soning; an idea in the understanding 
in relation to the perception of the ne- 
cessity there should be like cause for 
like effect, and proportional causes for 
proportional effects. 

Again, as to the continuation of 
the existence of independant objects, the 
original causes and capacities for every 
thing must be concluded as uninter- 
rupted, as long as effects are renewed at 
intervals ; it being a contradiction that 
such effects should begin their own exist- 
ences. Therefore, the perception of the 
continued existence of objects is also in 
relation to the knowledge of causation, 
and is an idea gained by the under- 
standing by reference from reason. Out- 
ward existence, is the perception of a con- 



RECAPITULATION. 175 

tinued independant existence in relation to 
motion, from our own minds taken as a 
centre whence we set out ; the which mo- 
tion is a sort of sense, whose sensible 
quality merely, could not immediately 
yield the notion of unperceived ex- 
teriority, unless mixed with the powers 
of the understanding, which refer its 
sensible quality to an unperceived cause, 
in the way that has been described to 
be the case both with respect to itself, 
and to the other senses ; by which 
means they are considered to interact 
with those things known by consci- 
ousness not to be minds. For motion 
is when unperceived a capacity or qua- 
lity of being, in relation to those vari- 
ous objects which are proved to be con- 
tinually existing by their regular reply to 
its action.* 

And when motion is considered in 
relation to empty space merely, it is 
also perceived to be in relation to a 
mode of existence, proved by the same 

* See this Essay, p. 83, 84, and from p. 102 to 
107 ; " It is not sufficient therefore ;" also Essay 
VI. 



176 RECAPITULATION. 

process of the understanding to be 
continually existing. For as the ex- 
teriority of space, or distance between 
objects, replies regularly to the sense 
and use of motion, so must it be re- 
garded as a common quality to all objects, 
having its own unperceived essence. Al- 
though, therefore, the instruments of 
sense, and motion, can only after their 
action form sensible qualities, " ideas of 
sensation," yet their use immediately 
gives notice of outward, insentient, and 
unperceived existences ; — because the 
understanding being supposed correct 
in the notion that such " must needs 
exist" in the manner explained at large 
in this treatise, informs the mind that it 
is with these continuous unperceived 
existences, that the organs of sense and 
motion themselves also as unperceived 
existences interact in order to the per- 
ception of their sensible qualities when the 
whole union touches the sentient capa- 
city.* But it is motion, as first in order, 
and first in proof, which is impowered 
to detect the outwardness of ob- 
* See pp. 54, 55, &c. 



RECAPITULATION. 177 

jects :* because those things which return 
upon the application of motion to the 
sense of touch, are by that necessity of 
motion in order to apprehend their 
tangibility justly defined as distant from 

* It is here I differ with several French authors 
whose works I have met with since writing this 
treatise, with M. Destutt de Tracy, Condillac, de 
Gerando, &c. 

The sense of the resistence of solidity to the 
sense of voluntary motion, no more proves the ex- 
teriority, independancy , and continuity of objects, 
than the reply of colour to the use of the eye. 
The will is no more self, than is the eye, or the 
hand. The five organs of sense in their conscious 
use, afford by the phenomena which take place in 
consequence, an equal proof of these attributes 
belonging to those constituent parts of the whole 
causes of our sensations, which are by conscious- 
ness known not to be contained in the mere pos- 
session of the mind itself, and in the motions of 
the five instruments of sense. For these latter 
can exist and act without certain given ideas, there- 
fore the REMAINING NECESSARY PARTS of the 

whole cause of such ideas, are independant and 
separate from them. Such also regularly reply to 
irregular applications, in relation to them, there- 
fore, continue in their existence. This is the argu- 
ment, and it applies, equally to each of the five 

i 5 



178 RECAPITULATION. 

the mind which apprehends them,* for 
every distinct quality may be named 
as we please according to its variety of 
appearance. But it is these distant con- 
tinuous existences, which exhibit their 
qualities, one quality, that by the ear 
is perceived as sound ; another, by the 
palate as taste ; a third, by the nostrils, 
as smell ; a fourth and fifth, by the eye, 
as figure and colour. Nevertheless 
these distant independant beings in re- 
lation to motion, are wholly unknown 
as to their imperceived qualities, which 
yet we immediately perceive must exist 
by means of the sensible qualities they 
excite, and which are associated with the 
ideas of their causes. It is not, therefore, 
colour only, but all sensible qualities 
whatever, which are carried out by an act 

organs of sense, as much as to the sense of touch. 
The touch would not prove this point, without a 
mixture of reasoning : and which reasoning would 
be sufficient to draw the same result from the phe- 
nomena of the other senses. 

See Destutt de Tracy Ideologic, p. 114, duod. 

* See p. 57, &c. of this Essay. 



RECAPITULATION. 179 

of the mind, and considered as propor- 
tionally distant from the mind, as is the 
quantity of motion required to attain 
them in their tangible form, and as im- 
mediately coalescing, and inhering in 
and with those independant objects.* 
Infants very soon perceive motion to be 
in respect to existences, which are not 
included in the idea of themselves; 
and which they also very soon con- 
ceive to continue to exist unperceived, as 
they are " ever ready to appear" upon the 
caprice of their action ; that is to say, 
the influence of thought or conception of 
ideas, is soon mixed with simple sensa- 
tion, forming thereby those complex 
beings called outward objects ; (I may 
say, those perplexing beings, at once 
ideas of the mind and existences inde- 
pendant of it ! ) Now the understand- 
ing perceiving that independant con- 
tinued existences, are not the same be- 
ings as those which are included in our 

* See Essay 4th, on the union of colour and ex- 
tension. 



180 RECAPITULATION. 

own sentient natures ; that they are 
not merely sound, colour, &c. places them 
beyond, (that is, considers them as 
existing under a capacity of being in- 
dependant of) every source of our own 
sensibility ; viz. out of the limit of the 
definition of our bodies and minds ; asso- 
ciating with the ideas of their distances 
their whole sensible qualities. 

I now repeat this reasoning is also appli- 
cable to the primary as well as the secon- 
dary qualities. For what are " parts in 
cohesion or extension,"* when separated 
from that external independant exist- 
ence which the understanding allots to 
the unperceived unknown causes of these 
ideas in the mind, and from their rela- 
tion to motion, (which when unper- 
ceived is also unknown as to its nature,) 
but " ideas of sensation" exhibitions of 
colour and of touch, &c. 

Nor will it be a reasonable objection to 
say, (as Dr. Reid does) " an idea cannot 
be extended and solid," for the proposi- 

* See Reid's Inquiry. 



RECAPITULATION. 181 

tion concerning the perception of external 
qualities, intends to assert, that the idea 
of extension as a sensation independant 
of its cause is not an extended or solid 
idea, any more than the idea of a colour 
is a coloured idea ; or of a sound a 
noisy idea. 

For although the qualites are under- 
stood to be created by their exterior 
causes, yet these qualities are but 
effects ; — a certain " idea of sensation " 
is not coloured, it is colour — does not 
emit a sound, it is sound — does not ex- 
hibit extension, it is extension, and so of 
the rest. They are all simple sensations, 
created by causes which the understand- 
ing concludes to be external and inde- 
pendant of self; and are in relation to 
motion and the five senses, for the ex- 
hibition of their appropriate effects, 
and having corresponding proportions 
among themselves. Parts, therefore, are 
unknown powers, save that they exist 
in relation to motion, to touch, and 
other affections, the which when un- 
perceived are still also unknown powers, 
save in their existences, their mutual rela- 



182 RECAPITULATION. 

tions, and their proportional varieties. 
For there exists one set of exterior 
qualities, which we may know of, as re- 
sembling such as are inward* They are 
the same as those, which affect the sen- 
sations, and which the understanding- 
can apply to every kind of existence, 
sentient or insentient. Such is that of 
variety ; we perceive variety amidst our 
sensations ; but other existences might 
also be various ; and being so, we in- 
timately and immediately know what va- 
riety means. The same of independancy ; 
one sensation may be independant of 
another, so may any other existence, 
and we know what quality it is we 
speak of, when we predicate independ- 
ancy of unperceived existences. 

Existence is upon the same footing 
also ; existence of a sensation is in the 
very exhibition and conscious feeling of 
a quality. But the idea of existence 
in general is the very being of any qua- 
lity whatever, as barely contrary to 
non-existence. t This idea of existence 

* Seep. 162. 

f See p. 42, 162, 163, Essay VI. 



RECAPITULATION. 183 

is gained by comparing the conscious- 
ness of successive sensations with the 
idea* of non-existence; which idea is 
also generated by the means of their 
successive disappearance. Thus, the idea 
of existence is a more general idea 
than that of the idea of sensation, for as 
each sensation in particular successive- 
ly ceases to exist, so they all must ; 
and as they do not begin their own 
existences, so they are but changes 
of something which is neither any one 9 
nor yet the whole of our sensations : 
therefore, sensation is not necessarily 
existent, but existence is something 
which is not included in any conscious- 
ness, and is the general quality of which 
sensation is the accident, or exponent ; 
instead of sensation being a mere sy- 
nonymy with existence, as I have heard 
contended. 

Therefore an unperceived quality may 
exist unfelt, and in that quality of exist- 
tence, can be conceived of when un- 

* See p. 50, concerning negative ideas. 



184 RECAPITULATION. 

perceived, as similar to perceived exist- 
ence : Also in a more popular and 
practical way, we judge that another 
mind might not perceive our sensations, 
nor we the sensations belonging to 
another, yet that both would equally 
exist in relation to each unperceivedly. 
Continued existence is likewise subject 
to a similar observation, and signifies 
that no interval of time, interrupts the 
existence of a particular quality ; such 
an affection may belong to unperceived 
as to perceived existences. 

Identity, or the continued sameness 
of a quality, may be predicated of an 
unperceived quality, and there may be 
other affections liable to similar rea- 
soning, which at present do not occur 
to my mind, unless it be the relation of 
cause and effect, which may equally 
exist among insentient as sentient na- 
tures. The reason why these unper- 
ceived qualities, may resemble those 
which are perceived, and not any of 
the primary or secondary qualities of 
bodies (relating to the five organs of 



RECAPITULATION. 185 

sense) be resembling in their perceived 
and unperceived state, is because the 
external qualities which are in relation 
to the senses and mind, require their 
aid to modify them ; and that which is 
altered cannot be the same as when exist- 
ing previous to alteration. 

Unperceived, unconscious, extended 
parts, (whatever parts unperceived may 
be,) cannot be like the idea of extension. 
But among sensations themselves, after 
their determination upon the mind, there 
may exist relations which the senses 
have nothing to do with, have 7iot altered, 
and which may be applicable to any 
existence whatever : — Putting all these 
things together; the colouring of a scene 
in nature or art, is in relation to real or 
supposed motion — and motion is con- 
ceived in relation to existences inde- 
pendant of self; therefore colouring will 
always be seen as though it were 
outward, and therefore conceived of as 
thus by the imagination. The organs 
of sense convey sentient existences in- 
ternally to the inmost recesses of the 



186 RECAPITULATION. 

soul : the understanding reacts upon 
them, and places all things without it in 
similar proportions. If this proposition 
were not capable of proof by abstract 
reasoning, the exhibition of the Diorama 
now before the public (of a scene of 
natural size from nature, and another 
from art,) would be enough to prove 
that colouring is placed in proportion to 
the position of things among themselves ; 
and such positions are as the capacities 
of distance, and the powers of motion in 
relation to us, as well as among themselves : 
The scene, independant of the under- 
standing, is a scene of mental sensation ; 
for when the mind is for a moment 
deluded, (of which I speak from expe- 
rience, knowing that this extraordinary 
fac-simile of nature and art has the 
power of effecting a complete delusion,) 
and forgets the place in which it is — the 
relation of place being forgotten, the 
scenes are conceived of as real ; i. e. 
the colouring is symptomatic as a quality 
of beings, which will fulfil the remain- 
der of the qualities belonging to their 



RECAPITULATION. 187 

definitions upon trial, and thus be equal 
to their whole definitions. But when 
we recollect where we are, the mind 
perceives these thoughts to be illusory, 
and the colouring is not then conceived 
to be a quality of such objects as will 
fulfil their whole definitions. I shall 
conclude with saying, that as we never 
can experience the fulfilment of that 
part of the definition of external objects, 
viz. their existence after our own ceases ; 
so although it be an inference of high 
probability, yet it is short of strict de- 
monstration. We can indeed by refer- 
ring like effects to like causes, and pro- 
portional effects to proportional causes, 
demonstrate thus far ; but we never 
experience this further complete inde- 
pendancy of outward object as an effect. 
All we can do is to refer compound si- 
milar and various effects, to compound 
similar and various causes ; which occa- 
sions an inference that such causes are 
like ourselves, plus or minus the vari- 
eties, and we finding ourselves inde- 
pendant of them, are led to conclude 



188 RECAPITULATION. 

they will in like manner be independant 
of us. 

This statement of the matter imme- 
diately touches upon the difficulty there 
is in the detection of like compound 
objects being present to us. However, 
the reasoning on the point is nearly de- 
monstrative, and practically is entirely 
so — for when we get at objects like 
ourselves, which must exist as causes of 
the effects we experience, nothing is 
perceived capable of making such a 
difference, as should prevent them from 
existing independant of us were we 
no more — yet things are real, if even 
this last test of independancy remain 
without proof; for they are real which 
fulfil the definitions for which their 
names were first formed. The being 
true to expectations formed of their qua- 
lities, is the very criterion of reality ; 
and even upon the supposition of a total 
independancy being out of contempla- 
tion, still all existing things would be 
in relation to our senses, and to motion ; 
and be independant of our thoughts and 



RECAPITULATION. 189 

actions. Nor let it be thought that in- 
fants, peasants, and brutes, do not 
reason ; all of these are capable of per- 
ceiving certain relations, included in 
the impressions made -upon them, and 
of drawing them as occasion requires 
into practical results.* 

With respect to the nature of God, 
(in which all men are so much and 
justly interested) his essential existence, 
his continued existence is demonstrated, 
by the abstract argument used in this 
treatise. Whatever variety and changes 
of beings there are, all changes must 
finally be pushed back to that essence 
who began not, and in whom all de- 
pendant beings originally resided, and 
were put forth as out goings of him- 
self in all those varieties of attitudes 
which his wisdom and benevolence 
thought fit. 

And I shall not shrink from saying,, 
that such thoughts as these, do unin- 
tentionally render the mysteries of re- 

* M. de Tracy says, " Un enfant apperc.oit un 
rapport cerume il appercoit un couleur." 



190 RECAPITULATION. 

ligion easier to the comprehension than 
otherwise they would appear ; for shall 
we limit the capacities and attributes of 
Divinity, in his unknown, unperceived 
state, by our meagre perceptions ? May 
he not to every world that hath come forth 
from him, offer a protection, and an in- 
terference, in proportion to, and in re- 
lation to its wants ? May not some 
confined manifestations, of the uni- 
versal essence, be sent to different 
worlds adapted to their capacity for 
moral improvement, to the motives 
which may act upon them, and the 
uses which result from such a mani- 
festation of his presence, in the way 
either of action or passion ? Again shall 
all things swarm with life, and the 
principle which divides animate from 
inanimate nature be still undiscovered, 
and yet no emanation from the essen- 
tial deity, brood over the face of the 
deep, or breathe into man the breath 
of life ? or finally, shall God be either 
limited, or divisible, by senses that 
cannot detect his presence, although 



RECAPITULATION. 191 

known by the understanding that he 
" needs must exist," and be in all 
times and places " ready to appear" 
to his creation, as the continually 
existing cause for its support, its life, 
its hope, its confidence, and its joy ! 



ESSAYS 



ILLUSTRATIVE OF 



THE DOCTRINES 

CONTAINED IN THE PRECEDING ONE, 



AND IN 



AN ESSAY 



ON THE 



RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 



K 



PART II. 

ESSAYS CONTAINING INQUIRIES 



RELATIVE TO 



THE BERKELEIAN THEORY; 

THE COMPARISON OF MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICAL 

INDUCTION ; 
THE UNION OF COLOUR AND EXTENSION; 
THE CREDIBILITY OF MIRACLES ; 
THE NATURE OF A FINAL CAUSE AND OF MIND; 
THE REASON OF SINGLE AND ERECT VISION. 



195 



ESSAY I. 

consideration of the erroneous 
reasoning contained in bishop 
Berkeley's principles of human 
knowledge. 

Section I. 

" When several ideas," says Bishop 
Berkeley (section 1st,) " (imprinted on 
" the senses) are observed to accom- 
" pany each other, they come to be 
" marked by one name ; and so to be 
" reputed as one thing, thus a certain 
" colour, taste, smell, figure, and con- 
" sistence, are accounted one distinct 
" thing, signified by the name of apple; 
" other collection of ideas form a stone, 
" a tree, a book, &c." (Section 3rd, 
p. 25,) " For what are objects but the 
" things we perceive by sense ? and 

k 2. 



196 on Berkeley's principles 

' what do we perceive but our own 
" ideas or sensations ? for, (section 5th,) 

:i light and colours, heat and cold, ex- 
" tension and figure, in a word, the 
" things we see and feel, what are they 
" but so many sensations, notions, ideas, 
i( impressions on the sense? and is it 

' possible to separate even in thought 
" any of these from perception." 

Sec. 9, p. 27. " Some make a distinc- 
" tion between primary and secondary 
" qualities ; but extension, figure, and 
; ' motion, are only ideas existing in the 
' ( mind . And an idea can be like nothing 
" but an idea, for neither these nor their 
" archetypes, can exist in an unper- 
" ceiving substance." (Section 15th.) 
" It is impossible, therefore, that any 
" colour or extension at all, or sensible 
" quality whatever, should exist in an 
" unthinking subject without the mind, 
" or indeed, that there should be any 
" such thing as an outward object." 

Thus far Bishop Berkeley, on objects 
being only ideas, or sensations of sen- 
sible qualities, and these ideas as com- 



OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 197 

prehending the primary as well as se- 
condary qualities, Many, I conceive* 
will think, from what I have said in the 
foregoing pages, that there is no mate- 
rial difference between my doctrine, 
and his. But a careful investigation of 
both, will show there is a very consi- 
derable one. For although, I agree 
with him, I st. That nothing can be like 
a sensation, or idea, or perception, but a 
sensation, idea, and perception; 2ndly. 
That the primary qualities, after the 
impressions they make on the senses, 
are sensations, or ideas, or perceptions ; 
as well as the secondary ones. Yet I 
do not agree with him, in stating, that 
objects are nothing but what we per- 
ceive by sense, or that a complete 
enumeration is made of all the ideas 
which constitute an apple, a stone, a 
tree, or a book ; in the summing up of 
their sensible qualities. For I have 
made it clear, I trust, by the foregoing 
argument, that an object perceived by the 
mind is a compound being, consisting 
of a certain collection of sensible qua- 



198 on Berkeley's principles 

lities, " mixed with an idea the result 
of reasoning" of such qualities being 
formed by a " continually existing out- 
ward and independant set of as various 
and appropriate causes ;" therefore th^t 
there must be " an outward object," 
existing as a cause to excite the inward 
feeling. The logical error, therefore, 
of Bishop Berkeley on this part of the 
subject, is an incomplete definition; for 
no definition is good which does not 
take notice of all the ideas, under the 
term ; and in every object of sense 
which the mind perceives, the know- 
ledge of its genus, as a general effect 
arising from a general cause independant 
of mind, is mixed with the sensations or 
ideas resulting from its special qualities 
affecting the same. The notion of this 
genus is omitted in Dr. Berkeley's 
definition of an object, by the limiting 
words but and only. 

2. Bishop Berkeley is guilty of an 
ambiguity, when he speaks " of ideas 
being imprinted on the senses" " of 



OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 199 

our perceiving" (by sense) "our own 
ideas and sensations,' for he appears 
to speak of the " senses on which ob- 
jects are imprinted, " as if he intended 
by them those five organs of sense, viz. 
the eye, the ear, &c. vulgarly called the 
senses, but which, in truth, have no 
sense or feeling in themselves as inde- 
pendant of mind ; but are mechanical 
instruments ; which as powers modify 
exterior existences, ere they reach the 
sentient capacity ; the which capacity 
as a general power or feeling becomes 
modified thereby; for undoubtedly, the 
senses as organs cannot perceive what 
the senses as organs are required to 
form.* ■ 

When he speaks of " ideas being im- 
printed on the senses," the phrase con- 
tains the very doctrine he is controvert- 
ing. 

The ideas of colours cannot be im- 
printed on the eye ; nor those of sound 
on the ear ; nor those of extension on 

* Dr. Reid on visible figure, &c. is guilty of a 
like error. 



200 on Berkeley's principles 

the touch ; for there are no such ideas, 
until after the eye, as an instrument, 
has been affected by some sorts of out- 
ward objects, fitted to convey to the 
sentient principle, a sensation of colour, 
and so of the rest. Therefore the ob- 
jects perceived by the organs of sense 
cannot be our ideas, and sensations. 
Indeed, he does not take notice that 
he uses the notion of perception (which 
is that upon which the whole argument 
depends) in two different methods, or 
meanings. For the term perception, 
when applied to those objects for 
whose observation the organs of sense 
are required, and by which certain 
qualities are determined upon the per- 
ceiving mind, is used as the notice the 
mind takes of the presence of certain 
qualities in consequence of the conscious 
use of the organs of sense, the use 
and action of which must, therefore, be 
in relation to some objects which are 
not the mind ; but when applied to the 
" ideas and sensations of sensible qua- 
lites," perception is only used as the 



OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 201 

mental consciousness of those quali- 
ties, leaving out the conscious use of 
the organs of sense, and the ideas of 
the outward objects which must neces- 
sarily have acted on them. 

Nor is this reasoning I am using, the 
mere turning of an expression, for in 
this sentence " what are objects but the 
things we perceive by sense ?" and " what 
do we perceive but our ideas and sen- 
sations ?" there is an offence against one 
of the plainest and most useful of logi- 
cal rules ; for the argument if placed 
in a regular syllogism, will be seen to 
contain a middle term of two different 
and particular significations from which, 
therefore, nothing can be concluded. 

Let the question be, " Are objects, 
ideas and sensations only?" and the 
middle term, " The things we perceive " 
— be united with the predicate for the 
major proposition, and then be altered 
to — " the things we perceive by se?ise.' : 
when joined to the subject, for the 
minor ; it will be seen that an incon- 

k5 



202 on Berkeley's principles 

elusive syllogism is thence formed. — 
For if the major proposition stands, 
"Our ideas and sensations, are the only 
things we 'perceive,'" and the minor, " Ob- 
jects are the things we perceive by sense," 
the conclusion, viz. " Therefore objects 
are only our ideas and sensations," does 
not logically follow, because the middle 
term would then consist of " two different 
parts, or kinds, of the same universal idea," 
i.e. the idea of perception in general; 
" and this will never serve to show whether 
the subject and predicate agree, or dis- 
agree."* For in the general conscious per- 
ception of sensible qualities, are included the 
knowledge that the organs of sense are used, 
as mechanical instruments acted upon by cer- 
tain causes, and the ideas of these~causes . 
And this conscious use of the mechanical 
action of the five senses in relation to other 
beings than the mind, is a very different 
part, or kind of the universal idea of per- 
ception, from the mental consciousness of 

PARTICULAR SENSIBLE QUALITIEStfft/z/ ,' 

* Watts's Logic. 



OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 203 

which is also another part, or kind of 
the general notion of perception ; which 
general notion includes every species of 
consciousness whatever. The conscious- 
ness whether the organs of sense be 
used or not, in perceiving objects, is the 
great criterion of a sane, or insane state 
of mind, of its waking or sleeping con- 
dition ; the consciousness that the 
organs of sense are used, makes all the 
difference between objects of sense, or 
objects of memory, reason, or imagina- 
tion. By the quick and practical use of 
the senses subsequent to infancy, the asso- 
ciations of ideas, resulting from reason 
and experience, are so interwoven and so 
immediate with the consciousness of their 
use, that they ought always to be consi- 
dered as forming a component part of the 
whole ideas which lie under the terms, the 
objects of sense. The objects of sense, 
therefore, (under the conscious use of 
the organs of sense,) are known, (ac- 
cording to the reasoning used in the 
foregoing chapters of this essay,) to be the 
continued, exterior, and independant exist- 



204 on Berkeley's principles 

ences of external nature, exciting ideas, 
and determining sensations in the mind 
of a sentient being ; but not only to be 
ideas and sensations. 

In the sentence already commented 
on, and which contains the sum of Dr. 
Berkeley's doctrine — the word object, as 
well as the phrase " perception by sense" 
is of ambiguous application; — for in his 
use of the word object, he begs the 
question ; meaning thereby a collection 
of sensible qualities, formed by the 
senses and apprehended by the mind ; 
whereas the adversary means by that 
word, a set of qualities exterior to the 
mind, and to which the organs of sense 
are in relation as mechanical instru- 
ments, and of which they take notice 
as those permanent existences, which 
the understanding is aware must needs 
continue when unperceived, ere they are 
transformed by their action into other 
beings. Objects before the notice of 
the senses, are not the same things as 
after their acquaintance with them. All 
men mean by objects the things which 



OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 205 

exist previously to their mixture with 
the action of the organs of sense, and 

Which FROM POWERFUL ASSOCIATION, 

they conceive to exist under the forms of 
their sensible qualities; — therefore by 
feigning the contrary notion there can 
arise no convincing argument. 

To go on, however, with the argu- 
ment, (by which I would show that ob- 
jects of sense are not only the ideas of 
their sensible qualities,) I observe that 
reason discovering these objects to be 
in their relation to each other, as va- 
rious as the impressions they convey; 
also perceives them to be in one respect 
like Xh.e ideas they create ; i.e. in the 
same proportions and bearings to each 
other, outwardly as they are inwardly. 
Therefore among the observations we 
have of " our ideas and sensations" of 
sensible qualities, we do perceive some- 
thing else than these mere " ideas or 
sensations ;" for we perceive by reason, 
that those things which must needs be 
present in order as causes to affect the 
sense, may on account of their variety, 



206 on Berkeley's principles 

their similar distinctness, and proportions, 
be named, (when considered as existing 
exterior to the instruments of sense,) 
by the names they bear when inwardly 
taken notice of. 

Now I consider the observation of 
this latter circumstance as containing a 
full answer to all the puzzling contra- 
dictions of Bishop Berkeley's theory; 
for although, in a popular manner, men 
consider things are outwardly the coun- 
terpart of what they perceive inwardly ; 
yet this is not the whole reason of the 
difference they make amidst things : for 
the soul does truly in a sense perceive 
outward things, as they are when exist- 
ing outwardly, for after reason shews 
that the qualities of things, in a state 
of perception, cannot be like them out of 
a state of perception, yet being conscious 
that sensation is only a simple act, (a 
power, a quality,) it perceives by the un- 
derstanding thatthe varieties of things are 
in relation to each other outwardly in the 
same proportion as are the inward sensa- 
tions . Thus hard and soft,bitter and sweet, 



OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 207 

heat and cold, round and square,are there- 
fore perceived not only to be sensations, 
but to be certain unknown qualities of 
objects independant of the mind in re- 
lation to each other, and in that state " to 
continue to exist, ready to appear to the 
senses when called for." Popularly, the 
sensations these excite, are associated with 
the notions of the outward objects, and all 
their varieties. But when philosophy 
breaks up this association, she should 
not take away more than what this na- 
tural junction of thought has created; 
Bishop Berkeley does not merely sepa- 
rate what is mixed, but would destroy 
the whole compound together. This 
observation, in my opinion, contains a 
demonstration against the Berkelean 
theory, and restores nature entirely to 
her rights again. " Equals taken from 
equals the remainders are equal.'" Take 
sensation, simple sensation, the power or 
capacity of feeling merely, from exten- 
sion, from colour, from sound, and from 
taste; from heat and cold; from electri- 
city or attraction ; from fire, air, water, 



.208 on Berkeley's principles 

or earth ; from the 'perception of life, or 
the idea of death ; from motion or rest. 
Is there nothing left ? Every thing is 
left that has any variety or difference in 
it. " What are objects" (says Bishop 
Berkeley) " but the ideas perceived by 
sense ?" They are beings perceived by 
reason, to be continually, independantly, 
outwardly existing, of the same propor- 
tions as are the inward sensations of 
which they are the effects. Had Bishop 
Berkeley allowed of the force of a most 
finished piece of reasoning he uses in 
respect to the proof of the existence of 
other minds than our own, in behalf also 
of objects that are not minds, he had 
not set before the public, some para- 
doxes, unhappily considered as unan- 
swerable. In (sect. 195), he says, " From 
" what has been said, it is plain that 
" we cannot know the existence of other 
" spirits otherwise than by their opera- 
" tions, or the ideas by them excited in 
"us. I perceive several motions, 
" changes, and combinations of ideas, 
" that inform me there are certain par- 



OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 209 

" ticular agents like myself, which ac- 
" company them and concur in their 
" production. Hence the knowledge I 
" have of other spirits is not immediate 
" as is the knowledge of my ideas, but 
" depending on the intervention of ideas, 
" by me referred to agents or spirits 
" distinct from myself, as effects or con- 
" comitant signs." 

Now my argument (however ill I 
may have executed it) intends the whole 
way to show " that our knowledge of 
other objects" (of any kind) is not im- 
mediate as is the knowledge of our ideas," 
but depends " on the intervention of our 
ideas," by us referred to " agents or 
spirits," (to unknown proportionate causes 
distinct from ourselves,) and that the 
several " motions, changes, and combina- 
" tions of ideas, which we perceive, in- 
" form us that there are certain parti- 
" cular agents like ourselves" (always like 
ourselves as continuing to exist, and in 
other qualities, plus or minus ourselves) 
" which accompany them, and concur 
" in their production." 



210 on Berkeley's principles 

In order, however, to carry the argu- 
ment a little farther on these matters, let 
us examine with a greater nicety than 
we have yet done this proposition ; — 
" figure, extension, and motion are only 
" ideas in the perceiving mind," — and 
let us select one quality, say figure, 
for this examination, in order to sim- 
plify the analysis ; then the argument 
which applies to figure, will also apply 
to the other qualities. 

Let the question be ; Is figure an idea 
only in the perceiving mind ? Now un- 
doubtedly the sense, inward perception, 
or notion of figure, (or by whatever word 
shall be designated the conscious sensa- 
tion of a living being which it has, un- 
der the impression of figure,) can only be 
in a perceiving mind ; and nothing else 
can be like it but such another sensa- 
tion : but this sense of figure, is not what 
the word figure, only means when ap- 
plied to an object which affects either 
the sense of sight or touch. It is then 
a relative term — a sign of a compound 
notion, signifying a particular sensation 



OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 211 

caused by a particular cause, which cause 
is not a sensation. Moreover, the word 
is also understood to be applicable to the 
proportion which that cause (or " outward 
continuous object " ) bears to the other out- 
ward beings surrounding it; (and this 
without supposing they are the least 
like our ideas ;) for let us consider a 
round figure, for instance, apart from our 
perception of it ; the line which bounds 
this solid substance outwardly, (whatever 
line and solid may be,) and parts it from 
the surrounding atmosphere, (whatever 
parting or atmosphere may be,) must still 
be a variety, or change, or difference, among 
these outward things, and this difference 
among outward unknown things, not 
like sensations, is outward, and is always 
meant in that sense by the word, which 
signifies, a certain state of continuous ex- 
istence, which is independant of mind. 
The word and notion are compound, and 
each stands for the cause and effect united, 
and not only for the effect. Philosophers, 
therefore, ought to be capable of per- 
ceiving that figure, extension, and mo- 



212 on Berkeley's principles 

tion, &c. are not only ideas in the mind, 
but are capacities, qualities, beings in 
nature in relation to each other when 
exterior to mind. 

It is owing to our ideas being the 
counterparts of the proportions of those 
things, which our reason teaches us 
must be independant of mind, that Dr. 
Reid talks of an intuitive conception and 
knowledge of the nature of outward 
extension, &c. Whereas it is by ob- 
serving the relations of our ideas which 
are effects, whose causes must be equal 
to them, that we have a knowledge of 
that relation which the independant and 
permanent objects of the universe must 
needs bear to each other ; if instinct 
only guided us, there would be no more 
proof of the external world than of a 
dream, where there is an equal instinct 
in behalf of what is afterwards acknow- 
ledged to be non-existent. 

But the perceptions of the relations 
which our ideas and sensations bear to 
each other, and the results therein de- 
duced, put the proof of an external and 



OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 213 

continually existant universe upon the 
same footing as the existence of the 
sensations themselves, and form a de- 
duction as demonstrable, and clear, and 
convincing* as any mathematical cer- 
tainty whatever. 

To go on, Bishop Berkeley however 
allows that there are causes for the sen- 
sations of sensible qualities ; independ- 
ant of the perceiving mind. But it is 
in descanting upon their nature that he 
is again guilty of as fallacious, and in- 
conclusive, and paradoxical reasoning 
as that which we have just examined ; 
for he uses the very argument of his 
adversary, (which he has been indus- 
triously endeavouring to destroy,) as an 
instrument to prove his own doctrine, 
and I shall now proceed to shew that 
he does so. 



Section II. 

(Section 25th and 26th.) " We per- 
" ceive," says Bishop Berkeley, " a 
" continual succession of ideas ; there 



214 on Berkeley's principles 

" is therefore some cause of these ideas. 
" This cause cannot be any quality or 
" idea ; for an idea " (section 25th) 
" is an inert being, and cannot be the 
" cause of any thing. It must therefore 
" be a substance," (section 26th,) " and 
" as it has been shown there is no ma- 
" terial substance, it remains the cause 
" of our ideas, is an incorporeal, active 
" substance or spirit." (Section 27th.) 
" A spirit is one simple, undivided, 
" active being, which hath understand- 
* ing and will." (Section 28th.) " My 
" own will excites in my mind ideas at 
" pleasure, and by the same power they 
" are destroyed. This making and un- 
" making of ideas, very properly deno- 
*' minates the mind active." (Section 
29th.) " But the ideas imprinted on 
" sense are not the creatures of my 
" will, there is therefore some other 
" will or spirit which produces them." 
(Section 30th.) " Now there are set 
" rules, or established methods, where- 
" by the mind we depend on excites in 
" us the ideas of sense, and these are 



OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 215 

" called the Laws of Nature."* (Section 
156th.) " By nature is meant the vi- 
" sible series of effects or sensations 
" imprinted on our mind." The con- 
clusion of the whole matter is, that 
there is nothing but two sets of ob- 
jects, viz. "spirits" and "ideas;" 
" spirits as causes, and ideas as their 
effects." Now it is plain we can know 
no more of activity, indivisibility, and 
simplicity, as applied to substance, called 
mind, than of inertness, divisibility, &c. 
applied to another sort of substance, 
called matter. These are still only ideas 
gained in the usual way, rejected when 
applied to objects of sense existing with- 
out the mind, but made use of by him, 
when applied to spirit, existing without 
the mind. " Motion" (Bishop Berkeley 
distinctly says) " is only an idea existing 
in the mind." If so, I ask, what does 
he know about activity, as absolutely ne- 
cessary to constitute a cause, and which 

* The remaining sections are taken up in an- 
swering objections, and are quite immaterial to the 
subject of these remarks. 



216 on Berkeley's principles 

cause, he says, cannot be an idea? 
because ideas are " visibly zwactive." 
Also, what notion can he have of cause 
at all, if he knows of " nothing but 
ideas ;" and ideas are not causes, and what 
too are the rules and methods of the 
working of a spirit, which as rules and 
methods and laws of nature, cannot 
themselves be spirit or substance, yet 
are not allowed to be material beings ? 
And how can the will at pleasure, call 
upon an idea, when before it begins to 
call, it must know what it wishes to call, 
and so must have consciousness of the 
idea in question, which as an object asso- 
ciated with another idea, can and does 
truly act as a cause in order to introduce 
it. But /argue as we can distinguish 
between the capacity for sensation in 
general, and that for the exciting causes 
of extension and other qualities in par- 
ticular, so we have a right to name 
this mind, and that body, and that 
after all the talk of materialists, who 
say, " matter cannot act on mind/' 
(" they are discordant beings ; so all is 



OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 217 

matter;") And the immaterialists who 
say the same things, (" and that all is 
mind," for the same reason;) it ap- 
pears perfectly easy that such causes 
and capacities, such collections of qua- 
lities should intermix, and produce 
those results, which take place under 
different forms of sensible objects ; and 
which in my opinion are combined by 
the junction of the qualities of matter, 
or unknown powers, or qualities in na- 
ture ; the senses, or instruments fitted 
to act along with these ; and the mind, 
or sentient principle and capacity. Na- 
ture in her whole works bears witness 
such is the case. — Also by keeping 
strictly in view, that the power of 
sensation is one and simple, ---and that 
subtracting it from all the objects with 
which we are acquainted, the remain- 
ing qualities will bear still to be con- 
sidered as worthy of holding the 
various names affixed to their appear- 
ances upon the sense, and reasoned on 
as before; — there will be cause and 
effect, extension and space ; time and 

L 



218 on Berkeley's principles 

eternity ; variety of figure and colour ; 
heat and cold, merit and demerit; 
beauty and deformity, &c. &c. 

The proportions of all these beings 
among themselves, the external inde- 
pendant qualities in nature among 
themselves, corresponding to our per- 
ceptions, must be as various as they 
appear to the mind ; therefore, there is 
figure, extension, colour, and all qua- 
lities whatever. Nor is it necessary in 
order to support the idea of Deity, and 
his constant presence and providence, 
to have recourse to the ridiculous no- 
tion of his activity as a " spirit" upon 
our senses in order to change our 
ideas; for whilst the perception of sen- 
sible qualities immediately informs us of 
our own sensations* reason by the in- 
tervention of the ideas of their dif- 
ferent relations, equally discovers to 
us insentient existences, as well as that 
of our own, and other minds; whilst 
with respect to the being of God, his 
essential existence, his continued exist- 

* See p. 14, " Also the mind," &c. 



OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 219 

ence, is demonstrated, by the abstract 
argument used in this treatise. " What- 
" ever variety and changes of being 
" there are, all changes must finally be 
" pushed back to that essence, who be- 
" gan not to be, and in whom all de- 
" pendant beings originally resided, and 
" were first put forth as out- goings of 
" himself in all those varieties of atti- 
" tudes, wherewith his wisdom and 
" benevolence are able to fit out every 
" variety and gradation of creature."* 

* See p. 189. 



L2 



220 



ESSAY II. 

UPON THE NATURE OF THE FIVE OR- 
GANS OF SENSE, AND THEIR MANNER 
OF ACTION WITH REGARD TO EX- 
TERNAL PERCEPTION. 

I would here more fully consider a 
subject of great importance, upon 
which I have but briefly touched in 
the larger essay, " on external per- 
ception ;" namely, The nature of the Jive 
organs of sense, and the manner in which 
they are used, with regard to the con- 
veyance of the perception of external ob- 
jects to the mind. This subject appears 
to me but partially analysed by the au- 
thors to which I have there alluded. 
It is naturally complicated ; embraces 
a vast variety of particulars bearing 



ON THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 221 

upon each other ; — Each of which in order 
to be examined aright, must, during 
the period of its examination, be equally 
considered as unproved, as well as 
others which might suffice as proofs, 
were they not also involved in the un- 
certainty of the point in question. 
When this is done, every object what- 
ever of supposed existence, independant 
of mental consciousness, is found to be 
upon an equal footing, and must neces- 
sarily be put aside, on account of being 
as yet unacknowledged. 

What then remains as given data ? 
Nothing but our sensations, mental con- 
sciousnesses, (simple or complex,) ar- 
bitrarily named, and their relations ; 
and this seems to leave so frightful a 
void ; the analysis of our knowledge 
into such materials seems so impossible ; 
and the being capable of arriving at 
any certain evidence for real things (as 
they are called,) by a synthesis formed 
of such, seems likewise so impossible, 
that the soul starts back with a wise 
alarm for fear of venturing too far, and 



222 THE NATURE OF 

beyond the limits whence it may be able 
to retread its steps if such should be 
the case ; yet as I have attempted to 
question so much, I must in order to be 
consistent, push my inquiries still fur- 
ther. I must lead on to where this 
subject points, and endeavour to make 
that theory, which to my own mind 
is consistent and luminous, appear so to 
others. 

Now, that our living conscious sen- 
sations, that is, those consciousnesses 
which are sufficiently vivid to form 
strong impressions ; and long enough in 
duration to admit of being compared 
together ; with the results of their com- 
parisons as again forming a new class 
of sensations, (ideas of reason,) are the 
only, the original, and immediate ma- 
terials of our knowledge, is the chief 
feature of the philosophy I would pro- 
fess. And I do consider these mate- 
rials as sufficient for every useful opi- 
nion ; for the proof of every existence 
which others refer to " instincts," "pri- 
mary laws of belief" " ultimate facts" 



THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 223 

" immediate knowledge by the senses," or 
other meatis, the which do truly leave 
the objects of which they testify wholly 
without any proof whatever ; for, " that 
we are incapable of thinking otherwise 
than we do" can itself be no reason that 
we think rightly. The same instincts, 
laws of belief, immediate knowledge 
by senses, do, in the course of every 
twenty-four hours, afford the same kinds 
of proof for the independant existence 
of objects which men admit to be non- 
existent without a doubt remaining on 
the subject; but when our conscious- 
nesses of sensation, and the results 
arising from the comparison of them 
are reposed in, as being the only ori- 
ginal materials of our knowledge, and 
as therefore containing the proofs of 
the existences, with which we are ac- 
quainted, then inasmuch as the ori- 
ginal sensations are the beings, the 
very beings themselves ; so the know- 
ledge of their existence is in and with 
themselves, as well as of the existences 
contained in their relations. 

The ideas of reason are thence upon 



224 THE NATURE OF 

the same footing as to certainty, as are 
those of sensation, and are true demon- 
strations of existences. The reason, 
therefore, for believing in existence, 
independant of consciousness, must bear 
to be examined and substantiated upon 
this foundation; i. e. as being the re- 
sult of the comparison of our " ideas of 
sensation." The ideas of reason must 
be the corollaries included in the 
impressions of sense, from whatever 
source they may be supposed to arise ; 
they must be the conclusions of 
the judgment when the faculties are 
in a state to exert their power. For 
independant existences are, by the very 
terms, and supposition of the state- 
ment, unconscious ; and, therefore, must 
be known of as a result derived from 
the comparison and included in the re- 
lations of those which are conscious. 

In this inquiry all writers I have met 
with, (especially Bishop Berkeley, who 
professes idealism,) are to be blamed 
for an oversight, when they speak of 
the senses in such phrases as these, 
"objects imprinted on the senses" "the 



THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 225 

perception of external objects by the 
senses ;" &c. without even considering 
that the whole question is begged by 
this use of the word sefises ; an object 
imprinted on the eye, for instance, must 
mean, (even in Bishop Berkeley's 
sense,) an object rendered conscious 
by the use of the eye ; but what is the 
use of the eye itself, other than a con- 
scious sensation, or action, supposed 
to involve the knowledge of an object, 

EXTERIOR tO, and INDEPENDANT of 

that mind, to which it serves as an in- 
strument of perception ? For unless 
the whole subject in question is 
granted, the consciousness of the use 
of the organs of sense, can but be con- 
sidered as some " sensations and ideas,"* 
which introduce into the mind, other 
" sensations and ideas." Yet Berkeley 
evidently considers the use of the or- 
gans of sense, as a circumstance dis- 
tinguished and different from " ideas and 

* " Sensations and ideas," is the phrase by which 
Berkeley always expresses the conscious perception 
of any sensible qualities whatever. 

L 5 



226 THE XATURE OF 

sensations;" because he considers that 
••' God by set rules and methods, called 
" the laws of nature, works upon and 
•• with the sensed, in order to create 
tc ideas of sensation, objects of sense 
" every moment.'" He thus makes an 
essential difference between the two 
powers in nature, without marking out 
any criterion of distinction by which 
the mind may recognize any such dif- 
ference between them : the senses, there- 
fore, in his notion of them, are as ne- 
cessary, to be acted upon " by these set 
rules and working* of a spirit," as they 
are in order to be worked upon by real 
extension, kc. in the language of the anti- 
idealists. What then, I again ask, are 
the so worked upon ? are they 

other set rides of the spirit I If so, one 
set of rules acts upon another set of 
rules, in order, for instance, to give us 
ideas of vision : but one set of rules 
would seem enough to give us such 
ideas. It appears, then, that the 
" senses" in relation to the actions of a 
spirit, must at any rate be something 



THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 227 

extra to the consciousness of their use. 
They are something in Berkeley's sense 
by which the spirit we depend upon 
introduces " ideas in our minds," but 
they are not as yet sensations in a 
mind, for it is by them sensations and 
ideas are introduced into the mind. 
The consciousness of the use of the eye 
could not introduce light ; it must be 
the eye properly so called, whatever 
that organ when unperceived may be : 
therefore, the organs of sense are at 
least, even in Berkeley's sense, some 
objects — not themselves <f the set rules of a 
spirit" nor yet " ideas and sensations," 
but, existences independant of either, 
which must needs exist as continuous 
existences, unknown and unperceived in 
their qualities, in order to account for 
the creation of sensations and ideas in the 
mind. And if so, there may be others 
like them, and every variety which may 
be unlike them, save in that one quality 
of existence. 

In Mr. Stewart's and Dr. Reid's * 

* There may be some slight shade of difference 
between Mr. Stewart's and Dr. Reid's sentiments on 



228 THE NATURE OF 

sense, the " senses" mean mechanical, 
extended, figured, solid existences ; as 
means, instruments, and causes, by 
which we immediately perceive the exist- 
ence of external objects, and to the 
use of which there is instinctively an- 
nexed, the knowledge of the nature of 
their primary qualities, w T hen existing 
independant of any perception of mind ; 
as well as an " ultimate law of belief" 
" without any process of reason," by 
which there arises the knowledge of 
their permanent independant existence. 
It is evident, the whole question in 
such a doctrine is again taken as 
granted. Does the eye, then, tell us 
what the eye is made of? or, does it 
acquaint us with what is the nature of 
touch ? Does the ear tell us of its own 
formation ? or, the nostrils prove to us 
their solidity and extension ? This ob- 
viously cannot be the case. Let then 
the organs of sense be set apart as 
they ought, (if the argument is to be 
logically conducted,) and the knowledge 

this head, but if so, it is too indistinctly set forth, 
to enable me exactly to descry its boundary. 



THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 229 

of these as external, independant, and 
continuous existences be involved in the 
general question. In this sense, how 
is their existence known ? 

I suppose Dr. Reid and his friends 
will tell us, that the touch, as a mere 
sensation, would be capable of " sug- 
gesting" the exteriority and indepen- 
dancy of the other organs of sense : 
" That the hand might grasp" the eye 
"as a ball, and perceive it at once 
" hard, figured, and extended :" (( That 
" the feeling is very simple, and hath not 
" the least resemblance to any quality of 
"body:" yet, that it "suggests to us 
" three primary qualities perfectly distinct 
"from one another, as well as from the 
"sensation which indicates them;"* for 

* These sentiments Mr. Stewart alludes to in his 
essays, as being at once original, and profound ; 
logical and luminous ; giving them his warmest 
approbation, and supporting them by his sanction ; 
therefore, it may perhaps be some error, (for aught 
I know,) in my judgment, which makes me conceive 
them as unfounded in fact, and contrary to every 
principle of correct reasoning. See his Essay on 
the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. 2, chap. 1, 
sec. 3, p. 68, also Essays, note O. 



230 THE NATURE OF 

" that although the feeling of touch no more 
•■ resembles extension than it does justice, or 
" courage, yet that every moment it 'presents 
" extension to the mind ; and that by it we 
" have the notion of " a quality of body ;" 
(which, however, is not a notion but a 
quality of body.) 

But when the eye is in the hand, 
what informs the mind by this touch ; 
what suggests the independant continuous 
existence of its extension, figure, and 
hardness, granting these qualities were 
proved ? (for this is the material part 
of the question :) For when the organs 
of sense, both by idealists and anti- 
idealists, are spoken of, it is taken for 
granted, that as mechanical instruments 
they are continued independant existences ; 
and are neither sensations of mind, nor 
yet the qualities of bodies. 

The power of motion, as a sixth or- 
gan of sense, (for so it may be re- 
garded,) as the method of overcoming 
distance, and of becoming acquainted 
with tangible extension, is equally taken 
for granted, as existing unperceived, 
and as an aid to the five organs of sense. 



THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 231 

After perceiving these errors in the 
distinct manner I do, I feel anxious in 
entering upon a statement which I 
would fain believe less open to ob- 
jection. I conceive, however, that the 
doctrine I have laid down at large in 
the essay on external perception, must, 
if understood rightly, be so considered, 
and I will add thus further to it. 

Philosophically, the organs of sense 
must be considered as z^zknown exist- 
ences in their unperceived state, yet 
as yielding their own peculiar and ap- 
propriate sensations or ideas to the 
mind ; their continued, independant exist- 
ence is found as a result, or perceived 
by the understanding as a relation of 
its simple sensations ; for the mind 
perceiving, upon each irregular appli- 
cation to some sorts of beings, or qua- 
lities, or ideas, which it may call the 
organs of sense if it jjlease, that they 
regularly reply to that application, 
justly concludes them to exist when 
unnoticed, in order to be capable of this 
readiness to reply. Those objects, also, 



232 THE NATURE OF 

which do thus reply, yield to the sense 
of motion from point to point, an idea 
of resistance and extension in parti- 
cular; and so are regarded as body; 
that is, as essences different from the 
mind, or the powers of sensation in ge- 
neral; but continually existing objects, 
or qualities, which yield ideas of ex- 
tension, are not ideas, but continued 
existences called bodies. 

Thus the organs of sense, are those 
independant continuous existences, with 
whose ideas the mind associates the sen- 
sible qualities their action excites in the 
mind ; and which are observed to have 
their share in performing the changes, 
as well as to detect # the presence of ob- 
jects, which are themselves, neither the 
organs of sense, nor yet the mind itself. 

The foundation of the whole reason- 
ing concerning the independancy both 
of the organs of sense, as well as of 
other objects, arises from the axiom, 
" that no idea, or quality, can begin its 

* See p. 233, " But again," &c. ; also, p. 102, 
" It is not sufficient, therefore," &c. 



THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 233 

own existence." For we perceive that 
the sensation as of the use of any organ 
of sense, does not alter the mind always 
in the same way ; therefore, the mind 
and the organs of sense being the same 
upon any occasion as on a former one, 
when no other object than themselves 
were present, a third object is required 
to occasion the interruption of its pre- 
sent state, which object is to be seen, 
or heard, or felt,&c* But again, when 
there is the mind, and any other object 
known, or supposed present, — if the 
eye be shut ; the hand removed, &c. 
such object will not appear ; therefore, 
to the observance of any particular ob- 
ject, there is not only required the 
mind, and the object, but also the 
organs of sense; those parts of the 

* In this inquiry it ought to be unnecessary to 
repeat, although I have done it for the sake of 
clearness, that no object, or idea, can begin its own 
existence, but must appear as a change of those 
objects already in being, and as requiring corres- 
ponding previous interferences, unions, separations, 
&c. 



234 THE NATURE OF 

human frame, (or ideas, or whatsoever 
else they may be called.) 

The organs of sense, therefore, when 
analysed are continued existences, which 
form the media of admixture between 
other objects and minds. It is not the 
consciousness of their use, however, 
which renders them a part of the whole 
cause necessary to that end, because that 
consciousness is but an effect, or sen- 
sible quality ; they must be considered 
when they act as causes, as unper- 
ceived beings, and so must the minds 
also, as well as the other objects in re- 
lation to them ; and it is in the co- 
alescence of these three, that consci- 
ous, complex, sensible qualities,* must 
be considered to exist. But to this 
day the sensible \ qualities are consi- 
dered as fastened upon the objects, which 
are neither organs of sense, nor minds, 
and to be their own independant qualities 

* See 6th Essay, that sensible qualities cannot 
be causes. 

f The doctrine of Aristotle is the same as this, 
which I have found since writing the above. 



THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 235 

on account of the intimate association 
between their respective ideas and sen- 
sations.* 

I have already, perhaps, intruded 
upon the patience of the reader too 
much, by repeating some things already 
said, in order to throw light upon this 
intricate part of the subject; I shall 
only now add, that the great difficulty 
and mystery in the affair, is, that in 
dreams, insanities, &c. the organs of 
sense are thought to be in use; for 
there is a sensation, as though they 
must have been in use, on account of a 
reference made to them, as the only 
instruments capable of having let their 
specific objects into the mind's appre- 
hension. The memory and understand- 
ing are then asleep, and the mind there- 
fore cannot take notice of all the ideas 
which would otherwise affect it and their 
relations. The objects, therefore, which 
appear, are considered as those, which 
are in relation to the senses, and they 
are thence expected to be capable of 

* See p. 142, i( Now objects," &c. 



236 THE MATURE OF 

those further qualities which are ne- 
cessary to their definitions. And, in 
fact, I perceive not how the proposition 
can be refuted, that although there may 
be truth in the world, yet the dis- 
covery of an absolute criterion of an under- 
standing capable of detecting it, does 
not seem to be the lot of human nature. 
Thus the sensible quality termed the use 
of the senses, appears to the mind in 
dreams, whilst yet the mind cannot 
discover that it is but dreaming ; it 
must therefore awake, and be in a state 
to find that such senses as these, do 
not fulfil their definitions, that their 
organs do not continue to exist, and 
cannot exert any unperceived action, 
ere it is able to discover the delusion. 

The reason why the. mind is deluded 
in dreams, and other fancies, is on ac- 
count of its being known, first, that si- 
milar effects must have similar causes, 
and secondly, that these causes are usually 
found along with other compound objects, 
which have further effects, other qualities 
when meeting with other objects ; a habit of 



THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 237 

expectation is thus formed which even in 
a disordered fancy leads the mind to 
consider similar sensible qualities, as a com- 
pound general effect, from such a general 
cause * or object, as will fulfil the re- 
mainder of its qualities upo?i trial. 

In dreams the sensible qualities arising 
from what is termed the use of the senses, 
is not corrected, by other sensible qualities ; 
nor by the reasoning which the mind 
when awake is always latently using, 
when it draws inferences from certain 
consistencies, or inconsistencies, amidst 
its ideas ; to the power of such reason- 
ing it is restored upon the moment of 
awaking, by which it is made aware of 
the place where it has long been ; then 
the mass of appearances before the 
fancy, immediately takes its flight and 
the enchantment is dissolved. 

Indeed it may be remarked, that in 
waking as tvell as in sleeping hours, when 

* See essay on causation ; Mr. Hume is so far 
from being correct in supposing that regular con- 
junction generates the idea of causation, that on 
the contrary, it is only itself looked upon as ax 
effect of its own regular cause. 



238 THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 

memory is gone, we cannot remember that 
we forget, nor perceive relations which do 
not 'present themselves to deficient powers of 
reasoning ; the want of ideas in those who 
think they have sufficient, will ever yield a 
ground of scepticism to men of understand- 
ing ; lest they should lie under the same pre- 
dicament, without having any criterion by 
which to detect the difference. It is when 
ideas of reason are clearly included in those 
of sensation, that I assert, they are upon 
the same footing as to certainty. I con- 
clude nothing from the want of them. 

Bishop Berkeley has been, I think, 
much misunderstood on account of his 
conceiving that things were created each 
time of their appearance ; he only 
meant to say, that the formation of the 
sensible qualities by the use of the 
senses, existed in and by their use, 
and that they could not exist thus, (in 
that manner and fashion,) except in a 
mind perceiving them, and thus far I 
perfectly agree with him. 



239 



ESSAY III. 

THAT THE EXTERNAL CAUSES WHICH 
DETERMINE THE VARIOUS PERCEP- 
TIONS OF SENSE, ARE NOT THE IM- 
MEDIATE ACTIONS OF DEITY. 

As our perceptions themselves are 
allowed on all hands not to be imme- 
diate actions of Deity, so their causes 
may be equally observed to require 
many processes of nature in order to 
their production ; of this we may very 
well judge by that comparison of ideas 
in which all reasoning consists. For 
sensation in general being but a simple 
power, its particular varieties can be no 
other than measures, tests, or examples 
of that variety which must necessarily 
exist in those things which are not in- 



240 CAUSES OF PERCEPTION" 

eluded in sensation, - that is, in those 
things which are excluded from it, and 
are therefore in qualities exterior to it, 
but which meeting with the internal 
sense, alters it accordingly: thus we 
may very well know that vast prepara- 
tions go on of unperceived beings, and 
of such whose essences are unknown, in 
order to accomplish the formation of an 
universe, or the growth of the harvest ; 
the creation of man, or the flight of a 
butterfly ; the developement of the least, 
equally with the most magnificent of 
nature's works, which requires the pro- 
gress arising from successive changes. 
For it is manifest, that the external 
causes of our sensations must exist 
among themselves in the same propor- 
tions as do the internal varieties of sen- 
sation, their effects ; and this notion 
may be expressed after the same man- 
ner in which any usual proportion is 
stated ; thus, as is the variety of differ- 
ent simple or compound sensations, so is 
the variety of their causes. Therefore 
by examining aright the proportions and 



NOT IMMEDIATE ACTS OF DEITY. 241 

relations of our ideas, by perceiving that 
some afford evidence that they are 
created by living beings ; " beings like 
" ourselves (plus or minus their va- 
" rieties,") and that others afford evi- 
dence that they are created by beings 
devoid of life ; still by beings like our- 
selves, (" plus or minus the varieties/') 
we may arrive at the knowledge of ex- 
ternal sentiency and insentiency ; and 
thus that all which is external cannot be 
of one kind, i.e. mind or sentiency ; nor 
yet the conscious actions of a sentient 
mind. But if it be said that though 
they are not the conscious actions of 
mind, yet they are actions which are 
the effects of a conscious mind, but 
themselves not conscious ; then they are 
not immediate acts of Deity, but mediate 
acts of Deity, whose varieties meeting 
with the human senses, create our 
ideas. 

And this is the very doctrine for which 
I contend, and the elucidation of which 
is not unimportant, now that there exists 
a disposition among some, to revive a 

M 



242 CAUSES OF PERCEPTION 

rigid Berkeleian philosophy ; admitting 
no existence in the universe, excepting 
that of the Deity, and the individual 
who is reasoning, I divide therefore 
with Berkeley, by applying the argu- 
ment he himself uses in behalf of the 
proof that there are other minds than 
his own in the universe, to the proof of 
existences which may be other than 
mind. 

Thus there becomes a real distinction 
between the nature of some existences 
and that of others, as far as their rela- 
tive variety and proportion goes. And 
this difference may be known by the 
nature of the effects in their varieties : 
the one kind of existence may very pro- 
perly be termed matter, and the other 
mind. And thus the definition of matter 
becomes the capacity of exhibiting upon a 
sentient nature, the sense of solid exten- 
sion in general; and that of mind, a 
capacity fitted to be excited to any sensa- 
tion in particular. 

Therefore as the capacity for exhi- 
biting extension, appears not itself to 



NOT IMMEDIATE ACTS OF DEITY. 243 

be essentially sentient, and in all cases 
fitted to be excited to sensation ; so by 
thus differing in its enumeration of qua- 
lities, it cannot be mind, or the sentient 
actions of Deity. 

But although the proportional varieties 
of external objects may be known 
thus far, nevertheless I consider it 
never can be too much insisted on, (in 
order to maintain an exact philosophy,) 
that the positive nature and essence of 
unperceived beings cannot be known ; 
feeling, thought, sensation under its 
varieties, is the only essence of which 
we have absolute consciousness. Other 
essences we know, must exist by rea- 
soning ; but the reasoning is here the 
consciousness, not the other essences. 
We have the knowledge there must 
necessarily be such beings ; but it is 
the knowledge of which we are con- 
scious, not the beings themselves. We 
have proof by the comparison of our 
ideas, that there are unperceived na- 
tures ; but it is the proof whose es- 
sence we know, not the nature proved. 

m2 



244 CAUSES OF PERCEPTION 

We believe in those things, of the exist- 
ence of which there are unequivocal signs ; 
but the signs are not the existences. 

The real essences of matter and 
mind we know not ; we only know our 
sensations, as real beings, very essences : 
these are the very things themselves. 
We know of other things which must 
" needs exist" by our sensations, but 
cannot conceive the nature of any es- 
sence not in our experience. 

I trust such ideas will not be thought 
tending to a dangerous scepticism. So 
different does their tendency appear 
to my own mind, that I consider them 
as leading to the most solid belief and 
conviction, in the existence of every 
variety of being which alters the con- 
scious sense, and which reason upholds 
as exterior to it, and independant of it ; 
whether as a perpetual series of 
changes flowing from the only origin 
of all things; or as that mysterious 
being himself, either concealed behind 
those mediate acts which screen his 
glory from mortal man, or manifesting 



NOT IMMEDIATE ACTS OF DEITY. 245 

himself in many ways, better suited to 
our comprehension, and better fitted by 
the qualities contemplated, to be com- 
pared to ourselves in their variety ; and 
to create trust, esteem, and hope, in 
their decided superiority. 



246 



ESSAY IV. 

UPON THE PHILOSOPHY OF MR. DUGALD 
STEWART AND DR. REID, AS IT RE- 
GARDS THE UNION OF COLOUR WITH 

extension; and the PERCEPTION 

OF THE EXTERNAL PRIMARY QUALI- 
TIES OF MATTER. 

Mr. D. Stewart has the following 
passage in the first volume of the Phi- 
losophy of the Human Mind.* " I 
" formerly had occasion to mention 
" several instances of very intimate as- 
" sociation formed between two ideas, 
" which have no necessary connexion 
"with each other; one of the most 
66 remarkable is that which exists in 
" every person's mind between the no- 
" tions of colour and of extension. 
* Part 2, ch. 5, p. 1. 



ON COLOUR AND EXTENSION. 247 

" The former of these words expresses 
" a sensation of the mind, the latter de- 
" notes a quality of an external object. 
"So that there is, in fact, no more 
" connexion between the two notions 
" than between those of pain and so- 
" lidity." 

Now, I consider, this passage as con- 
taining, in a few lines, a complete ex- 
ample of the errors in modern meta- 
physics, as to the nature and manner of 
external perception. There is here said 
to be, an intimate association between 
two notions, viz. those of extension and 
colour; whilst yet the word extension 
is said to express " the quality of an 
external object," instead of a notion; 
and as such must be incapable of asso- 
ciating as an " idea," with the " idea of co- 
lour," which is also said to be " a sensation 
of the mind" The whole sentence to those 
who will examine it accurately, must 
appear to involve a contradiction. 

Mr. Stewart, by later publications 
than this, shows himself the avowed 
admirer and supporter of Dr. Reid's 



248 THE UNION OF COLOUR 

philosophy, which, although he ob- 
serves, that it may require some im- 
provement in the way of addition, he 
conceives to be incontrovertible as far 
as it goes, and as not involving obvious 
inconsistencies, and contradictions. It 
is the philosophy of these authors, that 
the primary qualities of bodies are 
objects immediately perceived to be 
exterior to the mind, whose essences also 
may distinctly be conceived of, in their ex- 
ternal state ; that the conception of the 
nature of these essences is suggested by 
means of the sensations these qualities 
excite in the mind, through their action 
on the senses, but that the conception itself 
is not a sensation. These exterior qua- 
lities are, therefore, perceived not to be 
sensible qualities, but to be totally unlike 
them. Along with this perception of 
the exteriority, and conception of the 
nature of external primary qualities, 
instinct affords an aid to the senses; 
by which power it is, the mind becomes 
acquainted with the fact, that these 
exterior qualities continue to exist when 



AND EXTENSION. 249 

unperceived by the senses, and inde- 
pendant of any of its conceptions.* 
Thus, the perceptions of extension, 
figure, solidity, motion, hardness, and 
softness, &c. are not sensations of mind ; 
and there is no occasion for any ideas 
of reason, or other means than an ar- 
bitrary impulsion by which to appre- 
hend their situation, as external to 
it; we have also a clear conception 
of their positive nature, as they exist 
when exterior to the mind ; yet this 
clear conception of positive natures, is 
not an idea in the mind, nor does it 
" suggest any thing which, without the 
" grossest abuse of language, can be 
" called a sensation." 

Visible figure is also supposed by Dr. 
Reid, to be " immediately perceived, as the 
<( position of parts in relation to the eye, 
" external to it, and distant from it." 

* This is called the doctrine according to com- 
mon sense. See Reid's Essay on the intellectual 
powers; also Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind, 
c. 5, sec. 3 to 7, pp. 73 to 88, duod. 

Stewart's Essays, Note O. 

M 5 



250 THE UNION OF COLOUR 

Thus visible Jigure, i. e. vision; i. e. the 
conscious sight of an object, involves 
u no sensation of mind,'" but simply 
there is " the perception of parts, ex- 
ternal to the eye;' " so that if no ap- 
pearance of colour existed in the mind, 
the external position of an object might 
be perceived without its intervention."* 

When such thoughts as these are 
still held as the doctrines of common 
sense, how shall there be future im- 
provement in any department of phi- 
losophy ? 

To return to Mr. Stewart, I would 
take his own view of the subject with- 
out any needless cavil at a mere ex- 
pression. " The sensation of colour is 
associated with an external quality, 
which is not a sensation of mind." 
If so the sensation of colour is there 

* That visible figure is perceived altogether ex- 
ternal to the eye involves to my mind the statement 
of a complete contradiction. It is the result, and 
sum of our present philosophy, and lays the foun- 
dation of many a further error. See Reid's In- 
quiry of the Human Mind, c. 6, sec. 8. pp. 132 
and 133. 



AND EXTENSION. 251 

where the extension is; which involves 
the absurdity of sensation residing with- 
out the mind ; and is an opinion, 
which, (however much modern philoso- 
phers may pride themselves upon the 
discovery of its absurdity) is yet truly 
included in the whole doctrine of the 
immediate perception by sense, of ex- 
terior primary qualities, of whose 
nature there is a clear conception. 

But should it be retorted,* that by 
this phrase is meant that the notion or 
perception of extension is united to 
the notion or sensation of colour; and 
that the association of these thoughts is 
in the mind, although the quality of ex- 
tension be external to it: to such a 
vindication I would answer, that then 
the notion, or perception of extension, is 
allowed to be in the mind, notwith- 
standing the many battles Dr. Reid 
has fought to keep it thence. Coloured 
extension is at last, therefore, obliged 
to be admitted as a compound notion 

* I think, however, Mr. D. Stewart could hardly 
use such an argument with fairness. 



252 THE UNION OF COLOUR 

which exists in the perceiving mind ; — 
Upon which result arising, I will not be 
unfair enough, in my turn again, to retort 
with the question, which is tauntingly 
asked of the idealists : — Is this notion 
of extension, a square, or a round 
notion ? how broad, or how long is it? 
because such a question is not very 
consistent from those, who admitting every 
variety of the appearance of colour, or of 
other secondary qualities of matter to be a 
sensation of mind, (not possible to exist 
unperceived,) never consider it necessary 
to ask, whether any particular appear- 
ance be a scarlet, or green sensation ; 
a blue, or yellow thought ? If an idea 
be sweet, or sour ; loud, or soft ? &c. 
Now, a philosophy which should ex- 
plain the circumstance of colour being 
still seen as exterior to, and distant 
from the mind and body, after so much 
has been done to prove it to be a mere 
affection of the mind, would go far by 
its natural reunion with every abstract 
and practical science, to put the method 
of our knowledge of an external uni- 



AND EXTENSION. 253 

verse upon a better footing than it has 
hitherto appeared. 

I have attempted some ideas of this 
kind, which I fear will hardly be ac- 
cepted ; and I am aware the abstruse- 
ness of their nature, involves me in the 
danger of being thought inconsistent. 
The notion of perceiving primary qua- 
lities immediately by the organs of sense, 
and that they possess exteriority, and of 
being able to conceive them by suggestion 
from sensation, such as they positively 
exist, is contradicted by the circum- 
stance of EXTENSION, RESISTANCE, SO- 
LIDITY, FIGURE, DISTANCE, MOTION, 

being perceived as immediately, and as 
vividly, as to every circumstance the 
same, in dreams, insanities, and hallu- 
cinations, as in a waking and sane state 
of mind. Individual appearances will 
be in every point alike ; thus all con- 
scious qualities, however deemed pri- 
mary, and conceptions unlike sensa- 
tions, are proved to exist as mental 
sensations, or perceptions. They are 
thus all and equally effects; changes 



254 THE UNION OF COLOUR 

upon the principle of sentiency ; va- 
rious powers of sensation. It is difficult 
indeed, to find a phrase at which philo- 
sophers will not cavil ; but perceptions 
must necessarily be conscious, therefore, 
they are affections of an animated na- 
ture. For in whatsoever primary and 
secondary qualities may differ, yet 
there must be one quality in which 
they all agree, namely, as being sen- 
tient affections, or consciousnesses. 
Primary qualities shall be perceptions if 
they please, and secondary ones be 
only sensations ; but, as far as per- 
ceptions are conscious, they are sentient. 
The perception, as perception of exter- 
nal qualities, must be conscious, there- 
fore, perception of extension, must be a 
conscious sensation. 

I have founded my theory alluded to, 
upon the observation and analysis of 
certain facts : — For, first, I perceive 
there is no difference in a delirium, &c. 
and sane state of mind, between the 
delusion and the reality, as far as all 
notice of sensible qualities is con- 



AND EXTENSION. 255 

cerned. Again it is a notorious fact, ac- 
cording to the laws of light, that were 
the sun blotted from the heavens, it 
would still continue to be seen eight 
minutes after such an event. 

Now,accordingtoMr.Stewart,andDr. 
Reid, its figure is immediately perceived 
altogether external to mind and body ; 
for whilst its extension consists in an 
exterior, known, positive quality, sug- 
gested to the conception, by a SENSATION 
of touch, unlike its conception, this 
extension is further associated with the 
sensation of a brilliant colour, the whole 
forming a visible figure ; a relation of 
parts to the eye far distant from it. 

What becomes of such a theory ? 
of so much argument ; of so much 
ridicule of others ; of so much com- 
mon sense, in support of a doctrine 
entirely inconsistent with other disco- 
veries much better supported ? 

I have endeavoured to inquire into 
the mystery of the knowledge of external 
nature, and I own it is wonderful ; I 
am as much persuaded as any, that the 



256 THE UNION OF COLOUR 

objects in relation to the senses, form 
an independant and external universe ; 
that motion is requisite in order to 
overcome distance, &c. Yet the argu- 
ment is demonstrative that sensible 
qualities, both primary and secondary, 
are conscious exhibited effects ; sensations 
formed by the excitement of unknown 
causes, on the sentient powers ; that 
motion in this respect is also a sensa- 
tion ; distance likewise ; every con- 
sciousness, every perception, every no- 
tice, is mental. 

What, then, is nature ? What, then, 
is the universe ? What are our friends 
and children ? I answer, a whole set of 
corresponding, but unknown, unperceived 
qualities, which have a variety in that 
proportion and difference among each other, 
which their perceived varieties possess, and 
that the knowledge of such a fact, comes 
by reason, or arises from the perceptions 
of the relations of our ideas. 

It is, therefore, because in some 
cases reason is wanting in its powers 
of observation, and comparison ; because 



AND EXTENSION. 257 

many results and consequences aris- 
ing thence, many ideas put in posi- 
tion with others are annihilated in 
dreams, hallucinations, and insanities ; 
that there is a difference of the most 
material kind, with respect to our ca- 
pacity of forming a right judgment as 
to the causes concerned in the exhibi- 
tion of sensible qualities. In delusions 
the mind cannot take notice that they are 
not caused as usual, because the sense of 
place is lost ; and the notice of the means 
used in the formation of objects by pre- 
vious causes, becomes annihilated ; which 
formation it is that renders objects truly 
similar to others, and not their mere 
appearances. In a sane and waking 
state of the mind, we can reason 
on causes, and can perceive by an 
act of the understanding immediately 
coalescing with the senses, all the con- 
sistencies, or inconsistencies of the re- 
lations of the ideas of the sensible qua- 
lities. In such a state, we therefore re- 
fer sensible qualities to objects per- 
manently, and externally existing ; be- 



258 THE UNION OF COLOUR 

cause we take notice, they have been 
for^med in a manner, and appear under 
circumstances, which yield the suppo- 
sition of being similar to those which 
will return upon irregular applications of 
the organs of sense, and so " must needs 
continue to exist." In delusion there is 
no perception of the understanding ; in 
sane thoughts there is. In dreams 
the understanding sleeps, the fancy 
only is awake : — Yet, however vivacious 
the images of fancy may be, if the 
understanding in any particular case 
should chance to be awake, they are 
considered by the subject of them as the 
qualities of a disordered mind ; not bo- 
dies external to it. 

I have heard of a conscious delirium, 
in which the sensible qualities of ex- 
tension, resistance, sound, colour, the 
voice of human beings, and animals, 
dancing, music, and painting, all, ap- 
pear as real, and vivacious as though 
they had been external and distant, 
which yet the patient knew did not 
exist except in his own heated fancy, 



AND EXTENSION. 259 

so long as he retained the sense of the 
place where he lay, and had presence 
of mind to reason on that fact; but 
when he lost the recollection of place, he 
could not put it in relation with the 
rest of the ideas or images in his mind ; 
and so referred the sensible qualities 
to such usual causes as produced such 
images ; i. e. he considered that their 
causes existed independant of fancy. 
Thus coloured extension is a compound 
sensation; the sense of motion is another ; 
tangibility and resistance are others ; 
but their unperceived, continually 
existing causes, are independant of sen- 
sation, unperceived, and unknown ; and 
whilst their positive nature is unknown, 
yet their relative value, among them- 
selves, is known to be equal to the re- 
lative variety of the " ideas and sensa- 
tions;" i.e. the effects they determine 
on the mind. But lest in this short 
exposition I should only by giving a 
hasty sketch, mislead the reader, I re- 
fer to the larger essay for these ideas in 
their fuller detail. Suffice it to keep 



260 THE UNION OF COLOUR 

to the point in question, and it fol- 
lows, that conscious, coloured extension, is 
as a picture in the mind, and must be 
associated there with ideas of position, 
and distance, and direction, in relation to 
motion. The understanding knows these 
sensible perceptions of motion and dis- 
tance, have corresponding exterior qua- 
lities which can appear to other minds, 
and which would exist were no con- 
sciousness present. Now it is unper- 
ceived motion which is in relation to 
unperceived distance, and unperceived 
contact; (whatever such qualities may- 
be when unperceived ;) therefore, when 
the soul perceives the picture in which 
the coloured atmosphere appears, as 
well as the objects beyond it ; it places 
them all in proportion to its perception 
of the motion requisite to attain con- 
tact with them ; referring all the per- 
ceived qualities, which are effects, 
equally to all the unperceived qualities 
which are their causes; and which are 
in equal mutual relations. Unperceived 
motion truly goes forth to unperceived 



AND EXTENSION. 261 

extension, &c. The perceived quali- 
ties are as a landscape, sent from an 
unseen country by which we may know 
it ; as algebraic signs, by which we 
can compute and know the proportions 
of their qualities ; as a language, which 
must be translated, before it can ex- 
plain the actions of nature. The mind, 
in this landscape, is taken as an unex- 
tended centre, ready to go forth amidst 
the surrounding scenery ; perceives itself 
amidst the algebraic equations, the sim- 
ple quantity which never varies ; and 
when it philosophises converts the ideas 
of its own operations into those analyti- 
cal forms of expression, to which it is 
obliged to have recourse when it would 
adequately comprehend the interactions 
of the powers of nature. 

Visible figure is thus truly nothing 
more than a conscious line of de- 
marcation between two colours, and 
so must itself be colour ; figure must 
ever comprehend visible extension ; and 
visible extension does not take place 
without colour : nor can I conceive of 



262 THE UNION OF COLOUR 

perceiving it externally and immediately 
without it ; for extension without colour 
is complete darkness.* 

Now, when the soul goes forth to 
that, which the understanding may be 
supposed correct in considering a per- 
manently existing object, does it go 
forth to colour and extension? There 
is no philosopher of the present day 
who would not answer, that it does 
not go forth to colour, but that it most 
certainly goes forth to extension. Now, 
I say, that in this respect colour and 
extension must stand or fall together ; 
every argument of Dr. Reid's philoso- 
phy applies equally to both, for con- 
sidering them external; whilst also every 
argument in considering secondary qua- 
lities as mere affections of mind, caused 
by permanent unlike causes, applies 
equally to both ; therefore, I again 
ask, Does the soul go forth to colour 
and extension ? I answer, That it does 
not go forth either to perceived colour, 

* See Reid's Inquiry, c. 6, sec. 8. 



AND EXTENSION. 263 

or to perceived extension, but that it 
does equally go forth to unperceived 
colour, and to unperceived extension; 
for that it attains unto, and forms an 
immediate junction with those unper- 
ceived permanent causes, or objects which 
determine perceived colour and exten- 
sion upon the mind ; and which unper- 
ceived objects, although considered 
themselves as coloured and extended, 
are only so considered, because inca- 
pable of being conceived of, save under 
the forms of those sensations which are 
always created by them, and which bear 
equal varieties of proportions among 
themselves ; and that however every 
change of step may alter any colour, 
figure, and perceived extension, yet those 
permanent exterior existences are con- 
sidered by the understanding, as they 
truly are, unvaried in themselves. Thus 
to endeavour to catch at unperceived 
relations is a very difficult task for the 
mind ; whilst fit expressions for them 
are still more so. 

The advantages resulting from this 



264 THE UNION OF COLOUR 

doctrine are, that it purports to be an 
analysis of facts, which, when syntheti- 
cally put together, will again accord 
with nature. 

Secondly, that it admits of examining 
nature without scepticism; for the 
landscape, the calculation, the language, 
are supposed correct in every part, 
either in respect to the representation of 
the objects, the computation of the pro- 
portional quantities, or the expression 
of the facts. 

Thirdly, a view is here taken which 
may enable physiologists and physi- 
cians, moralists and divines, parents 
and instructors, better to observe, and 
more wisely to act than they do, with 
respect to the health, the opinions, and 
the practices of those under their care. 
Sensations are effects ; the same exter- 
nal causes would yield the same in- 
ternal sensation to each mind, if the 
varieties were not in the individuals. 
Sentient capacities seem also the result 
of an uniform, permanent power in na- 
ture. The varieties by every induction 



AND EXTENSION. 



265 



we are capable of making, seem to de- 
pend upon variety of organization, 
either in its arrangement, or its action. 
The former, whether in men or animals, 
has its most permanent characters 
stamped by the Deity. The latter is 
as multifarious as food, medicine, and 
climate ; the circulation of the blood, 
the passions, the habits of education, 
and the notions of individuals, can ren- 
der it. They are wrong, therefore, 
who, ignorantly taking no notice of 
these things, expect the human will, to 
be in all circumstances equal to self- 
command. Men make excuse for their 
actions in dreams and insanity, saying, 
the essences of things are then different ; 
but never consider, that every degree 
and variety of their state of mind de- 
pends upon analogous laws and causes, 
which wisdom acting in time might 
alter with advantage, but which after- 
wards may lie beyond any human power 
to ameliorate. 

I say, that in this doctrine the synthesis 
is equal to the analysis, because if a sen- 
tient being were placed in the midst of 

N 



266 THE UNION OF COLOUR 

various insentient qualities, capable of ex- 
citing changes in the sentient being, the 
sentient being would consciously per- 
ceive the changes, would soon reflect on 
them, would soon perceive the relation 
of cause and effect, i. e. objects, or 
some changes of mind, without which 
others would not happen, and so would 
refer its own changes to causes ; self, 
would therefore appear as a general 
capacity for any sensation, united to a 
body, i. e. a sphere of certain limited con- 
sciousnesses; and objects independant of 'self \ 
would appear to be the causes of specific 
sensations in particular ; without which 
self in general might continue to exist. 

Thus all things would justly be consi- 
dered as out of the mind which were not 
in any given state of sensation ; but the 
objects which existed in relation to the 
senses would also yield a proof, (by 
their regular return on the irregular ap- 
plication of the organs of sense,) that 
they permanently continued to exist 
under certain defined and regular forms. 
It is these continuous existences which 
are called the objects of nature. In all 



AND EXTENSION". 267 

this the mind, as I think, from very 
early infancy, perceives the true rela- 
tions of things, with almost as much 
ease as it perceives the sensible qualities 
of things. Along with this there would 
arise an intimate association of the sensi- 
ble qualities with the ideas of their per- 
manent causes; an action of the mind, 
which leads to the illusory belief of a 
corresponding external union. A notion 
not easily, and which ought not too 
hastily, to be broken up. 

The only reason why pain and pleasure 
do not seem to exist in the objects capable 
of yielding them, but to reside within 
ourselves, is because in those cases there 
is not a permanent association. 

Beauty and deformity are (except by 
some philosophers) considered to exist 
external to the mind ; yet are no more 
than sensations of satisfaction or disgust, 
which some unknown, external causes 
create, and which are transferred upon 
those causes, and seem at a distance, 
on the surface of bodies, just in the manner 
in which Mr. Stewart speaks of colour, 
as seen united to extension at a dis- 

n2 



268 THE UNION OF COLOUR 

tance, and which I conceive admits of a 
similar explanation to that which I have 
endeavoured to give of that phenomenon. 
In like manner love, as long as it lasts, 
considers its rapture to be caused by the 
merit of its object, but when distaste ar- 
rives it is found to reside in a selfish sensa- 
tion; and by a new delusion, the object 
of its former passion, is now thought 
equally by its demerit to deserve a con- 
trary emotion. 

But the whole of the matter is, I re- 
peat, a mystery ; an " unknown lan- 
guage' is not that in which to think, with 
much ease and satisfaction. I take the 
subject in its full amount to be " one of 
those secret things which belong to the Lord 
our God." The deep consideration of 
it is, however, well fitted to afford the 
conclusion, that apparently like objects 
may in every sensible quality be simi- 
lar, and yet they may essentially differ 
in their remote causes ; i. e. in those ag- 
gregates or objects which contain their 
proper effectual causes, and therefore 
ought to be examined upon their own 
grounds. There may be no perfect 



AND EXTENSION. 269 

analogy between any complex objects 
in nature ; therefore, to understand 
them aright there ought to be a com- 
plete analysis of every part of them. 
Whilst it must nevertheless be owned, 
that an exact examination of objects 
made by experiment, (or nice obser- 
vation,) is a true source of the demon- 
stration of similar qualities for the future 
in like circumstances. In both these 
respects modern philosophers err ; con- 
sidering partial analysis as affording 
ground for analogical conclusions, which 
without unwarrantable scepticism, or 
weak hesitation, are not open to ob- 
jection :* whilst at the same time, no 
principle is supposed sufficient to explain 
the doctrine, that where there is a com- 
plete similitude known, or supposed, in 
the formation of two individuals, there 
is any necessity there should be a com- 
plete likeness in their qualities or 
effects. An association of ideas is thus 
erected into a fit means for the know- 

* As in the conclusion that because some reli- 
gions are false, all are so — some miracles ill sup- 
ported, and alleged to have taken place upon fri- 
volous reasons ; all are on the same foundation. 



270 ON COLOUR AND EXTENSION. 

ledge of existence ; whilst the deduc- 
tions of reason are considered as in- 
adequate to their discovery. 

I have attempted to reverse this order, 
and to show that an association of ideas 
will never prove any other existence than 
that of an association of ideas, but that rea- 
son has power to deduce the knowledge 
of an universe, existing independantly 
both of ideas and their associations. 

The consideration of this subject also 
may show modern philosophers two 
principal errors in their doctrine of 
causation ; the adoption of which con- 
fuses the otherwise luminous pages of 
Mr. Stewart ; for it proves, first, that 
cause is not an arbitrary antecedency of 
sensible qualities in the mind, but an 
efficient concomitancy in external nature ; 
as also, that the greater uncertainty of 
physical when compared with mathe- 
matical science, arises from the superior 
difficulty of detecting the presence of 
exactly similar objects or causes, not of 
demonstrating their like effects if found : 
but this latter remark deserves further 
consideration. 



271 



ESSAY V. 

THAT MATHEMATICAL DEMONSTRA- 
TION, AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION, 
ARE FOUNDED UPON SIMILAR PRIN- 
CIPLES OF EVIDENCE. 

Since writing the essay on causation, 
I find that my views with respect to its 
nature, accord less with general notions 
than I was then aware of. I became 
acquainted, indeed, during its progress 
in the press, with some remarkable 
passages in the writings of Mr. Dugald 
Stewart, perused many years before, 
although then obliterated from my me- 
mory, but was unwilling to oppose a 
living author of such celebrity, although 
my notions were not altered by his ob- 
servations : the first passage to which I 
allude, is the following : — * 

" From these observations it seems 
" to follow that our expectation of the 
"continuance of the laws of nature, 
* Mr. Stewart's first essay, p. 138. 



272 ON MATHEMATICAL 

" is not the result of the association of 
" ideas * nor of any other principle 
" generated by experience alone ; and 
" Mr. Hume has shown with demon - 
" strative evidence, that it cannot be 
" resolved into any process of reason- 
" ing, a priori ; till, therefore, some 
" more satisfactory analysis of it shall 
" appear than has yet been proposed, 
" we are unavoidably led to state it 
" as an original law of human belief/' 

There is a note annexed to this 
passage, containing a quotation from 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica, upon the 
article Experimental Philosophy, which 
renders it still more evident, that my 
notions venture to interfere with almost 
universal opinions, as to the nature and 
manner of causation. 

It is as follows : " Experimental phi- 
" losophy seems at first sight in direct 
" opposition to the procedure of nature 
" in forming general laws. These are 
" found by induction from multitudes 
" of individual facts, and must be 

* Alluding to some previous observations on Mr. 
Hume's notions. 



AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 273 

" affirmed to no greater extent than the 
" induction on which they are founded. 
*' Yet it is a matter of fact, a physical 
" law of human thought, that one sim- 
M pie, clear, and unequivocal experiment, 
" gives us the most complete confidence 
" in the truth of a general conclusion 
*' from it to every similar case." 

" Whence this anomaly ? It is not 
" an anomaly, or contradiction of the 
" general maxim of philosophical in- 
" vestigation ; but the most refined ap- 
" plication of it. There is no law more 
(( general than this; that nature is con- 
" stant in all her operations. The ju- 
" dicious and simple form of one ex- 
** periment, ensures us (we imagine) in 
" the complete knowledge of all the 
" circumstances of the event. Upon 
" this supposition, and this alone, we 
" consider the experiment as the faith- 
" ful representation of every possible 
" case of the conjunction. "* 

The passages which in this sentence 
appear to me exceptionable, are, " There 

s The confusion of mind arising from considering 
cause as essentially an antecedency, instead of a 

n5 



274 ON MATHEMATICAL 

'Ms no law more general than this, that 
" nature is constant in all her opera- 
" tions ;" and " that it is a physical 
" law of thought to believe that the 
" results of any experiment will hold 
" universally." 

Both of these phrases are of ambi- 
guous import ; for nature is so far from 
being constant in her operations, that 
single cases of exception occur to 
otherwise invariable courses of regularly 
antecedent and subsequent objects : 
thus we not only can " imagine,'" but 
we experience a change in the course 
of nature, as far as all outward appear- 
ance and modes of detection can go. 
On the other hand, her real course, in 
the operation of similar cause, must be 

concomitancy, and of making- no distinction between 
its nature and operation, and our ability to detect 
its presence, is transfused into all modern writers on 
Cause. The value, however, of the abstract doc- 
trine of efficiency in cause is of great moment ; for 
it enables us to refer like effects to like proximate 
causes, (whatever variety may creep in amidst ex- 
terior aggregates), as also to depend usually on the 
regularity of nature, as itself an effect resulting 
from an equal cause. 



AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 275 

necessary and universal; one unequivocal 
experiment (if such can be made) be- 
comes therefore an example of all others 
of a like kind, and thence forms the 
datum for an universal premiss, in which 
all similar particulars are involved. 

To believe such, does not require a 
" physical law of thought," (the very- 
terms of which phrase imply, that the 
belief of the mind, although imperious, 
may yet leave its object without proof 
for its truth,) but is founded in a de- 
monstrative species of evidence, namely, 
in the mental perception, " that it is a 
: ' contradiction, qualities should begin of 
" themselves ;" " that changes are there- 
"fore changes on the things that are;" 
;< that similar interferences will make 
" similar changes ;" " therefore, that when- 
'' ever things are under similar inter- 
fi ference, they lie under a similar change;" 
" so that thus, an exact experiment is in- 
" dependant of time ;" and, therefore, 
when repeated, must be a similar object 
repeated, and not a different one, or one, 
which is possible to be affected by that 
time, whether future, or past ; whether 



276 ON MATPIEMATICAL 

present, or distant ; which enters not into 
its composition. 

A yet more obvious disagreement, 
arising in like manner from the different 
view I take of causation, is to be found 
in the two following passages of Mr. 
Stewart,* in which it affords me a satis- 
faction to perceive that my ideas on 
this subject coincide with those of La 
Place :— 

" The slightest acquaintance with 
" mathematics is sufficient to produce 
" the most complete conviction, that 
" whatever is universally true in that 
"science, must be true of necessity; 
" and, therefore, that a universal and 
" a necessary truth are in the language 
" of mathematicians, synonymous ex- 
" pressions. If this view of the matter 
" be just, the evidence afforded by ma- 
" thematical induction must be allowed 
" to differ radically from that of phy- 
" sical ; the latter resolving ultimately 
" into our instinctive expectation of the 
" laws of nature ; and consequently, 

* See Elements of the Philosophy of the Human 
Mind, vol. 2, chap. 4. sec. 4. pp. 455, &c. 



AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 277 

* never amounting to that demonstrative 
' certainty which excludes the possi- 
1 bility of anomalous exceptions." 

" I have been led into this train of 
' thinking, by a remark which La 
1 Place appears to me to have stated 
' in terms much too unqualified : ' Que 
' ' la march e de Newton dans sa de- 
' ' couverte de la gravitation universalle 
' ' a etc exactement la meme que dans 
' ' celle de la formule du bindmeS 
■ When it is recollected, that in the 

* one case, Newton's conclusion re- 
' lated to a contingent, and in the 
4 other, to a necessary truth, it seems 
' difficult to conceive how the logical 
' procedure, which conducted him to 
' both, should have been exactly the 
' same. In one of his queries, he has 
' (in perfect conformity to the principles 
' of Bacon's logic) admitted the pos- 
' sibility that ' God may vary the laws of 
' ' nature, and make worlds of several 

* ' sorts in several parts of the universe.' 

" ' At leasts he adds, ' / see nothing 
' ' of contradiction in all this.' Would 
1 Newton have expressed himself with 



278 ON MATHEMATICAL 

" equal scepticism concerning the uni- 
" versality of his binomial theorem, or 
" admitted the possibility of a single 
" exception to it, in the indefinite pro- 
" gress of actual involution ?" 

" In short, did there exist the slightest 
" shade of difference between the de- 
" gree of his assent to this inductive 
" result, and that extorted from him 
" by a demonstration of Euclid ? Al- 
" though, therefore, the mathematician, 
" as well as the natural philosopher, 
" may without any blameable latitude 
u of expression, be said to reason by 
•' induction, when he draws an infer- 
" ence from the known to the unknown, 
" yet it seems indisputable, that, in all 
" such cases he rests his conclusions 
" on grounds essentially distinct from 
■' those which form the basis of expe- 
" rimental science." 

The passages of the " Essay on Cause 
and Effect," which I would select in oppo- 
sition to those of Mr. Stewart, are those 
which presently follow. They are in- 
tended to show, first, that the science of 
mathematics is truly but one branch of 



AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 279 

physics : for that all the conclusions its 
method of induction demonstrates, de- 
pend for their truth upon the implied 
proposition, " That like cause must 
have like effect ;" a proposition which 
being the only foundation for the truths 
of physical science, and which gives 
validity to the result of any experiment 
whatever, ranks mathematics as a species 
under the same genus ; where the same 
proposition is the basis, there is truly 
but one science, however subdivided 
afterwards. 

Secondly, That, when objects are formed 
the same upon one occasion as another, 
their qualities, properties, and effects, will 
he similar. It is this proposition on 
which mathematical demonstration, and 
physical induction equally, and only, 
rest for their truth. There is no dif- 
ference ; objects are what their forma- 
tions render them, whether in the 
shape of mathematical diagrams, or 
other aggregates in nature. Thus they 
are intended to show, that the laws of 
causation form the base on which ma- 
thematical certainty is built; and that 



280 ON MATHEMATICAL 

the reason why some other branches of 
science are less secure in their conclu- 
sions, is merely because of the difficulty 
there is in tracing the original forma- 
tions of the objects* without inpugning 
in the smallest degree, the universality 
and necessity of the axiom, that if cause 
in any instance be like, the effect must 
also be like. 

Thirdly, They are furthermore intended 
to point out the fact, that as we know 
nothing of objects but the enumeration 
of qualities, so the reasoning which con- 
cerns the qualities contained in phy- 
sical objects, must fundamentally be of 
the same kind, as that concerning the 
quality termed quantity, whether it be 
expressed by abstract numbers, or by 
mathematical diagrams. f 

* Or in finding a criterion whereby to detect aft 
unobserved " secret power" creeping in amidst the 
most unequivocal determination of similar " sensible 
qualities." 

f This I believe is the old Pythagorean doctrine, 
and which I am sorry Mr. Stewart considers but " a 
dream." Pythagoras used to say, " Leave but one 
quality out of the definition of a pear, and the ob- 
ject is not a pear." 



AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 281 

1. " All mathematical demonstration is 
" built upon the notion, that where 
" quantities, or diagrams resemble each 
" other, the relations which are true 
" with respect to one of each kind, 
" will be true with respect to all others 
" of a like kind; only because there is 
" nothing to make a difference among 
" them. So, if in all past time such 
" 'secret powers' could be shown ne- 
" cessarily connected with such sensible 
" qualities ; yet, in future it could not 
" thence be proved to continue so, un- 
" less supported by the axioms, that like 
" causes must exhibit like effects, for 
" that differences cannot arise of them- 
" selves." 

2. "To represent the relation of 
" cause and effect, as, A followed by B 
" is a false view of the matter; cause 
" and effect might be represented 
" rather, as A x B = C, therefore C 
" is included in the mixture of the ob- 
" jects called cause. If C arise once 
" from the junction of any two bodies, 
" C must, upon every like conjunction, 



282 ON MATHEMATICAL 

" be the result ; because there is no 
" alteration in the proportion of the 
" quantities to make a difference ; C is 
" really included in the mixture of A 
" and B, although to our senses we are 
" forced to note down (as it were) the 
" sum arising from their union after the 
" observance of their coalescence.'" 

3. "In like manner the result of all 
" arithmetical combinations are included 
" in their statements. Yet we are 
" obliged to take notice of them sepa- 
" rately and subsequently, owing to 
" the imperfection of our senses in not 
" observing them with sufficient quick- 
" ness, and time being requisite to 
" bring them out to full view, and ap- 
" parent in some distinct shape. In- 
" deed, my whole notion of the rela- 
" tion of cause and effect is aptly ima- 
" gined by the nature of the necessary 
" results, included in the juxta position 
iC of quantities. But, as long as cause 
" shall be considered only as an antece- 
" dent, the future can never be proved to 
" be included in the past, which yet is 



AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 283 

' truly the case. For when it comes 
' to be observed, that cause means, and 

* really is, the creation of new qua- 
■ lities (arising from new conjunctions 
' in matter or mind) then it is per- 
' ceived that the future is involved in 
1 the past ; for when existing objects 

* are the same, they must put on simi- 
' lar qualities, otherwise contrary qua- 
' lities or differences would arise of 
1 themselves, and begin their own exist- 
' ences, which is impossible, and con- 

* veys a contradiction in terms.* All 
' that experience has to do is to show 
' us, by what passes within ourselves, 
6 that there is a contradiction in the 
' supposition of qualities beginning 

* their own existences, and a contra- 
' diction is never admitted in the re- 
' lation of any ideas that present them- 
1 selves." 

" No mathematical reasoning can 
- ever be driven further back than by 

* showing that the contrary of an as- 

* See the " Essay on Cause and Effect,'* pp 
141 143. 



284 ON MATHEMATICAL 

serted proposition is a contradiction 
in terms. Fire and wood must, in- 
deed, be antecedent to combustion, 
but it is in the union of fire and wood, 
there exists immediately combustion as 
a new event in nature; also in this 
union there exists the similar cause 
allowed by the data ; whilst combus- 
tion is termed the effect of the union 
of fire and wood, but however 
termed an effect, is in fact, a new but 
similar object as heretofore ; a simi- 
lar mass of qualities in kind, which 
cannot, therefore, be a differe?it mass 
of qualities in kind. Equals added to 
equals upon any two occasions, the whole 
must be equal : Add equal qualities to 
equal qualities, the sum of the qualities 
must be equal upon every repetition of the 
junction; and the sum must be the 
same result taken twice over, not two 
different, or possibly altered sums. It 
may be seen, therefore, upon ma- 
thematical principles, that a difference 
in the result of equal unions, can no 
more arise out of the mixtures of any 



AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 285 

" other quantities of objects, than from the 
i( junctions of those of numbers.'" 

Thus it may be seen, that in the 
study of mathematical science, the 
scholar is supposed to know the general 
axioms, " that qualities cannot begin 
their own existences, and that the form- 
ation of things being supposed equal, the 
properties are nothing else but those re- 
suits-, included in their formation, and, 
therefore, cannot at the same time both be 

SAME and DIFFERENT ; AND THERE- 
FORE, THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSATION 
IS UNDERSTOOD BY THE SCHOLAR AS 
THE BASE ON WHICH THE TRUTH OF 
EVERY THEOREM IS SURELY BUILT. 

In this point of view, the demonstra- 
tion, by means of reasoning on a dia- 
gram, is but the " one simple and ju- 
dicious experiment," which proves the 
relations of every other formed after a 
similar fashion in every different time 
and place. Could these maxims of 
causation be altered ; could qualities 
begin of themselves ; could (therefore) 
like cause produce other than like 



286 ON MATHEMATICAL 

effect; all the axioms, diagrams, and 
demonstrations might stand as they do 
in the books of Euclid, without any 
avail as to their application to other 
diagrams of a similar kind and their 
properties ; and for this plain reason, 
because, although the objects were 
formed similar to others, their qualities 
might differ of themselves. We might 
have the radii of circles, for instance, 
forming themselves unequally, although 
it were granted their boundary line was 
made a true circle by its usual mode of 
formation. Thus the doctrine of neces- 
sary connection is the result of perceiving 
that two or more individual objects, or 
quantities, which are like each other, 
are to all intents and purposes with 
respect to any relations which may 
arise respecting them, identically the 
same, and may be always considered as 
the same individual objects or quantities 
repeated as many times : instead of as 
many various although similar objects. 
It is such a perception as this, in which 
consists the essential power of abstrac- 



AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 287 

tion: an abstraction which Bacon, New- 
ton, Berkeley, all must have allowed, 
or there could have been no science ; 
and did virtually, and truly allow, 
notwithstanding some cavils on that 
head. 

The relations of the simple impres- 
sions which influence the minds of 
children, or peasants, nay, even of 
brutes, enable them to perceive, that 
like things are equal to the same things 
repeated, and that they have no relation 
to time. The past, therefore, governs 
the future, because no interval of time 
can prevent the same thing from being 
the same. Inferior understandings, in- 
deed, and perhaps all men, consider 
things to be like, or the same kind of 
object, upon too partial an observation 
of their qualities or methods of forma- 
tion ; still they expect like causes to 
have like effects, or like objects to 
have similar qualities in future, when 
they do consider them as like, only 
because no interval of time can make 
any difference in respect to them ; and 



288 ON MATHEMATICAL 

there is no other difference supposed or ob- 
served. 

In the mathematics, diagrams are 
formed by ourselves, and we may there- 
fore be always sure of our future and 
universal conclusions ; because we frame 
an hypothesis, and examine by one ex- 
periment, (i. e. one experience,) the re- 
lations which arise ; and the same data 
being given to all future ages, there is 
nothing supposed which can make any 
difference amidst these relations; for 
all particular instances are included in 
the first experience made. The notion 
of time is left out of consideration, for 
it is observed to have nothing to do 
with the circumstance of one example 
being capable of proving the relations 
of all that are like it in every time and 
place ; as each may be considered to be 
identically the same. 

This is the reasoning, therefore, or 
intimate perception, which men and 
animals have with respect to the course 
of nature ; and I cannot avoid consi- 
dering Sir Isaac Newton's theory as 



AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 289 

something puerile and unphilosophical, 
if it is to be understood in the sense 
Mr. Stewart gives to it. 

God no doubt may vary the laws of 
nature, &c. that is, create, arrange, 
alter the capacities of objects, by means 
adapted to those ends. But to under- 
stand God aright, he cannot work a 
contradiction ; he cannot occasion the 
same objects without any alteration 
amidst them supposed to produce dis- 
similar effects. 

It is, therefore, no more an invasion 
of the attributes of Deity, to assert 
that he cannot alter an effect arising 
from an equal physical cause, than 
that he cannot render a triangle, at 
the same time that it remains a tri- 
angle, to be without the properties of a 
triangle. The same kind of object is 
the same kind of object, and its effects 
are but qualities the result of its for- 
mation, which being the same cannot be 
different ; and that, whether the quality 
resulting from its formation be a colour 
or a proportion. 

Mathematical science, therefore, and 

o 



290 ON MATHEMATICAL 

those physical actions, which are termed 
laws of nature, equally depend upon the 
one only law,* " Like cause must exhibit 
like effect;"' and this axiom depends on 
the principle, that " No quality can be- 
gin its own existence" For when the 
inquiry concerning causation is pushed 
back as far as it may, it will readily 
be perceived, first, that if any parti- 
cular quality were supposed to begin of 
itself the following contradiction would 
arise, viz. that the beginning of exist- 
ence, which is a quality of being, could 
belong to a being not yet in existence ;f 
secondly, that in this respect all qualities 

* Mr. Stewart considers the word law to be only a 
metaphorical expression, E. P. H. Mind,vol.2,p.220. 

I can only give it a rational meaning, by convert- 
ing it into quality, property, or relation, in which 
senses, when general, it forms a general efficient 
cause, and when we detect by an exact experiment 
a similarity of qualities, we cannot but expect simi- 
lar effects, because we must expect same things will 
be same, independantly of time and place. It may be 
called a physical law of thought thus to believe, 
but I must believe as much of any data in physics, 
and cannot believe more in mathematics. 

f See essay on the relation of cause and effect, 
p. 34, " Let the object, &c." 



AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 291 

are upon the same footing, and that no 
variety of accident can make any differ- 
ence in the universality of that truth. 

The faculty of abstraction, is truly the 
origin of all science. By abstraction, is 
meant the consideration of any quality 
apart from others with which it may be 
usually united, in order to notice what 
inferences may be drawn from its nature. 
Taking that quality apart, therefore, 
viz. the commencement of existence, we 
perceive that every imaginable being 
is on the same footing with respect 
to it, namely, that it is a contra- 
diction to suppose it the quality of a 
being not yet in existence : — " That 
existences cannot begin of themselves," 
is thus an universal perception, and 
which ought to govern every deduction 
of philosophy. 

Nor can I agree with Mr: Stewart, 
that children and brutes do not readily 
abstract ; for, I consider, that an intui- 
tive perception, or ready observation, 
(whichever it may be termed) that the 
intervals of time, or the multiplication 
of the individuals, prevent not objects 

o 2 



292 ON MATHEMATICAL 

if they be of the same kind known, or 
supposed, from being like others of a 
similar kind, (with respect to their fu- 
ture untried qualities,) to be a perception 
which belongs universally to animate be- 
ings. Objects, I grant, are considered too 
readily as similar ; for nature is so re- 
gular as to the union of similar secret 
powers, with similar sensible qualities, 
that she is almost imagined incapable of 
being otherwise, until found so ; but 
however irregular she may occasionally 
be found, she never inspires the notion 
of being at a contradiction with herself. 

Mr. Stewart's notions with respect 
to the general nature of causation, 
setting aside the particular view he 
took of it, as being dissimilar to mathe- 
matical induction, (as well as those of 
Mr. Hume, Dr. Reid, and others,) are 
expressed more eoncisely and less am- 
biguously than in any other passage in 
these following words. 

" From experience we learn that 
" there are many events which are con- 
" stantly conjoined so that the one in- 
" variably follows the others ; but it is 



AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 293 

" possible, for any thing we know to 
" the contrary, that this connection 
" though a constant one, may not be a 
" necessary one. It is possible, for any 
" thing we know to the contrary, that 
" there may be no necessary con- 
" nections, and we may rest assured 
■' that if there are such we shall never 
" be able to discern them."* 

It is against such opinions that the 
" Essay on Cause and Effect" was im- 
mediately directed ; it is intended there- 
by to prove that the sort of experience 
called experiment, will show, that there 
exists efficient cause between the objects 
of nature, because it shows that there 
are objects without which others will not 
exist, and with which they will exist ; 
that the same kind of experience, being 
mingled with an abstract and demon- 
strative reasoning, enables us to know 
that the manner of efficient cause, is not 
by arbitrary antecedency and subse- 
quency of event ; but by mutual and 
simultaneous affections and interactions of 

* Elements of the Philosophy of the Human 
Mind, vol. 1, chap. 2, sec. 2. 



294 ON MATHEMATICAL 

particles or qualities : whilst a similar 
mode of reasoning on experiment, also 
leads us with equally demonstrative 
evidence to the conclusion, that there 
must exist " an universal necessity of 
connection" between any given cause 
and its effect. 

In short, causation is necessary not 
arbitrary ; and though the nature of any 
particular effect requires to be ascer- 
tained by experience, yet it is reason 
must show r its necessary connection with 
its cause, as opposed to its arbitrary or 
accidental connection with it ; its imme- 
diate inherence in its cause, as opposed 
to its mere subsequency to it ; and the 
knowledge of its invariability of connec- 
tion for the future, as opposed to the 
mere experience of its conjunction in 
past time. Thus although experience 
is required to show, " that blue and 
yellow mixed in their particles, will 
form the colour termed green : yet that 
experience must be reasoned on before it 
can show, that by, in, and with the mix- 
tures of particles, there exists imme- 
diately green as a new quality in na- 



AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 295 

ture;" or such a set of altered particles 
as shall determine green when meet- 
ing with the eye and mind. The aid 
of reason is also equally needful, yet 
sufficient to show, that the connection 
between the mixture of such particles, 
is necessary and invariable. In like 
manner, one experience shows that 
ten taken ten times over, yields one 
hundred ; but it is reason which proves 
that this result coalesces in and with its 
cause, and that in every step of its 
progress : and that if it once coalesces 
it must necessarily and invariably do so 
always.* 

* " Things are what their enumeration of qualities 
make them ;" in the abstract sciences, we can limit 
these ourselves, and therefore can predicate the 
properties of any given subject in them univer- 
sally, but physical objects of experiment cannot 
be detected with equal certainty. This is the 
whole difference ; for in any case where we cannot 
show the reason of any regular appearance in the 
sciences respecting quantity, a strictly demonstra- 
tive proposition cannot be enunciated concerning it, 
and an universal induction of a constant fact 
could not thence result. 



296 



ESSAY VI. 

THAT SENSIBLE QUALITIES CANNOT 
BE CAUSES. 

Bishop Berkeley has incontestably 
proved this proposition, and Mr. Hume 
has made it a main ground of his doc- 
trine on causation. But these phi- 
losophers either did not perceive, or 
did not choose to allow the whole in- 
ferences from the doctrine ; for Berke- 
ley, perceiving that " the ideas and 
sensations of sensible qualities" could 
not be the external acting causes of 
nature, that they could not stand out 
and be independant of the mind again, 
after being once formed there, in order 
to mix with or affect any other object 
in nature ; and yet, knowing that men 



SENSIBLE QUALITIES, &C. 297 

would still consider extension, that is, 
matter as an object having operative 
cause in nature, and taking notice him* 
self, that such combined sensible qualities 
as are called objects did truly invaluably 
forerun other combined sets of sensible 
qualities, considered as their effects ; was 
forced to explain such regular ante- 
cedents and subsequents as ordained by 
God in that arbitrary fashion, for the 
wise and good purpose of affording us a 
set rule and method, by which to guide 
our conduct. 

Mr. Hume adopts this idea, and 
thence deduces his whole doctrine; 
showing, that combined masses of sen- 
sible qualities, called objects, are only 
the forerunners of other combined 
masses of sensible qualities, and not 
their producers; and hence he infers, 
that there is no productive principle, 
that there is only antecedency and sub- 
sequency of events of an arbitrary kind ; 
and the mind is, therefore, free to con- 
sider a change in the course of nature as 
possible. 

o 5 



298 SENSIBLE QUALITIES 

These notions are also adopted by- 
Mr. Stewart, Dr. Reid, and others ; 
but their fallacy may be discovered 
by considering that extension, motion, 
figure, colour, taste, &c. cannot be car- 
ried out of the mind to interact with 
other extension, motion, figure, colour, 
taste, &c. Certain sensible qualities 
must necessarily, no doubt, forerun cer- 
tain other sets of sensible qualities. 
Some objects determined to the senses, 
will invariably be antecedent to others ; 
but such sequences are only successive 
effects, from one common, exterior, un- 
known cause in nature, existing unper- 
ceived by the senses, and meeting suc- 
cessively with various organs of sense, 
adapted respectively to the perception 
of qualities ; fire will always burn, and 
bread nourish ; but, what do we mean 
by Jire, and bread ? The sensible qua- 
lities of these will neither burn nor 
nourish. This, at the first reading, 
may appear a strange opinion ; yet the 
consideration of complex notions, as 
though they were simple, is at the 



CANNOT BE CAUSES. 299 

foundation of the difference of the ideas 
between philosophers and the vulgar on 
this head ; the vulgar, however, appear 
to be nearer the truth than the philo- 
sophers ; these latter, considering ob- 
jects as only sensible qualities, will not 
allow them to be more than ante- 
cedents ; whilst the vulgar conjoining 
them with the ideas of the conti- 
nuous exterior causes in nature, and 
considering that the amassed sensible 
qualities are those very continued exist- 
ences, formed after a certain fashion 
exterior to their senses, do consider 
them in that state acting in, and with, 
and meeting as necessary, operating, 
and productive principles, with other 
objects, which they alter. 

In a science of analysis undertaken 
in order to correct our opinions, and to 
improve philosophy for practical pur- 
poses, it is requisite to separate these 
conjoined circumstances, and show, that 
it is merely the unknown powers of 
nature, the exterior qualities which are 
correspondent to the sensible qualities, 



300 SENSIBLE QUALITIES 

which can ever interact with other ex- 
terior qualities, in order to any alteration 
in nature. It is on this point, where 
Berkeley being puzzled by his own 
doctrine, runs into a gross contradiction 
with himself. 

As I find I have neglected to notice 
this extraordinary paragraph in its pro- 
per place, I shall not scruple to notice it 
here.* 

" But say you, it sounds very harsh 
" to say, we eat and drink ideas, and 
" are clothed with. ideas; I acknowledge 
" that it does so ; the word idea not 
'f being used in common discourse, for 
" the several combinations of sensible 
" qualities which are called things. But 
" this doth not concern the truth of the 
" proposition, which, in other words, 
"is no more than to say, We are fed 
" and clothed by those things which 
" we perceive immediately by our 
" senses." 

" The hardness, or softness, the co- 
" lour, taste, warmth, figure, and such 

* Sec. 38, Principles of Human Knowledge. 



CANNOT BE CAUSES. 301 

" like qualities, which combined toge- 
" ther, constitute the several sorts of 
" victuals and apparel, have been shown 
" to exist only in the mind that per- 
" ceives them ; and this is all that is 
" meant by calling them ideas. If, 
" therefore, you agree with me, that 
" we eat and drink, and are clad with 
" the immediate objects of sense, which 
" cannot exist unperceived, or without 
" the mind, I shall readily grant, it is 
" more proper and conformable to cus- 
" torn, that they should be called things, 
" rather than ideas." 

But who is there of the smallest ca- 
pacity for analytical philosophy, who 
could agree with him, that we eat, 
drink, and are clad, with those sensible 
qualities which can only exist in the 
mind ? Do they come out thence again, 
to be tacked on our bodies, or poured 
down our throats ? Do we eat the 
sensible colour white, and swallow the 
consistency which appears to the touch 
of the hand? Does truly any sensa- 
tion of the colour, figure, and extension 



302 SENSIBLE QUALITIES 

of white drapery, which exists in one 
man's mind, cover the lifeless insentient 
body of another ? This is surely a doc- 
trine which has justly provoked the ri- 
dicule of mankind. 

But Berkeley here pushed himself to 
a notable dilemma, for he was either 
obliged to admit the very doctrine he 
combated, namely, that ideas exist, 
exterior to mind and body, and in that 
state perform the various operations of 
nature ; or, secondly, that parts of the 
mind, that is, the ideas of the mind ; 
that is, mental things performed them ; 
in other words, all things being sensible 
qualites, "ideas in the mind;" some 
ideas, clothe or feed other ideas ; i. e. 
some parts of the mind clothe other 
parts of the mind ; some parts of the 
mind swallow other parts of the mind ; 
but all these propositions mean no 
more than that the actions of some 
parts of the mind interact with other 
parts of the mind. A notion so con- 
fused that nothing can be made of it, 
and moreover, contrary to what he 



CANNOT BE CAUSES. 303 

elsewhere asserts, namely, " that the 
mind is simple and indivisible" — " that 
ideas are inert beings, having no power 
or activity, and cannot be causes." 

There was but one way left in which, 
with any consistency, he could get out 
of the difficulty, namely, by saying, we 
eat, and drank, and were clothed with 
God, the only being external to ideas, 
which he admits; — a strange and mon- 
strous thought ! I cannot reflect that this 
sentence is in his book without pain ; 
whoever shall study it, as it deserves, 
for the sake of unravelling the paradox, 
may, peradventure, find the clue to a 
better theory, and may come to per- 
ceive, that in nature there must neces- 
sarily be exterior qualities correspond- 
ing to, and as various as those ideas 
with which the mind is impressed ; 
and to which exterior qualities, sensa- 
tion is not necessary. God is not found 
by regarding him, as an active spirit to 
raise ideas in us, at our board, at our 
toilet table, by the side of our hearths. 
To imagine that he is swallowed in 



304 SENSIBLE QUALITIES 

gluttony, or drunk for satisfaction of 
thirst or intemperance, is not the hap- 
piest way to demonstrate his being. 
Neither do our own minds, or any parts 
or " ideas in our minds," or the " ideas 
in other men's minds," perform these 
offices for us. 

By denying abstractions, Berkeley de- 
nied analysis — by denying analysis, he 
truly kept up the associations of the 
vulgar, who conjoin the sensible qualities 
exterior causes create, with those causes 
themselves ; — the very error he wrote to 
combat. 

Now it is the formation of the par- 
ticles, (whatever particles may be,) 
which renders exterior objects such as 
they are, and of any certain definite 
constitution ; and this formation we 
can trace in, and by the means of sen- 
sible qualities, as signs of the things 
that are hid. It is the exterior unknown 
particles of fire, it is a certain principle 
disengaged and elicited by certain de- 
fined means, which rendering by its 
appearance certain perceptions to the 



CANNOT BE CAUSES. 305 

mind, will, when in connection with the 
live flesh, disperse its particles with 
violent pain ; or meeting with the un- 
known powers, whose sensible qua- 
lities, when formed, are termed wood, 
disperse the particles of that substance 
without including in the action the idea 
of pain. 

In like manner, " It is not whiteness 
" and consistency which nourish ; it is that 
'* which is sown, reaped, kneaded, and 
" baked, which seen or unseen is fitted 
" to nourish."* The appearance of fire, 
it is true, will antecede the burning of 
the hand, if seen before it is touched ; 
but its appearance, and its power of 
disceptibility, are but successive and 
conjoined effects ; and in the latter in- 
stance, if bread be seen and touched 
before it is eaten, the colour and con- 
sistency will precede its nourishment ; 
but they are but conjoined and succes- 
sive effects. Such action of cause and 
effect must be the same throughout all 
nature. 

* See the " Essay on Cause and Effect," p. 121, 



306 SENSIBLE QUALITIES 

Thus, I consider it to be the want of 
separating our perceptions from their 
causes, which has given occasion to the 
false notion, viz. that of the successive 
effects perceived, the antecedent are causes 
and the subsequent are effects. 

A, after A is formed, and determined 
upon the senses, when it is followed by 
B,* cannot be B's cause in any sense 
whatever ; but if A and B have been 
determined to the senses by any exter- 
nal object in nature, A will be the 
effect of that external object acting on 
one sense, and B of the same object 
acting on another sense ; and so long 
as this object acts on these senses shall 
A be followed by B, and the appear- 
ance of one will ever guide rational 
minds to expect the appearance of the 
other, f without expectation being so 
great and mysterious an act of the 
mind upon such occasions, as Mr. Hume 
supposes. 

* See Dr. Brown's Essay on Hume's doctrine. 
f Mr Hume says, " I ask for information," &c. 
See sec. 4, " Sceptical doubts," &c. 



CANNOT BE CAUSES. 307 

I find several men of science agree 
with me in thinking that this view of 
the matter may be considered as of 
practical importance. It bears immedi- 
ately upon every part of physiology, 
and very materially upon the treat- 
ment of mental and bodily disorders, 
upon the nature of chemical actions, 
&c. as it opens a different view of the 
nature of the action which goes on be- 
tween matter, (as it is termed,) and 
mind. 

The ancients, in order to explain the 
mystery of this phenomenon, invented 
the notion of sensible species ; but the 
modern phrases, of perceiving things, 
or knowing them by the ideas of them, 
imply no more than that we know cer- 
tain definite varieties of mind, must be 
occasioned by equal varieties in ex- 
ternal nature. Most men, however, are 
not able to conceive otherwise than that 
those changes of mind, called primary 
qualities, exist by themselves externally. 
Now the moderns have found by ob- 



308 SENSIBLE QUALITIES 

scrvation and experiment, that by the 
means of every organ of sense, there 
is truly an interaction between the cor- 
poreal part of the senses, and the 
external objects of nature, whence it is 
matter of surprise to me, how it can be 
still maintained as a point of the 
highest perfection in philosophy, to 
be able to explain the nature of external 
perception. 

Now, I dare venture to say, however 
bold it may appear, that if the doctrine 
I have proposed upon causation be 
ever received, it will help to throw 
light upon this subject, hitherto sup- 
posed to lie beyond the reach of human 
discovery. 

From a practical knowledge of cause 
and effect, we measure the heavens, and 
foretel their revolutions ; — if a scientific 
knowledge of its principle be obtained, 
we may perhaps be enabled to under- 
stand and imitate nature, better than we 
have hitherto done. 

In the modern metaphysics " things 



CANNOT BE CAUSES. 309 

that go together are defined and- es- 
teemed to be causes and effects," and, 
at the same time, are considered 
as not necessarily connected* which is 
a contradiction to the understanding. 
But when a rigorous analysis of those 
complex notions which are formed 
and associated by nature takes place, 
proximate cause and effect will be per- 
ceived to be synchronous, and to be 
nothing more than a change of qualities 
from the interferences which take place 
amidst ' the qualities of different ob- 
jects.-}- There seems to me little 
difficulty in apprehending different parts 
of the human frame, the external ex- 
tremities of the organs of sense to 
interact with the particles of external 
nature and become changed thereby ; 
which frame being sentient must con- 
sciously notice these changes, and which 
changes can neither be like external 

* See D. Stewart, E. P. H. Mind, vol. 2, p. 222, 
&c. Lawrence's Lectures, pp. 79, 81. 

t This I have spoken of at large in the '■ Essay 
on Cause and Effect." 



310 SENSIBLE QUALITIES 

nature, nor the parts of the human 
frame — nor like the principle of sensa- 
tion, soul, mind, spirit, or by what- 
ever name may be designated the ca- 
pacity for sensation in general, and con- 
sciousness. 

Now, indeed, the nature of body and 
soul is supposed to be so well known, 
that the body is considered to act "be- 
fore the soul and upon it" and vice 
versa, " the soul before the body, and 
also upon it," and contradictory inex- 
plicable propositions are framed, con- 
cerning essentially different natures, mu- 
tually affecting each other in some 
manner beyond our scrutiny ; for though 
some action must take place in some 
manner, yet philosophers are very apt 
to rej ect every proposed manner as equally 
nugatory and absurd ; so that virtually no 
manner of action whatever is supposed pos- 
sible. But let it be considered, that the 
qualities of body and mind are equally 
unknown, save that mind is a capacity 
or cause for sensation in general, when 



CANNOT BE CAUSES. 311 

that capacity shall meet with some 
other object to draw it forth ; (for in 
sound sleep there seems no inherent 
sentiency, though there be animation ;*) 
and body, a capacity fitted to determine 
the particular feelings, or perceptions, 
of extension, colour, smell, taste, &c. 
upon the capacity for sensation in ge- 
neral ; — then there appears no more 
contradiction to me, that they should 
thus act in, and with each other, than 
that any one event or object in nature 
should take place according to the con- 
dition of its essence. 

For there must always be a natural 
necessity in the interchange of qualities 
according to their original formation ; 
so that the contradiction would be to 
imagine them otherwise than they are, 
when once experience informs us of 
their appearances : therefore, muscular 
action, nervous influence, and in short, 
all actions of the human frame ; all the 
actions of nature, are to be explained 
* See Locke. 



312 SENSIBLE QUALITIES 

after one and the same method, namely, 
by conceiving cause and effect as syn- 
chronous in each step of the series of 
actions * which take place, from the 
first junction or mutual affection of the 
external senses, with the particles of 
external bodies, to the last sensation of 
animated consciousness. 

Nor is this idea a mere arbitrary hy- 
pothesis ; the knowledge of causation 
is got by a strict analysis, as well as the 
knowledge of the dissimilitude there 
must necessarily be, between any men- 
tal sensations, and any external qua- 
lities whatever ; by which discoveries 
the synthesis is afterwards formed, which 
shows that a successive series of unions, 



* To prevent the trouble of the reader in look- 
ing for the argument in the first essay for the proof 
of the simultaneous action of cause and effect, let 
him reflect, That every object would remain as it 
existed at any given moment unless it were inter- 
fered with ; and an interference cannot be either 
before or after itself; but must be in and with the 
same moment of the change occasioned by it. 



CANNOT BE CAUSES. 313 

and mutual affections of qualities,* will 
be equal to the formation of sensation and 
muscular action. 

* It is not meant that qualities must always 
unite, but that they mutually affect each other; 
for whatever may be the nature of their interaction, 
the argument equally holds good. No arbitrary 
law can create a mutual interference of qualities. 
Indeed, I have in vain endeavoured to. find what 
philosophers exactly mean by the word law ; the 
only rational signification is that mode of being, 
or action, or relation of qualities, which as Mr. 
Locke says, " renders an essence that which it is 
and not another." But it appears to me, as though 
they mean it to signify an arbitrary rule which mat- 
ter would observe without there being a necessity 
for it in any physical cause. This is impossible. 



314 



ESSAY VII.* 

THAT CHILDREN CAN PERCEIVE THE 
RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT, 
ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR BEING CA- 
PABLE OF A LATENT COMPARISON 
OF IDEAS. 

First principles are the perceptions of 
the corollaries, inclusions, or necessary 
relations of our simple impressions ; 

* I am aware that many ideas are repeated here 
which have been mentioned before. I can only 
plead the following as an apology for the tautologies 
which occur; namely, that the substance of these 
minor essays were addressed to several friends who 
considered some objections overlooked in the larger 
essays, and who permitted the insertion of the an- 
swers they approved of, and which they considered 
useful — a repetition therefore of some ideas was 
hardly to be avoided, even by casting them in a new 
form. 



CAUSATION 



315 



and infants who have not a capacity 
fitted to generate such perceptions, are 
born idiots. 

Idiotcy appears to be little else, than 
an incapacity for further perception 
than what resides in the immediate 
impressions created by the use of the 
five organs of sense, and the power of 
motion. 

Now the necessary connection of 
cause and effect, resolves itself into the 
identical proposition, that " same things 
are same;" and children perceive the 
relation of ideas which determines that 
conception upon the mind, and depend 
upon it, in all their understandings ; 
for children are too simple to perceive 
any difference between effects and qua- 
lities ; and although I must allow that 
they do not, cannot argue formally on 
the subject ; yet, I am fully persuaded, 
their understandings take notice of, 
(i. e. their latent powers of observation 
enable them to perceive,) certain simple 
relations included in those ideas of sen- 
sation, which are determined to their 

p2 



316 CHILDREN PERCEIVE 

minds by the organs of sense.* And 
this they very soon do, as readily as 
they distinguish by which organ it is 
that any new impression of sense is 
conveyed. It is not therefore neces- 
sary to have recourse to any instinct or 
principle of nature, which we know 
nothing of, in order to explain the 
source of those ideas which govern their 
expectations. 

To the question which inquires, 
" Whence it is, the child supposes a 
candle will burn his finger upon a 
second trial, as upon a previous oc- 
casion ?"-}- I answer, that the child 
considers, upon the second appearance of 
a candle, that the candle is a candle. 
He knows nothing about " secret 
powers," " methods of formation," Sec. 
but owing to the sensible qualities be- 
ing precisely alike, he considers the 
object presented to him to be a similar 



* M. Destutt de Tracy says, " Un enfant spper- 
coit un rapport, comme il appercoit une couleur." 
-f* See Hume's Essays, vol. 2. sec. 4. p. 40. 



CAUSATION. 317 

one to that, which he formerly observed 
of the same appearance ; he therefore 
expects it will prove itself the same in 
all its qualities. The burning of his 
finger he considers to be as much a 
part of the same whole, as the light 
which shines before him. There is 
thus a secret reference made with more 
or less distinctness to those exterior 
causes of its figure, motion, and bril- 
liancy, which are associated with these 
qualities— their effects ; thereby forming 
one whole : and as these exterior 
causes, were * on a former occasion 
capable of burning the flesh upon the 
application of touch, so they must 
again be considered as capable of that 
further quality, or effect, which must 
necessarily belong to them. 

No child or ignorant person sup- 
poses that it is the motion, figure, 
brilliancy, or colour of fire, (when sepa- 
rated from the outward permanent 

* To dispel this association was the object of 
Berkeley. Its intimate indissoluble nature formed 
the foundation on which Hume reared his doctrine 
of causation. 



318 CHILDREN PERCEIVE 

causes of these qualities,) which effici- 
ently governs the burning of the flesh ; 
for that these antecedent qualities after 
being determined upon the mind, are 
the only causes of any subsequent burning, 
is a discovery which they leave to philo- 
sophers to make ; but they conceive 
that some object, which is not in them- 
selves, and which affects their eyes 
with figure, light, &c. will also affect 
their touch with the painful sense of 
burning. They conceive that an ex- 
terior brilliant object is what they see ; 
and that they see it because it is bril- 
liant and like what they see ; they also 
think the same object is a burning ob- 
ject, and will therefore burn them. 
There is thus a false association made 
no doubt in conceiving the archetypes 
of sensible qualities to be the perma- 
nent causes of the sensible qualities, 
the effects ;* — but still their expec- 
tations depend upon the notion, that 
when a part of the whole effects belong- 

* It is this association which Mr. Stewart, Dr. 
Reid, and indeed, almost all men, still make con- 
cerning the primary qualities. 



CAUSATION. 319 

ing to one similar exterior cause or ob- 
ject takes place, that the remainder will 
do so, if nothing arise to prevent it. 

Thus it is really the case, that 
children possess a truer philosophy than 
that contained in the modern theories, 
concerning cause, viz. " that invariable 
antecedency of sensible qualities is the 
definition of cause;'" for they consider 
the successive sensible qualities which 
arise from the application of our different 
senses to the same exterior object, to 
be merely successive effects, on account 
of that object meeting successively with 
different senses. 

But to prove that the child, as well 
as the peasant, (and even the philoso- 
pher when withdrawn from his books,) 
considers the successive effects im- 
printed on the senses, as truly but con- 
comitant effects arising from one com- 
mon object, meeting with various hu- 
man senses ; it may be observed, that 
if any one were to shut his eyes for a 
moment, being aware at the same time, 
that a candle which he had imme- 



320 CHILDREN PERCEIVE 

diately seen placed before him, was 
neither removed nor extinguished ; he 
would expect upon re-opening them to 
see its light, &c. again. Why ? for 
when his eyes are shut the whole qua- 
lities of the candle become but as so 
many future effects ; and thence such 
an expectation lies open to Mr. Hume's 
query ; namely, " Why he expects in 
any case similar sensible qualities to be 
followed by similar sensible qualities?" 
for in this case, the darkness upon the 
shutting of the eyes is the similar sen- 
sible quality which may be supposed to 
have taken place upon a former occa- 
sion ? I answer to this query, that the 
expectation of seeing the candle upon 
opening the eyes, when it is known, 
not to have been either removed or ex- 
tinguished, is because, Like causes (or 
objects) being supposed and granted as 
present; like effects (or qualities) are 
known to be only capable of existing. 

The child, &c. upon such an occasion 
would consider there was a similar ob- 
ject present, and which he would im- 



CAUSATION. 321 

mediately perceive could not be a simi- 
lar object, and yet a different one ; and 
which nevertheless would be the case, 
could it do other than yield those future 
effects, of its light, brilliancy, motion, 
and colour. 

Expectation of future sensible qua- 
lities, is thus founded upon the notion 
of a similar object being in existence, 
when it is perceived to be similar, as 
far as concerns each impression made 
upon each organ of sense ; for although 
some unperceived cause might alter the 
exterior object as a whole, yet this 
is not much taken into the account, for 
it is perceived, that if an object were 
really the same, it would necessarily 
appear the same;* whilst also many cir- 
cumstances secretly influence the judg- 
ment of even very young children on 
this head, — i. e. as to whether appear- 
ances are entirely to be depended upon ; 

* Similarity of appearance proves the presence 
of like proximate cause ; other things therefore be- 
ing equal, it proves the presence of a really similar 
object. 

p 5 



322 CHILDREN PERCEIVE 

but however this may be, children's 
expectations are founded upon their 
conceiving a similar exterior cause or 
object to be placed before them as here- 
tofore, and knowing and perceiving as 
well as adults do, " that equals must be 
added to equals in order to render the 
whole equal,"" they suppose when parts of 
certain wholes are present, that the re- 
mainders will also recur upon similar 
occasions ; otherwise there would arise 
a difference, without any reason they 
could suppose for such an occurrence : 
and children never imagine that changes 
of qualities can arise without a reason 
for them ; or that qualities can begin of 
themselves without a producing prin- 
ciple ; or that there can be an uncaused 
change in the course of nature. These 
ideas appear to them to involve an im- 
possibility ; and indeed appear so to 
all, for I much doubt, although Mr. 
Hume said, " We could at least imagine 
" a change in the course of nature," 
(without a cause for it) whether he ever 
was able to stretch his fancy so far. 



CAUSATION. 323 

I grant that children, as well as 
others, too frequently consider objects 
as similar, upon insufficient data ; for 
when things appear like, and the cir- 
cumstances in which they are placed 
seem also to be similar, the imagination 
does not easily suggest a possible va- 
riety ; for which, however, there may 
be some unperceived reason. Never- 
theless, when any thing occurs different 
to that which was expected, such a 
change is supposed to be owing to 
some sufficient cause or reason, and the 
objects which yield such a difference 
in their effects, are considered as dif- 
ferent objects. But the contradictory 
notion is never held by infants, who 
have not the misfortune to be born 
idiots, that objects can be similar ob- 
jects, and nevertheless their exhibitions be 
different. 

Thus no interval of time, can have 
any relation to any supposed difference, 
and the expectations of the future are 
thus involved as identical with the know- 
ledge of the present. Time enters not 



324 CAUSATION, 

into the ideas of the axiom— that equals 
added to equals, the whole must be equal. 
" Add equal qualities to equal qualities 
" (of whatever nature they may be) the 
" sum of the qualites must be equal 
■' upon every repetition of the junction, 
" and the sum must be equal to the 
" same results taken twice over, and 
" cannot possibly be two different or 
" altered sums."* Objects are but the 
same groups of qualities meeting to- 
gether, and are therefore, to be con- 
sidered as the same aggregates repeated 
over again. Thus children, peasants, 
and even brutes, perceive, that similar 
objects being supposed to meet, mix, 
or in any way affect each other, no 
interval of time which may elapse be- 
tween the repetition of such mixtures, 
could prevent their being truly, the 
same identical objects in nature. 

* See " Essay on the Relation of Cause and 
Effect," pp. 54, 55, &c. 



32; 



ESSAY VIII: 

THAT HUMAN TESTIMONY IS OF SUF- 
FICIENT FORCE TO ESTABLISH THE 
CREDIBILITY OF MIRACLES. 

Mr. Hume says,* " I flatter myself I 
" have discovered an argument, which, 
" if just, will with the wise and learned 
" be an everlasting check to all kinds 
" of superstition and delusion; for so 
" long as the world endures will the 
" accounts of miracles be found in all 
" history, sacred and profane." Now 
this argument which Mr. Hume flatters 
himself he has discovered, is contained 
in the opinion he has formed on the 
nature and reason of our belief in caus- 
ation. 

* See Hume's Essay on Miracles, 1st paragraph. 



326 THE CREDIBILITY 

In his sections on the subject of the 
necessary connection of cause and 
effect, he has endeavoured to prove that 
custom is the only ground of our belief 
in cause as a " productive principle ;" 
or of the necessary connection between 
effects and their causes. 

The manner he applies this notion to 
miracles is as follows : " The reason 
" why we place any credit in witnesses 
" and historians is ?iot derived from 
" any connection which we perceive (a 
' ' priori) between testimony and reality, 
" but because we are accustomed to find 
" conformity between them." — " But 
" when the fact attested is such a one 
il as has seldom fallen under our obser- 
" vation, there is a contest of two op- 
" posite experiences, of which the one 
" destroys the other as far as it goes, 
" and the superior can only operate 
" on the mind by the force which re- 
" mains." 

The answer I would make to this 
statement, is in like manner a result 
from that view of causation which I 



OF MIRACLES. 327 

have already placed before the public, 
and which, I trust, may in some de- 
gree have helped to weaken the force 
of Mr. Hume's sophistry on this mat- 
ter. 

I have there shewn, that although, a 
priori, we know not what particular 
effect may arise as the results of any 
given cause ; yet that it is a general pro- 
position capable of demonstration, " that 
every effect must have a cause," and there- 
fore that whatever may be the effect 
which takes place in such case, the 
connection between it and its cause, is 
a necessary connection, and it must neces- 
sarily, (in like circumstances,) invariably, 
and universally inhere in its cause. 

Now it is a natural consequence result- 
ing from the experience we have of the 
value of truth amidst the transactions of life, 
that mankind will speak the truth in all 
cases, when it appears useful and ac- 
cords with their interest to do so ; as 
well as that in all other cases where 
the contrary consequences appear, men 
will be strongly tempted to falsehood ; 



328 THE CREDIBILITY 

being only prevented from using it by- 
observing that a superior value is con- 
tained in observing a general rule pre- 
scribing truth indifferently, whether for 
or against their interest. It thence 
follows as an axiom, that we place 
dependance on the veracity of men, in 
all cases were we cannot distinctly per- 
ceive any motive to falsehood ; and in 
like manner that we proportion our 
jealousy of the truth of their assertions, 
according as we may suppose them 
influenced by any circumstance of self- 
interest. This being the case when 
they relate " marvellous events" we must 
inquire if there be any motive to self- 
interest likely to tempt them in any 
particular given case to falsify ; to in- 
vent as fables what they detail as 
facts ; remembering always that nature 
is so far from keeping up any constant 
analogy in her works, that the very 
aversion to believe in excepted cases to 
those of experience, arises from that 
puerile adherence to a customary asso- 
ciation of thought, which made " the 



OF MIRACLES 



329 



Indian Prince 1 ' a child rather than a 
philosopher, " who reasoned justly' (ac- 
cording to Mr. Hume's argument) when 
he refused to " believe the first relation 
concerning frost." 

There is, no doubt, a necessary con- 
nection between similar qualities in 
union, but not unless there be similar 
qualities present in order to unite ; there 
can be no necessary connection if cir- 
cumstances be dissimilar. All laws of 
nature are comprehended in one uni- 
versal law, that similar qualities being 
in union, there will arise similar re- 
sults ; a miracle, therefore, is ill defined 
by Mr. Hume, when he would express 
it as "a violation of the laws of na- 
ture," because there is always under- 
stood to be a power in some superior 
influence in nature, in the presiding 
energy of an essential God, acting as 
an additional cause, equal to the alleged 
variety of effects. 

This observation enables me further 
to comment on the next important sen- 
timent of Mr. Hume's on this head ; 



330 THE CREDIBILITY 

and which, indeed, contains the sum of 
his doctrine upon it. 

" Let us suppose that the fact af- 
" firmed instead of being only mar- 
" vellous, is really miraculous ;" ("for a 
" miracle is a violation of the laws of 
" nature;") " then it follows, that as a 
" firm and unalterable experience has 
" established the laws of nature, the 
" proof against a miracle from the na- 
" ture of the fact is as entire, as any ar- 
" gument from experience can possibly 
" be imagined." 

Now let us examine this statement 
with nicety, and with the greatest care 
observe to what this famous doctrine 
amounts, which had sufficient attraction 
in it to draw the opinion of many from 
the belief of Christianity. 

First, This statement contains a false 
assertion ; an assertion contradicted by 
" the slightest philosophy." Our expe- 
rience never established, nor can ever 
be the measure of the laws of nature ; 
if by such laws he meant the original 



OF MIRACLES. 331 

inherent qualities of the " secret 
powers" and capacities of bodies and 
minds ; the mysterious influences of 
distinct masses of things, antecedent to 
their operation upon our senses. Our 
experience neither created nor arranged 
them, such as they are when external 
to us ; and, therefore, never can be the 
measure of what alteration might take 
place under certain altered circum- 
stances exterior to the senses. Nor can 
our past experience ever acquaint us, 
what latent influences, what new un- 
seen events, what " secret powers" 
might be drawn from the mysterious 
storehouse of unperceived nature to 
alter our experience in future. 

There may be no perfect analogy in 
nature, unless it be that there arise 
exceptions to hitherto universal expe- 
rience in all classes of things, with 
which we are acquainted. 

The tale of the Indian Prince, who 
refused to believe a natural occur- 
rence which passed the limits of his 
own experience, may be told of our- 



332 THE CREDIBILITY 

selves ; — we deem some limited obser- 
vation we make, the measure of an 
universal fact; — we draw general con- 
clusions from particular premises ; until 
extended knowledge acquaints us with 
exceptions, and sometimes with single 
and most important exceptions to other- 
wise universal facts. It therefore be- 
trays a want of profundity in reflec- 
tion, as well as of acquaintance with 
the sacred writings, to define a miracle 
otherwise than as an exception to the 
apparent course of nature, — than as a 
marvellous, because an extraordinary 
occurrence. 

Let the reader mark here, how Mr. 
Hume can shift his argument to serve 
his purpose. 

We have but just read in his pre- 
ceding pages, " That we might sup- 
" pose nature to change her course 
" without a contradiction;" — " That it 
" is acknowledged on all hands, there 
" is no connection between the sensible 
" qualities of things, and those secret 
" powers on which the effects truly 



OF MIRACLES. 333 

' depend ;" — " That we know not those 
' secret powers nature has in store ;" 
' and that our mere experience of a 
' few sensible qualities cannot acquaint 
' us with those unperceived laws which 

* truly govern the effect in every case ;" 
' — That nature being supposed hitherto 
1 ever so regular, does not prove that 
' for the future she may continue;" 
' — That henceforth snow may have the 

* taste of salt, and feeling of fire ; 
' rose trees may blow in December 
' frosts, and a pebble may put out the 
1 sun." 

All this he advanced without any 
distinct notions of that operation and 
manner of efficient cause, which might 
enable him to distinguish what was 
true from what was false in this hete- 
rogeneous mass of contradictory pro- 
positions, brought forward in order to 
support the conclusion " that custom 
is cause" Then considering that con- 
clusion as well established, he suddenly 
turns the tables in the essay on mi- 
racles, arguing that as custom alone is 



334 THE CREDIBILITY 

cause, it alone can be the reason of our 
belief in testimony, and of our sup- 
posing " there is any necessary con- 
" nection between the custom of be- 
" lieving in testimony, and the reality 
" of the events testified ;" therefore 
he would further infer, " that the course 
" of nature which can thus be imagined to 
" change without a contradiction, those 
" sensible qualities" which " have no 
" connection with the secret 'powers which 
" determine effects," is nevertheless to be 
the measure of future expectation ; expec- 
tation which cannot be altered in its 
experience, without such a " violation of 
the laws of nature" as infers a contra- 
diction ! 

In the reasoning I have employed, 
in the essay on causation, I have en- 
deavoured to show, that there is but 
one law which can experience no 
change whatever ; namely, that similar 
qualities in union necessarily include 
similar results ; therefore the apparent 
course of nature of which the senses 
alone can take cognizance, may, with- 



OF MIRACLES. 335 

out a contradiction change ; and there- 
fore, every single exception to nature's 
apparent course, is a " marvellous event" 
upon the truth of which we may admit 
and examine evidence, inasmuch as such 
event, and such testimony, do not in- 
volve a contradiction. 

The definition, therefore, of a mi- 
racle is " an exception to natures apparent 
course"* 

Whether the testimony to prove an 
event alleged, be credible or not ; and 
if it be credible, in what manner 
the event proves a doctrine, are two 
questions beside the main point of in- 
quiry, which is, * Whether an inter- 
ruption to natures apparent course can 
take place?' which confusion of three 
questions involved in one, is the reason 
that an unsatisfactory answer is gene- 
rally made. This view of the subject 

* The word miracle, in its derivation, signifies 
only a wonderful thing; that is, something at which 
we wonder, because contrary to our usual expe- 
rience, or in other words, an interruption to that we 
conceive the course of nature. 



336 TH^-CREDIBILITY 

did not occur to Mr. Hume, if we may 
judge from his incomplete analysis of it. 

Therefore, there are really three ques- 
tions involved. 

First, Whether the apparent course 
of nature can be altered ? 

Secondly, Whether the evidence pro- 
duced to prove such an alteration be 
credible ? 

Thirdly, If it be credible, in what 
manner the miracle itself becomes 
evidence of any particular doctrine, &c/f 

Now, first, that the apparent course 
of nature may be altered ; that a sin- 
gular exception to hitherto universal 
experience may take place, has been 
proved by means of the doctrine of 
efficient cause, not only here, but more 
at large in a former essay ; and it may 
be added, that when men are not jea- 
lous on account of consequences, they 
are not in' the least indisposed to admit 
evidence to the truth of such " marvel- 
lous" and singular occurrences. 



OF MIRACLES. 337 

The possibility of an interruption to 
nature's undeviating method, places 
therefore a religious miracle as far as 
its possibility goes, precisely upon the 
same footing as any other singular 
event for which an adequate cause is 
supposed, although it be undiscoverable, 
and renders the miracle equally fit to 
be an object of investigation as to the 
fact of its existence, with any singular 
event. 

Secondly, If the testimony to mar- 
vellous events be made under such cir- 
cumstances, that no sufficient motive can 
be imagined to tempt the witnesses to 
falsehood; if the events be such as 
would rather induce a cowardice of 
assertion concerning them than the 
contrary, then the evidence should be 
considered as worthy of confidence, and 
the facts honestly related. 

Thirdly, The manner in which mar- 
vellous events prove a doctrine is as 

Q 



338 THE CREDIBILITY 

follows : The events in question being 
alleged to occur by the operation of a 
cause known to be inadequate to the 
effect ; the mind is thence forced to re- 
fer to an adequate cause, and rests in the 
notion of superior power being present, 
and in action. 

The command of apparently a human 
voice bids the dead arise, and they do 
so. The spectators thence infer that 
necessarily " one greater than Moses" 
or any human legislator is present, in 
order to be acquainted with the pos- 
sibility of the action, and the powers 
to enforce its accomplishment. Hence 
it follows, that such events are needed 
in order to give authority to certain 
doctrines, and under such circumstances, 
however marvellous they may be, as 
exceptions to nature's course in fact, 
they are nevertheless probable events ; 
because as means necessary to an end, 
they obey that analogy of nature, 
which consists, in using necessary 
means towards every event that is 



OF MIRACLES. 339 

brought about ; they are, therefore, to 
be regarded as exceptions probable to 
take place, and the evidence of them is 
therefore to be received and examined, 
by the rules of evidence upon ordinary 
cases. 

When a doctrine is either a wicked 
or foolish doctrine, such events are so 
improbable to occur as connected with 
it, that the same evidence will not an- 
swer, and I will venture to add, has 
never been offered. 

Therefore it is, that the nonsensical 
differences in the Church of Rome, 
cannot be supposed as worthy of being- 
settled by miracles; none, also, who 
allege miracles to have been wrought on 
account of such trifling disputes, or 
other matters equally insignificant, lived 
the lives, died the deaths, or preached 
the doctrines of a Paul, Peter, or 
John. 

The testimony of those who assert 
miracles to have taken place in order 
to establish some favourite dogma of 

Q2 



340 THE CREDIBILITY 

their own, without the sacrifice of any 
interest in consequence, is liable to the 
strongest suspicion of being the result 
of self-interest and fraud. 

To prove a revelation it is necessary, 
first, That there should be miracles which 
testimony alone can be the means of 
recording. Secondly, That they should 
be such in which the senses cannot be 
mistaken. Thirdly, That there should 
be some notable overt acts of the wit- 
nesses, of sufficient self-denial in their 
sacrifices, in order to prove they believe 
in their own assertions. 

It is in respect of the two latter par- 
ticulars in which all spurious miracles 
are found to fail. They are either 
matters in which the senses of men 
might be imposed upon by the artful, 
or such asserted facts, whose truth 
never cost the bloodshedding of those 
who professed to have been their eye 
witnesses. 

Such distinctions as these if better 
analysed and arranged than I can pre- 



OF MIRACLES. 341 

tend to, would sink into utter disgrace 
Hume's childish comparison of the mi- 
racles of the New Testament with those 
of the Abbe" Paris, and others of a si- 
milar description. 

It was my original purpose in this 
Essay only to attempt a refutation of 
the argument, which Mr. Hume built 
upon his doctrine of causation ; but as 
there are two objections frequently 
made to a supposed method of reason- 
ing, in relation to the miracles, which 
may be thought to bear upon some of 
my observations, I may be permitted to 
notice them also.* 

First, It is objected, " That to say, 
the doctrine proves the miracles, and that 
the miracles prove the doctrine, is to argue 

in A CIRCLE. 

To this objection I would simply 
reply, that it possesses no force, when 
the questions to which it relates, are 
properly distinguished in their con- 
ception, and separated in their state- 
* See pp. 339, 340. 



342 THE CREDIBILITY 

ments. The questions therefore which 
are proposed ought not to be, 

1st. Whether the doctrine be true? 
to which an answer in the affirmative 
may be supposed as returned, — because 
the miracles alleged to be worked in its 
favour prove it ; — and, 

2ndiy. Whether the miracles alleged 
to be wrought in its behalf be true 1 . — 
to which also an affirmative is given ; 
and that, Because the excellence of the 
doctrine proves them so. But 

1st. Whether the doctrine be such as 
would justify the interference of Deity, 
if such interference could be proved? 
and 

2ndly. Whether there be sufficient 
evidence to prove the fact of alleged 
miracles, in order to sanction a doctrine 
which when independantly considered 
appears to be worthy of a divine au- 
thor? 

When these two latter questions are 
answered in the affirmative, no illogical 
answer in a circle is given to them, as 
any one may plainly perceive, however 



OF MIRACLES. 343 

little skilled in the technical rules of 
reasoning. No doctrine indeed can 
prove the existence of miracles, but it 
can be of sufficient use and importance 
to render itself worthy of being autho- 
rized by their interference, thereby 
placing the 'probability of such a fact 
taking place, and the evidence required in 
consequence, precisely upon the same 
footing as that of any evei4 in nature, 
where means are necessary to be used in 
order to the attainment of any given end. 
The excellence of a doctrine therefore, 
merely proves, that it might be of God, 
but miracles are wanted to prove that 
it is of God ; when therefore miracles 
are proved by the evidence of the hu- 
man senses, or by veracious testimony, 
they establish the authority of the doc- 
trine, which however wise, important, 
or useful, would not otherwise be bind- 
ing on the consciences of men. 

The second objection is, " That as 
martyrs have believed false religions, there- 
fore the sufferings of other martyrs cannot 
afford the proof of a true revelation." 



344 THE CREDIBILITY 

This objection arises from an erro- 
neous view of the nature of the cir- 
cumstance proved by martyrdom. It 
is not the truth of a revelation, but it 
is the sincere belief of the martyr in 
his own profession; the circumstance 
of martyrdom affords a proof against 
hypocrisy, not against enthusiasm, or 
delusion. Now to have a proof that a 
man is not an impostor, is a great 
point gained; for if he deliver a doc- 
trine, of consequence, it obliges every 
honest mind to open his books and ex- 
amine it with impartiality ; and to con- 
sider seriously, whether with respect to 
those events which he professes to have 
witnessed, his senses, and his under- 
standing could have been deceived as 
to their real occurrence. 

To me it appears impossible that 
the first Christian preachers could be 
impostors, when I read of their suffer- 
ings ; or that they could be deluded 
when I read the history (for instance) 
of the raising of Lazarus ; and if but 
one miracle be overwhelming in its 



OF MIRACLES. 345 

evidence, the rest which are associated 
with it in the same cause, are included 
in that evidence, and yield the same 
additional force in their testimony to 
the senses, and to the judgments of 
those that witnessed them, (and by 
parity of reasoning, to those who hear 
of them afterwards,) as do the frequent 
return of the external objects of sense, 
support the belief of that independant 
existence, of which the first vivacious 
impulse on the senses had originally 
created the impression.* 

In short, if the Gospel be a mystery, 
yet that it should be untrue would be a 
greater; — however, what I have said 
with respect to martyrdom as appli- 
cable in the way of forming an argu- 
ment, is only needful for succeeding 
generations. It is necessary for us 
who live at this day, that the Apostles 
should have suffered, and have sealed 
their books with their blood. 

* See 1st Essay, C. 3rd, ft on the Independancy of 
E. Objects," p. 78, " Thirdly," &c. comparing that 
sentence with C. 1st, " on Continuous Existence," 
p. 13, "For the mind/' &c. 



346 



ESSAY IX. 

ON THE OBJECTION MADE TO FINAL 
CAUSES AS ENDS, ON ACCOUNT OF 
THE EXISTENCE OF PHYSICAL EFFI- 
CIENT MEANS. 

Those who conclude that a final cause 
is not wanted for the phenomena of 
the universe, because there are phy- 
sical causes in action, efficient to the 
production of each object, draw their 
conclusion wider than the premises 
will warrant. They forget that in 
doing so, they overlook one effect 
which they have to account for, namely, 
the appearance of contrivance in the 
universe — this being beyond a chance 
coincidence of effects, arising out of a 
determination of motion that had no end 



TO A FINAL CAUSE. 347 

in view. There is therefore, an origi- 
nal direction of motion given to sepa- 
rate portions of different kinds of mat- 
ter, coalescing to one apparent end ; 
the cause of which direction they never 
arrive at by ever so many steps backwards 
from motion caused by previous motion ; — 
nay, could they even come at the ori- 
ginal direction in each case, and could 
they even perceive that a material mo- 
tion prevening, acted as the first sen- 
sible propellant, it would not follow 
that mind were not truly the final, i. e. 
the only efficient cause in that case ; 
— for, mark what it is to be a final 
cause when it acts in ourselves ; — it is 
to be that perception of future qualities, 
and that intention to create them, which 
forms the efficient cause of the direction 
of motion upon those qualities which are 
already in existence : — To be a final cause 
is to perceive a future possible quality, 
capable of being gained by that means 
in our power, called the direction of 
motion. But to perceive is a mental 
quality ; yet is it a quality which whilst 



348 OX THE OBJECTION 

it is not to be descried by any sense or 
instrument, chemical, or mechanical, in 
our power, nevertheless intimately 
unites in and with the action of the 
brain, which action might be discerned, 
and would, therefore, be considered by 
incomplete reasoners as the true pre- 
vening motion which alone determined 
the next in order, towards the supposed 
end. Yet perception of happiness, or 
utility, and the chosen direction of the 
eye, the ear, or the arm, in conse- 
quence, is not the mere action of the 
brain, the nerves, and the muscles. 

According to the language of some 
modern writers, we might, after be- 
holding a well constructed ship in full 
sail upon the waters, and examining 
each part in relation to the wind, and 
the waves, and the point at which it 
appeared destined to arrive; consider 
these aptitudes as accidental and unde- 
signed, in order to prove which, each 
motion might be traced backwards as 
resulting from the necessary physical, 
mechanical actions of matter, until we 



TO A FINAL CAUSE. 349 

arrived at the original materials from 
which the vessel was framed, along 
with those other actions of matter, viz. 
of the muscles, the nerves, and the 
brains of the human beings concerned 
in the arrangement. But we know by 
experience, this will not explain the 
whole objects which have been in action 
on the one hand ; nor on the other, 
could we descry, by the nicest instru- 
ments we possess, the power of sen- 
tiency as a physical cause, changing 
all the various material beings con- 
cerned in the formation of the magni- 
ficent object before us; — going on its 
way in its grand and easy motion. It 
is not possible a priori, therefore, among 
our own contrivances, to discover by phy- 
sical examination when it is that re- 
flection, determination of reason, or 
passion, have interfered to alter the 
things we see ; the powers of mind are 
one with the visible affections of 
matter, they inhere as one physical 
cause along with them ; the one power 
may be discerned by the senses, but 



350 ON THE OBJECTION 

the other cannot; and is only to be 
known by experience of what passes 
within ourselves. To know whether 
the action of mind m any case be the 
director of motion upon the things 
already in existence, we must examine 
some given state of their being ; and 
comparing them with such things as we 
know to be governed, arranged, and 
adopted by mental qualities, judge 
with discretion and impartiality, whe- 
ther they be of a like kind. We must 
judge of the probability whether they 
be designed aptitudes, where per- 
ception of possible qualities had di- 
rected the motions of matter towards 
their accomplishment, or whether such 
appearances were the mere accidental 
results of the necessary efficient causes 
of undesigned interactions of material 
qualities. 

In human affairs to judge properly 
in many cases, whether intellect has 
been at work or not, requires extra- 
ordinary powers of understanding, — 
higher faculties of mind than the ab- 



TO A FINAL CAUSE. 351 

stract sciences stand in need of. The 
knowledge of human nature, " which 
though no science, fairly worth the 
seven," is nothing but the penetration 
which enables us to discover the in- 
tentions that govern the motions of 
ourselves and others. In many cases 
it may be difficult to say, whether any 
design whatever has been in action, and 
in many more of what number and 
kind were the ends designed ; certain 
it is, that in productions of the highest 
order, or in very involved operations, 
design is not apparent to some meaner 
capacities. The master pieces, for in- 
stance, of music, sculpture, or painting; 
the delicate workmanship of a time- 
piece ; the simple positions of the parts 
of a telescope ; the wonders of the 
steam-engine; — might any or all of 
them upon being presented to an Es- 
quimeaux Indian, merely occasion him 
to stare with an undefined astonish- 
ment ; or if closer examination and re- 
flection suggested that they were pro- 
ductions of more accomplished beings 



352 ON THE OBJECTION 

than himself, upon the friendly, or un- 
friendly exercise of whose powers, his 
well-being might depend, his anxiety 
might endeavour to hide itself under 
some such words as these : " Ces 
merveilles meritent bien sans doute 
1'admiration de nos esprits refiechies: 
mais elles sont toutes dans les faits ; 
on peut les celebrer avec toute la mag- 
nificence de notre langue ; mais gardons 
nous bien d'admettre dans les causes 
rien d'etranger aux conditions neces- 
saires de chaque existence." " Nulle 
part sans doute les moyens employ6s ne 
paraissent si clairement relatifs a la fin ; 
cependant ce qu'il y a de sur, c'est que si 
les moyens n'avaient ici resulte neces- 
sairement des lois generates, ces creatures 
n'existeraient pas." 

If in any case we mean to exercise 
an unbiassed judgment, whether a men- 
tal foresight and design have been in 
action, we must begin a posteriori to 
consider the object, and examining 
some pieces of apparent workmanship, 
ask, if they are instruments and organs 



TO A FINAL CAUSE. 353 

fitted and designed to ends or not ? and 
if they do seem to be such, we ought 
to judge they are so ; and if they are, 
no mechanical, or physical actions of 
mere matter will account for the men- 
tal quality of design. There must, no 
doubt, in every step of progress be 
efficient material causes for each various 
state ; but amidst those material ac- 
tions somewhere there must have been 
perception of possible qualities, and 
direction of motion in consequence. 

Amidst the apparent contrivances 
which mortal beings have had no hand 
in arranging, it appears impossible to 
descry, or detect, the point where mind 
perceived possible qualities, and directed 
the aptitudes of various motions, but 
that mind must be the cause of that 
which the understanding concludes to 
be contrivance, is an argument, though 
short of demonstration, yet of the 
highest analogical proof ; and one which 
determines our conduct in human affairs 
invariably, and irresistibly. The ori- 
ginal intention, with its effect, the imme- 



354 ON THE OBJECTION 

diate direction of motion, may have 
commenced in the eternal mind at the 
beginning of this universe, or it may 
have existed through eternity, coeval 
with and essential to the Deity : As 
to which of these, we have no possibility 
of preferable conjecture ; but the eye, 
and the heart, and the brain in animals ; 
the sun, the earth, and the moon, 
amidst what is termed inanimate exist- 
ence, and all things of a like kind must 
all have been matters of contrivance. 

If any man looking at these, and the 
like objects with me, denies this, I 
need not compare my ideas with him. 
—Now all the efficient causes in the 
world put together, will not account 
for a mental result. We must have 
the efficient cause for the disposal of 
existences which are instruments and 
means to ends. We must have intention 
of such, perception of qualities, direction 
of motion. 

I consider, therefore, first, the ap- 
pearance of design, that is to say, that 
which reason after examination admits 



TO A FINAL CAUSE. 355 

to be the appearance of design, as the 
only proof of design ; it is the only- 
proof of it in human contrivances ; and, 
secondly, that the argument is futile 
which would attempt to show, " That 
" the physical actions of matter being 
" sufficient to account for the mere 
" physical results which accompany 
" such apparently designed results, the 
" efficiency of intention in the direc- 
" tion of motion on matter, is not 
" needed." Because admitting for the 
sake of argument, there is no design, 
then the physical actions of matter 
must be allowed to account for, or be 
deemed the whole cause of the ap- 
parent contrivance ; yet, on the other 
hand, admitting for the sake of argu- 
ment, that there is design, still all the 
physical actions of matter must be same, 
and yet could not be deemed the 
whole cause of this apparent con- 
trivance, for by the terms of the pro- 
position, design is admitted as one. 
The efficiency, therefore, of physical 
cause is evidence neither for nor against 



356 OX THE OBJECTION 

design, but leaves it open to proof by 
analogy or otherwise. 

Thus the examination of the actions 
of matter a priori, can never in any 
case form a criterion, whether de- 
sign, mental perception, has been in 
action or not. Therefore, whether a 
circumstance be designed or not, must 
always be examined a posteriori and 
be judged of by a sound mind, ob- 
serving its analogies, its tendencies, its 
bearings upon others, &c. If these 
favour the notion- of design, we must 
conclude that the mental perception, 
which is the only efficient cause equal 
to that beginning and direction of mo- 
tion which can accomplish contrivance, 
has been in action. Detected, or detect- 
able, physical efficients prove neither one 
side of the question nor the other ; be- 
cause in both cases they are equally 
wanted towards the mere physical results 
taken notice of : the only difference is, 
that in the one case there must have 
been a point where some mental per- 
ception directed the motions of mat- 



TO A FINAL CAUSE. 357 

ter: (an event not detectable amidst 
those motions ;) on the other, motion 
of matter must have directed the mo- 
tion of matter through all eternity, — 
leaving its beginning and direction to 
have existed without any reason or in- 
tention whatever, although wherever we 
turn our eyes, different and independant 
kinds of matter coalesce to useful and 
important results. 

Lord Bacon has been quoted as au- 
thority for rejecting the doctrine of 
final causes, as though he supposed it 
unnecessary to explain the motions of 
nature, and as fitted only to deceive 
the mind from physical inquiries. All 
that Bacon meant to say, or indeed did 
say, was, that it was equally ignorant 
and vulgar, idly to give design as the 
only reason for the physical properties 
beneath our view ; for the interaction 
of different kinds of matter; and thus 
prevent the analysis by experiment of 
their physical properties, in different 
situations with respect to each other, 
as well as in relation to our senses. 



358 ON THE OBJECTION 

Lord Bacon was a severe theist, and 
never imagined for a moment, but that 
a God had designed and arranged to 
given ends the whole of what we see 
around us. Lord Bacon, for instance, 
would have thought it ignorant, idle, 
and vulgar, were the physical causes of 
heat inquired into, to have it an- 
swered, that it arose from the spark 
intentionally communicated to a heap of 
wood. Nevertheless he could not deny 
in such a case, that the intention to 
create a partial fire, and the means 
used towards it, were the one its final 
cause, the other, its efficient causes. 
Bacon admitted the mental ruler of 
motion in the immense ends con- 
templated in the universe, and the wise 
and efficient means which must have 
been used towards them. 

But to say the truth, I much doubt 
if Bacon, or Newton, or any philoso- 
pher, has sufficiently considered the 
manner by which a final cause truly 
becomes an efficiently physical cause 
for the beginning and direction of mo- 



TO A FINAL CAUSE. 359 

tion. No doubt it is an answer " bar- 
ren" of every idea capable of yielding 
a notion that the question is properly 
understood, when the reason for the 
voluntary compounding of any aggre- 
gate of materials is given as a satis- 
factory answer to an inquiry into the 
nature, and the number of the materials 
used for such an aggregate ; or, if the 
ends to which any parts have a ten- 
dency as means, be assigned as the 
given, physical efficient for each step 
of the means towards that end. On 
the other hand, all things in a strictly 
philosophical sense, form one nature, 
and it is impossible to see the operations 
of nature in a clear point of view, 
unless the manner be clearly perceived, 
by which final causes become identical 
with those which are efficient. 

A final cause properly signifies the 
mental perception of an attainable end ; 
the contemplation of a certain number 
of qualities, the determination of whose 
existence is known to be in the power 
of the efficient agent, by his voluntary 



360 ON THE OBJECTION 

direction of the motion of those already 
present with him. Thus a final cause is 
the efficient cause that determines the will ; 
and which will, is the efficient cause 
that determines the direction of motion 
upon matter in any given case. 

In this sense, the whole forms one 
compound physical efficient cause, with- 
out which every endeavour to explain 
the diffei^ent directions of motion which we 
perceive in the world would he nugatory. 
We might, for instance, in vain lay out 
to observation every material motion, 
which could be detected by the senses, 
or by the nicest experiments, and all 
the general laws as they are called of 
physical attributes, whether mechanical 
or chemical, in order to account for the 
powers by which a bird at first exerts 
herself, and for the path in which she 
directs her flight ; if her perception of 
the intention to build her nest, and of 
the place where the materials lay; if 
the inherent nature she possesses of a 
capacity capable of perception ; if the 
interfering causes capable of exciting 



TO A FINAL CAUSE. 361 

it, were omitted in the examination of 
the physical causes for the beginning and 
direction of her motions. In this sense 
final is nothing more than a name for a 
compound set of physical efficient 
causes, undetectable by the organs of 
sense, but known of by experience of 
their very essence and primeval nature in 
themselves, and by reason and analogy to 
be exercised in other similar beings, as 
alone capable of yielding those appear- 
ances of contrivance and design of 
which we take notice, and of forming 
the conception of those wise ends we 
every where perceive around us, and 
which appear to be gained by appro- 
priate, various, complicate, and elective 
means.* 

If we direct our views from the con- 
templation of the ends attained by ani- 
mated nature, and look abroad upon the 
material motions, and the effects which 
they determine in the inanimate uni- 
verse, we also every where perceive 

* See Recapitulation. 

R 



362 ON THE OBJECTION 

appearances of designed ends to have 
been held in view, and of means of 
accomplishment to have been used to- 
wards them, incomparably more nume- 
rous, more difficult of arrangement, and 
of a larger comprehension than these. 

It is in vain therefore, to invent the 
word attraction, as though it were alone 
sufficient to express the whole of the 
physical causes known for the begin- 
ning and direction of the motions we 
see. It is a word as well suited as 
any other to express the effect 9 the di- 
rection of the motion of bodies towards 
each other, according to those laws of 
velocity which given densities observe ; 
but to imagine there is a certain given 
physical quality in all matter, which 
makes it endeavour to draw other matter 
at a distance towards it, which in its 
turn possesses the physical quality to be 
drawn in that direction, is to invest mat- 
ter by the deceptious use of a meta- 
phor with a mental quality, while yet 
no consciousness is supposed. It is in 
this sense a mere hypothesis ; no organ 



TO A FINAL CAUSE. 363 

of sense ever detected it; no experi- 
ment ever found it; no reasoning 
ever deduced it from admitted pre- 
mises ; the laboratory of the chymist 
never elicited it from any convincing- 
trial ; — on the contrary, so far as the 
conception of the mind can frame 
such an one, let it be done. — Let two 
balls be supposed, of the relative sizes 
and densities of the sun and moon; — 
and to be placed at the same relative 
distance in a state of complete rest in 
an exhausted receiver, with empty space 
alone between them ; is it imagined for 
a moment they would ever begin to 
move, and direct their motions towards 
each other after any law of attraction 
whatever? They could not, — for the 
causes being efficient to rest, they could 
not be also efficient to motion. And if 
it be said the bodies were not or could 
not be at rest, then they were in mo- 
tion — but motion is not attraction, and 
the motion supposed, still lies in need of 
being accounted for, both in its begin- 
ning and direction. 

r2 



364 ON THE OBJECTION 

It may be thought bold to venture 
any objection to the Newtonian theory; 
let it, however, be remembered, that I 
am speaking of Bacon's method of 
philosophizing. He wished to introduce 
observation of, and experiments upon 
nature, before he assigned physical and 
proximate causes for any given fact, 
instead of hypothetical occult modes 
of action; or the ends, instead of the 
means. I therefore say, that the New- 
tonian doctrine of attraction is contrary 
to Bacon's mode of philosophizing ; I 
am aware the Newtonians shift their 
ground when it is said, " the principle 
stated for the motions of the universe is 
but an hypothesis;" they retort, "the 
word is merely used as standing for the 
effect, for the motions we see, and the 
laws they observe ;" to which sense I 
am willing the word should be applied ; 
— but in the original Newtonian mean- 
ing, it signifies a quality, an attribute of 
all matter as matter, by which it begins 
and directs the motions of bodies ac- 
cording to their densities, at a distance 



TO A FINAL CAUSE. 365 

from each other ; and that they can do 
this with empty space alone between 
them. To which doctrine I would op- 
pose, that the existence of such a qua- 
lity is a mere hypothesis, not to be 
detected by observation of the senses, 
or by the experiments of the laboratory, 
or imagined by a mental conception of 
possibilities. 

The beginning and direction of mo- 
tion among what we term inanimate 
bodies has still therefore to be ac- 
counted for ; and I much doubt whether 
any notice of the senses, any trial of 
the receiver, the retort, or the cylinder, 
any mental conception of a possible 
experiment, will yield to us the true 
knowledge, of the causes for the be- 
ginning, the direction, and the con- 
tinuance of the magnificent operations 
we have it in our power to contemplate, 
rather than to understand. 

The most that I would contend for 
on the subject is this, that we should 
reason with impartiality from what we 
know, to what we know not. To con- 



366 ON THE OBJECTION 

sider things as probable to be like, 
which appear so; to refer such like 
effects to like proximate causes, how- 
ever such proximate causes may be 
united with different aggregates of 
qualities ; — with beings not in relation 
to our senses or experimental observa- 
tions. 

Keeping to so simple a mode of rea- 
soning as this, the ends, and apparent 
contrivances we perceive in nature must 
have had their final causes ; must have 
been effected by reason of the mental 
perceptions which yielded to some 
mind those results of the understand- 
ing, and that determination of will, 
which were necessary to discover and 
to direct all the efficient motions towards 
the phenomena in the universe. 

When so much of intention must 
have had its share of physical impulse 
in some time and place, whilst the na- 
ture of matter in general, and different 
kinds of it in particular, is for ever 
hidden from our scrutiny, and on which 
such intention must have operated ; 



TO A FINAL CAUSE. 367 

how is it possible that we should ever 
arrive in this world by the few inlets 
of knowledge we possess, at the true 
causes for the whole physical pheno- 
mena in the motions we perceive in any 
given case. Attraction is a word fitted 
to keep the Deity for ever out of view ; 
and I freely confess it often suggests to 
my mind an idea as ludicrous, as the 
supposed quality to which it is applied 
appears to be futile. It suggests 
qualities in matter which are only 
consistent with a capacity for sen- 
sation; and when it is used with re- 
spect to inanimate objects is but of me- 
taphorical application. Its direct mean- 
ing expresses a mental perception, a 
determination of the will, governed by 
the approbation of qualities belonging 
to the object of attraction. 

To transpose therefore, the word which 
is expressive of this kind of drawing to- 
wards each other, to the motions of mat- 
ter, as though the conversion of a term 
could suggest any defined idea of the 
true nature of governing causes, is merely 



368 ON THE OBJECTION 

to hide an unproved hypothesis by 
means of a metaphorical allusion. — The 
assignation of this occult quality, as 
forming a component part of the very 
essence of matter, has afforded to 
atheism its most powerful refuge. 
When other arguments have failed, the 
attractions and repulsions* of matter, 
elective attractions, &c. are assumed as 
efficient causes in each step of the pro- 
gress which forms an animal, or that 
governs the motions of a planetary 
system, and no other is supposed re- 
quisite to account for those grand and 
beautiful designs. f When such an ex- 
perimentum crucis shall be made, as 
that parcels of matter of different bulks, 
shall at a distance from each other, 

* When bodies start off from one another, then 
attraction as a quality of matter as a component 
part of its essence, is obliged to be given up ; and 
the repulsion of particles (its very contrary) is as- 
signed as the efficient cause of the particular mo- 
tions of matter so affected. In what sense then is 
it possible that attraction can be called a general 
quality or law? 

f I allude here to a well known French author. 



TO A FINAL CAUSE. 369 

with empty space alone between them, 
and being forcibly placed at rest for a 
moment, be afterwards left at perfect 
liberty, without any foreign impulse on 
either towards motion, and without their 
being affected by the motions of the earth, 
of which they are forming a part ; when 
in such a case, they shall bound towards 
each other, then shall I believe in an 
inherent quality as capable of such a 
propulsion, but till then, I feel it to be 
impossible : — I say forcibly held to rest, 
because, if attraction be the quality 
described, all things would ever be 
running towards each other, and even- 
tually form but one being, unless there 
were opposing forces, which must in 
their turn have an extraneous cause. 
Also if the inherent capacities of matter 
are equal to motion, they cannot like- 
wise alone be equal to rest. And if 
equal to rest, they cannot alone be 
equal to motion ; because I trust, that 
I have proved, that every various effect 
must have its cause. i\.n exact experi- 
ment, however, could never be made, 

r5 



370 ON THE OBJECTION 

because the earth's motion must affect 
all the bodies on it — and the forced rest 
would only be a relative state. The 
moment the balls were left at liberty, 
they must be acted upon in some way, 
by the swift motion of the greater ball 
on which they were called forth to ex- 
hibit their minor movements. 

But it must be rest which is the na- 
tural state of matter, and it must be 
motion which requires an extraneous 
cause : — because rest does not suppose 
motion, but motion implies rest ; — 
for the difference between the times of 
the respective velocities of any two 
given bodies, over a given space, is 
equal to the rest of that which has 
been the slowest, during the time of the 
difference. Rather, therefore, than re- 
fer the beautiful arrangements of the 
heavens and the earth to the occult, 
unproved qualities of attraction and 
gravitation, I would chuse to consider 
the beginning and direction of their mo- 
tions to causes analogous to those with 
which I am acquainted. Then it is that 



TO A FINAL CAUSE. 371 

a grand feeling bursts upon the mind. — 
A cause in action like in kind to that 
which I know of, but different in degree, 
and which may account for the origin of 
all the motions in the universe, and all 
their directions towards the designed 
ends, which in every various manner 
take place in the infinite and eternal 
universe — such an adequate and efficient 
cause as this suggests a conception 
commensurate with the Deity it demon- 
strates, and compels an unlimited wor- 
ship of his unbounded essence. 



372 



ESSAY X. 

THE REASON WHY WE CANNOT CON- 
CEIVE OF SENSATION AS EXISTING 
NECESSARILY, AND CONTINUOUSLY 
BY ITSELF. 

Section I. 

The general power of sensation contrasted with 
that which is particular : — its connection with 
immortality. 

It is difficult to perceive the ground of 
our belief in the continuous existence 
of something, the subject matter of 
all changing sensations, and why that 
something must be other than conti- 
nuous sensation itself. I believe this 
opinion is not owing to any unreason- 
able or accidental association of ideas ; 
but to have its ground in those simple 
modes of the understanding which are 



OF MIND. 373 

only of difficulty in the detection, be- 
cause they are too simple to be capable 
of much analysis, and have from the 
most early habits of thought, become 
so much a part of our very being, 
that they do not admit of the recol- 
lection of their commencement. Never- 
theless I consider the fact as indis- 
putable, namely, that we cannot con- 
ceive of sensation existing in, and by 
itself, and therefore, that there must be 
a cause for this opinion. # Let us en- 
deavour to find what it is, and whether 
when found, it can be substantiated by 
reason, or, whether it must be rejected 
as some fallacy, generated rather by an 
association, than conducted from a com- 
parison of ideas. 

The first and original reason for this 
opinion, is justly founded in that notion 
which forms the primeval law of the 
understanding, ' that no quality can begin 
its own existence.' 



* Mr. Reid and Dr. Stewart regard this idea as 
an ultimate fact, or instinctive belief. 



374 ETERNITY 

Had there been but one simple qua- 
lity in existence, and that at rest, no 
other could ever have been deduced 
from it : for there could have been no 
interference, no producing cause, where- 
by another might have been created. 
Now, although we do in our experience 
know of a stream of conscious sensa- 
tion kept up at intervals for many 
hours, and therefore it might be sup- 
posed that we could imagine such in 
a superior nature, to be continued with- 
out sleep; and thus sensation, simple 
sensation, exist in and by itself with- 
out interruption ; — yet let it be remem- 
bered, that during any state of con- 
tinued conscious sensation, the whole is 
compounded of parts of different kinds : 
there exists a succession of different 
sensations, (simple or compound,) each 
of which in its turn vanishes ; therefore 
as each vanishes, all vanish, and sensa- 
tion could have no reason for its exist- 
ence, unless a continuous being existed, 
indifferent to sensation, capable of 
being excited when interfered with, by 



OF MIND. 375 

appropriate qualities fitted to produce 
it. — Such a being is the subject of suc- 
cessive sensation, — such is a capacity 
for sensation, — such is mind. The in- 
terfering beings may be called organs 
or any thing else ; but the continuous 
capacity for sensation alone is mind. 
Its nature we cannot tell. Its essence 
cannot be matter, or the quality of solid 
extension simply, because all matter 
does not feel with the same interfer- 
ences. If a stone be thrown from a 
height, it does not suffer pain ; but 
if there be a quality so far inhering as 
a dormant capacity in all matter, that 
being placed under certain supposed 
conditions, and fitly interfered with, 
it will feel ; still that continuous capa- 
city to sensation is a being properly 
termed mind ; — If on the contrary, it 
be a quality which has its own ap- 
propriate extension as ready to be 
interfered with by fit organs, much 
more does it seem to merit that appel- 
lation, as one used in contradistinc- 
tion to every other kind of extension 



376 ETERNITY 

whatever : — In either case, the organs 
or qualities which excite a variety of 
sensations, are no more the one conti- 
nuous being which feels, than the hands 
of a watch that mark the hour, form 
the essence of time, or than the instru- 
ments which serve to keep alive a par- 
tial flame, are of the nature of eternal 
heat. 

It is here that the materialists err, — 
they can make no distinction between 
the nature and use of those organs 
which are necessary towards the elicit- 
ing each sensation in particular, from 
the continuous power which must exist 
as a totally different being, as a com- 
plete variety of essence from that of 
the solidity, the extension, and the ac- 
tion of such interfering organs. — These 
may be wanted either as interferers, or 
as instruments fitted to generate some 
peculiar quality of matter in a more 
appropriate relation to the capacity of 
sensation than themselves, but they 
are not the m}'Sterious eternal power 
of feeling, which has been conveyed to 



OF MIXD. 377 

each animal as its inheritance from the 
commencement of its species ; and 
which as a continuous existence must 
be an eternal power in nature, and as 
immortal for the future, as it must 
have been without beginning in the 
past. 

It may be modified by methods of 
infinite interferences — but its essence is 
one, and for ever. Memory of sensa- 
tions in the rounds of time may be ob- 
literated or retained, according to the 
mysterious and occult laws which go- 
vern the interferences ; — but the capa- 
city, the being, which can respond to 
joy or sorrow ; can be lofty or de- 
graded ; can be wise or foolish ; can be 
" the first-born of all things," or the 
crawling insect ; can " understand" the 
imaginary motions of " fluxions," — or be- 
ing fastened to the rock, possess no 
powers of motion, even of the simplest 
kind, whereby to resist or escape the 
influence of the surrounding wave ; — this 
subject matter for each variety of sen- 
tient perception, or action, must for 



378 ETERNITY 

ever exist: it may, for aught we can 
demonstrate, retain its individual con- 
sciousness of personality, communicated 
to it by particular interferences as in 
man, or be lost in the eternal ocean of 
mind : it may, under such modifica- 
tion, be improved and go on in a state 
of moral amelioration from the smallest 
touches of instinctive affection towards 
the first of its own kind which it ac- 
knowledged, to the perception of all 
the charities of friendship, and kindred, 
as preliminary to the consummation of 
angelic love hereafter ; or be absorbed 
amidst the properties only subservient 
to animal existences. — Still the in- 
visible, but demonstrated existence, 
must live for ever ; it may be interfered 
with more or less, — it may be modified 
more or less, by all kinds of organs 
and their powers ; — but its essence is 
one, and for ever. 

The proper question, therefore, con- 
cerning the immortality of the soul, is 
not whether it can survive the body as 
a continuous existence — for it must be 



OF MIND. 



379 



eternally independant of any parti- 
cular set of organs in past, as in future 
time. — But the inquiry should be, 
whether when the organs which are in 
relation to any individual capacity, un- 
dergo the change called death, if the 
continuing mental capacity become simple 
in its aptitudes again, or, whether it 
remain so far in an altered state by what 
it has gone through in the present life, 
that it continues as the result of that 
modification ? Whether from any other 
interfering powers than those of the 
visible body, memory and sense shall 
be elicited ; or whether a total variety 
from any memory shall be the result 
and consequence of its former state, — 
analogous to the powers of knowledge 
which foetal consciousness yields to in- 
fancy, and infancy to manhood, without 
conscious memory occurring as an in- 
tervening cause ? — Whether as a dor- 
mant capacity it remain unexcited and 
unconscious of existence during eter- 
nity, or, whether amidst the infinite 
changes of duration it shall start into 



380 ETERNITY 

life, under the modification of appro- 
priate interfering qualities ? 

The latter supposition is a resurrec- 
tion from the dead, is the life of the 
same mind anew excited ; whilst the 
'previous suppositions imply those states 
of mental existence so much discussed 
by the different sects of philosophers : 
for almost all men and nations have 
perceived with more or less distinct- 
ness, that the subject matter of their 
changing sensations could never die. 

That a total obliteration of feeling 
should take place when there is a ca- 
pacity for it, is contradicted by the 
analogy of nature, though we may not 
be able to demonstrate the contrary ; — 
powers of change amongst organs per- 
petual motions in nature fitted to act as 
interferers, are around and about us vi- 
sibly, and invisibly. 

Also, by the laws of the same ana- 
logy every thing is progressive ; every 
thing, (whether designedly so or not, is 
not now the question), is a means to an 
end. That moral capacities and im- 



OF MIND. 381 

provements ; superior benevolent feel- 
ings of some above others ; the higher 
acquirements of intelligence ; the com- 
pletion of virtuous habits, &c. should 
have no connexion with that portion of 
the eternal mind which has been al- 
lotted to the species called man in the 
ages of futurity, seems contradicted by 
that analogy. 

This argument appears to me to be 
as far as philosophy is capable of 
going. It demonstrates the essential 
eternity of all mind ; it renders pro- 
bable any given state of it, as con- 
nected with any after state in the re- 
lation of cause and effect ; whether 
with or without the revival of memory, 
and thus must to every candid inquiring 
mind offer a very strong presumption 
in favour of the testimonies of tradition, 
(to call revealed religion by no higher 
name, for the present.) If any one 
should conceive the analogy of nature 
not to be maintained by the supposition 
of the possible extinction of memory 
in after life, let it be recollected that 



382 ETERNITY 

the infant remembers not its state be- 
fore birth, nor the young child the state 
of infancy, nor the full grown man 
that of the very young child ; yet that 
each of these mental states improves 
by what it has learnt in knowledge, 
(if not in virtue,) from that which im- 
mediately preceded it :- — All the ideas 
of simple, sensible qualites ; of colour, 
figure, sound, and taste ; of heat and cold, 
hardness and softness, smoothness and 
roughness ; of rest and motion ; — all 
axioms termed " mental laws of belief' 
as well as many which are the founda- 
tions of science ; such as, ' There must 
be existence in order to feel;' ' Things 
do not make themselves ;' ' We our- 
selves and the causes of our feelings 
are not the same beings ;' ' The whole 
is greater than its part ;' ' Equals added 
to equals the wholes are equal,' — with 
the converse of that proposition; the 
original feelings and all the principal 
associated emotions of self-love ; the 
chief features of the grammar of a lan- 
guage, with names assigned to most of 



OF MIND. 383 

the objects of sense, and many abstract 
ideas ; in short the foundations of all 
knowledge, and the ability to express it, 
are acquired at a time, which does not 
by any method transfer the memory of 
the impressions by which the know- 
ledge gained was acquired ; although 
its result, the memory of these ideas, 
be united to every new impression 
which then arises. 

Therefore, in like manner as the child 
must assuredly be born though the foetus 
know it not, and man be in possession of 
ideas whose source is hidden from him, so 
may there in succeeding ages arise from 
the ashes of this, another universe con- 
nected with it as its natural effect and 
consequence : — Then every sentient 
power it may elicit, every single thought 
each various being may possess ; every 
capacity which shall then be demon- 
strated, may be the results of the pre- 
sent universe of thought, will, passion, 
suffering, or joy ; ignorance or know- 
ledge, virtue or vice, faith or profane- 



384 ETERXITY 

ness ; and that perhaps without any 
acquaintance being imparted to it of 
the former state on which its then des- 
tination shall hang. On the other hand, 
we are all aware of the analogies in 
favour of conscious memory hereafter, 
from the conscious memory of man 
through youth and manhood, of trans- 
actions during those periods. 

Under the balance of these analogies 
the testimony of scripture in favour of 
the renewal of conscious memory is as 
a casting die, which to any man who 
reasons as a philosopher, must affect 
his judgment. 

I am convinced there are many whose 
understandings take this view of the 
subject, notwithstanding they may per- 
mit themselves considerable latitude in 
their reflections on it. As for myself, 
though I think that, independant of the 
inference ' from scripture, the reunion of 
memory to future consciousness pre- 
sents no philosophical difficulty, yet I 
could be well content in the trust that, 



OF MIND. 385 

the inquiry for truth should be rewarded 
by the rinding it, whether the present 
labour in its search be remembered or 
not ; that the charity which sympa- 
thizes in witnessing pain, should be en - 
larged only to promote or to delight 
in the perception of pleasure, whether 
former misery be obliterated from the 
fancy, or not ; — that an instinctive de- 
votion towards God should meet with 
higher demonstrations of his presence 
than our faint conceptions here are 
able to embrace, though the satisfaction 
arising from the comparison should 
be then denied ; and that the conflict 
here with doubt, difficulty, suffering, 
temptation, and the observation of epl, 
should terminate as well as the memdry 
of it, in the personal consciousness, 
and the notice of surrounding happi- 
ness ; in a secure and perpetual pos- 
session of truth ; in the love and the 
enjoyment of the practice of every 
noble and kindly virtue. 



386 



ESSAY XL 

ON THE IMMATERIALITY OF MIND. 

Sensation as a simple quality contrasted with that 
of solid extension. — Its power to begin and direct 
motion. — Application to Deity. 

But there is still another reason for 
considering sensation as a simple qua- 
lity incapable of existing in itself and 
by itself \ which is, that though it does 
not occupy space as solid extension, 
yet it has a necessary relation to space, 
by requiring space in which to exist. 
In this light each particular sensation 
must be the unextended quality of 
some kind of extension, whether con- 
sidered as empty space, or as solid mat- 
ter ; or as some form of extended being 
not detectable by any organ of sense. 
If for argument's sake, there should be 



IMMATERIALITY OF MIND. 387 

supposed to exist one hundred square 
feet of empty space, and ten sensations 
at any moment within that boundary, — 
those ten sensations would appear as 
a component part, or affection of 
that space during such time, and they 
would together form one being. If 
again during each succeeding moment 
for an hour, ten sensations of a different 
kind from the ten preceding ones, 
should successively arise, that space 
would as the substratum, or continuous 
existence of which the sensations were 
the varieties, be the subject matter of 
which they were the changes. Now 
instead of empty space, of nothing, 
which never could be rendered a some- 
thing fraught with every changing sen- 
tient quality by any interference what- 
ever, — let there be that mysterious 
something capable of feeling, offering no 
solidity to touch, no impenetrability to 
resistance, no colour, nor sound, nor 
taste, smell, or other quality to the 
observation of any sense ; — let it be 
equally as extended as empty space, as 

s2 



388 IMMATERIALITY 

little of matter as that unresisting, 
equally diffused medium would be in 
any given place — but let the capacity 
to feel exist in its own extraordinary 
essence ; let such be within the given 
compass of any individual organization, 
and this substance would exist as the 
capacity of an individual mind. Its 
power may be perfectly simple, or it 
may possess fit aptitudes to retain the im- 
pressions once made on it, independantly 
of the organs; but certain it is that its 
simple perceptions of happiness or utility 
direct the motions of matter, and that 
the union of sentient and insentient qua- 
lities is so intimate as to coalesce, and 
together to form the physical efficient 
cause of the beginning and direction of 
motion amidst the powers of nature ; 
and that in a manner which is not ca- 
pable of being discovered by any sense, 
or instruments in our power : — so per- 
fectly one * is it, indeed, with the powers 
of matter, with whose mechanical actions 

* See note, p. 312. 



OF MIND, 



389 



it interferes, that were it not for thei r 
own experience, our modern atheists 
might deny its perception of ends, and 
its direction of means, as final and 
efficient causes amidst the motions they 
witness.* 

Let not any one think from what 
I have advanced that the mind and 
consciousness of Deity are put in doubt 
by this reasoning; so far from it, 
the ideas really contain a demonstra- 
tion of his essence, and the steps to- 
wards it are few, and short, — since we 
perceive instruments in existence which 
are means to ends, there must be the 
director of motion, the perceiver of ends, 
the former of instruments in the uni- 
verse ; — perception of ends and direc- 
tion of means, are mental qualities ; 
are the properties of the continued 
existence, called mind ; mind therefore 
must have been at the fountain head 
of these contrivances ; but not a mind 
whose existence is more invisible than 

* See preceding Essay, p. 360, also, the following 
Essay, pp. 404 and 405. 



390 IMMATERIALITY 

that of our own minds to each other; 
although experience informs us, that 
the great, the universal mind which 
must have executed these works is 
not united to any small defined body 
with which we can become acquainted 
by our senses ; therefore it is a hidden 
mind, although we know of its exist- 
ence, by means of reason. As mind, 
its eternal continuous capacity is de- 
monstrable by the same argument as 
that of all minds. The capacities 
for being must be eternal ; — changes 
may vary, but the subject for changes is 
eternal, and can have derived its original 
essence from no previous change. 

The universal mind, the infinite space 
for his residence, the amalgamation of all 
possible qualities in nature in One Being 
necessarily existing, — the capacity of 
perceiving all ideas executed in his own 
mind by the eternal, necessary, and es- 
sential union of such qualities as are 
fitted to the consciousness of all future 
knowledge, the circumference, towards 
which is propelled every direction of 



OF MIND. 391 

motion which forms the creatures,* — 
this is God, as far as our natures can 
contemplate such an awful, infinite, and 
invisible being. 

Let it not be retorted, that it is easier 
to conceive of all the little changing 
beings we know of, as existing without 
a creator than of such a being ; for I 
answer, it is not easier so to think ; the 
one side of the dilemma involves a con- 
tradiction, the other does not ; the one 
is to imagine the existence of a series 
of dependant effects without a conti- 
nuous being of which they are the qua- 
lities, and is equal to the supposition 
of the possibility of every thing spring- 
ing up as we see it, from an absolute 
blank and nonentity of existence ; the 
other is the result of referring like 
effects to like causes. The one is to 
regard each little being we know of, as 
the strange appearance of contrivance 
without design, and of being at once a 
series of changes in relation to no end, 
though apparently directed to it ; the 
* See Paley's Theo. pp. 301, 302. 



392 IMMATERIALITY OF MIND. 

other is to believe in the infinite uni- 
verse of mind, matter, space, and mo- 
tion, eternally and necessarily exist- 
ing : generating the creation of all minor 
existences in every form and kind that is 
possible, through the rounds of cease- 
less time.* 

* See note on matter, p. 401. 

The author hopes it will be understood that the 
object of these latter essays is to answer certain 
atheistical opinions to be found in various writers ; 
and not to arrange a system of theological philo- 
sophy, or to attempt an improvement of those stronger 
arguments in favour of Deity, which have been 
advanced by abler hands. 



393 



ESSAY XII. 

OX THE UNION OF MIND WITH ORGA- 
NIZATION. 

I have not advanced the opinions con- 
tained in the two preceding Essays, 
without being aware of an objection 
made by Atheists concerning the nature 
and existence of Deity ; they say that or- 
ganization is necessary as a cause for the 
existence of the minds we know of, and 
therefore it must be necessary to the ex- 
istence of the eternal mind, which is to 
imagine the Being, who has so arranged 
matter in order to a given end, to re- 
quire a similar arrangement for the 
existence of his own being. Such an 
objection arises from a very partial obser- 

s 5 



394 UNION OF MIND 

vation of the nature and use of organi- 
zation in animal frames ; as well as from 
a very inefficient examination of the 
nature and manner of causation, and 
especially in regarding time as neces- 
sary to the essence of cause as a 'pro- 
ducing 'principle. 

Now, with respect to the use of orga- 
nization, it is plain that no given indi- 
vidual organization produces its own 
powers ; each animal derives them, whe- 
ther of sensation or action, from its pa- 
rents ; and if each, all are beings derived 
from some other powers in nature than 
their own inherent properties, after they 
have been so derived : life, sentiency, 
and capacity to action, being given in 
and with the organs in relation to some 
other powers in nature capable of acting 
along with them, in order to the con- 
tinuance of these powers, — organization 
then, no doubt, will be requisite as a 
part of the whole causes necessary to- 
wards such continuance of life, sensa- 
tion, and action ; but the organs are no 
more the powers of feeling than the 



WITH ORGANIZATION. 895 

strings of an instrument are music, or 
than the clock, which is made in rela- 
tion to time, is time itself. 

But let us see what the organs do. 

If physiologists say right, the forma- 
tion of each animal exists previous to its 
separate sensation, life^ or action. These 
powers being also communicated in a 
manner independantly of such arrange- 
ment, the organization of each animal is 
not the cause of the arrangement of its own 
organs, nor of the first excitement to life, 
action, and sensibility. What then is the 
use of the organs ? Not to yield a crea- 
tion of original powers, but by their sepa- 
rate action (when excited) to be enabled 
by their relation with surrounding ap- 
propriate qualities of matter, to divide 
off from the parent stock, and become 
separate individual living beings. 

The organs are, to the capacity of 
sensation, what the organs of a musical 
instrument are in relation to the air. In 
unison with it, they can make delicious 
music, but there can be none without 
both. 



396 UNION OF MIND 

In like manner, animal frames, contain- 
ing within themselves as a component part 
of their existence a capacity for sensation 
in general; and the power of inward motion 
being originally communicated to them 
by another source, are enabled, by their 
relation with the atmosphere, or other sur- 
rounding qualities, to keep up the motion 
which perpetually varies the perception 
of the original capacity to feel. 

In other words, the arrangement and 
first action of the organs, and the animal 
power to feel, are given properties to 
each, and therefore to all men and 
animals, antecedently to their own ac- 
tion, in conjunction with the atmosphere 
under which they first draw life. Thus 
organization does not give any original 
powers, but merely its action changes the 
action and perception of those powers. 

The question therefore, with respect 
to Deity, is, Does the eternal necessary 
essence of mind require organs to give, 
or to change perceptions ? It does not 
follow, because minor beings, derived 
essences, scions from the great root of 



WITH ORGANIZATION. 397 

existence, require organs in relation to 
surrounding matter, to keep up or alter 
their perceptions, that therefore the un- 
derived Being, the necessary eternal 
mind, requires them. Changes, effects, 
require their proper causes, but not the 
mighty Being, which is no change, no 

effect, WHO IS SELF-EXISTENT. 

It is a state of mysterious thought, no 
doubt, which enters into the awful sanc- 
tuary of Being, so far removed from 
apprehension by the infinitude of every 
quality which belongs to it ; but I will 
venture thus far to say, that in finite 
creatures each particular sensation is a 
given state, — is a complete union of the 
essence of mind with any other qualities ne^ 
cessary to excite it. 

Time, without a doubt, is necessary 
to the continuance of existence ; but it is 
not in relation to the coalescence of the 
qualities which form any particular 
given existence. Whatever the organs 
are, they are but qualities, in relation to 
mind, or the power of feeling, with which 



398 UNION OF MIND 

they unite in order to perception. But 
the amalgamation of such properties, is 
sentiency, properly so called — is one 
being, one power, and the changes of it 
are still but its continued properties. 

Now, in the Eternal Essence which 
began not, and in whom must have re- 
sided the original capacities for all qua- 
lities, there must have essentially exist- 
ed, not only mind or a capacity to feel, 
but that coalescence of qualities which 
must have formed his magnificent and 
innumerable perceptions. Here, in each 
animal, the first perception is given, and 
the organs, in relation to the surround- 
ing medium, keep up a play of motion 
which interfere with, and change the 
circumscribed capacity to sensation. But 
there, underived, by eternal self-exist- 
ence, there must be the necessary union 
of similar qualities in a like nature of 
existence in as far as it is 'perception; 
but unlike in every other respect, by all 
the difference between God and man — 
between essential, and dependant being; 



WITH ORGANIZATION. 399 

between the small circle allotted to the 
exercise of each animal sensorium, and 
that which is as unconfmed as infinity. 

The organs, I repeat, are necessary 
to circumscribe individual capacities to 
sensation ; but the organs of themselves 
can create no original powers. 

All changes are but the little begin- 
nings of new forms of existence, derived 
from the Universal Essence which began 
not to be. All motions derived from pre- 
vious motion form together but one ac- 
tion put forth originally by the essential 
poiver to begin motion, itself no motion. 
To suppose otherwise, is to imagine it 
possible for all which we at present see, 
to be of itself capable of arising where 
there was nothing but a blank. The mind 
feels that such an hypothesis involves a 
contradiction ; that the idea contains an 
impossibility. 

All changes must therefore be effects 
caused by an Eternal Essence, holding 
within itself the principle of change, it- 
self no change from a former being, and 
thus essentially holding in unison by 



400 UNION OF MIND 

the mysterious nature of his essence, 
(which renders it that which it is,) such 
qualities as are fitted to give forth 
those changes which form the crea- 
tures. As these manifest contrivance, 
and are fitted as means to ends, 
so that essential union of qualities must 
have embraced perception as its neces- 
sary, eternal, underived situation, — and 
when it perceived that it was possible 
to make man in his own image, he per- 
ceived that by uniting a finite portion of 
mental power with the arrangement of 
that which was material, under an in- 
ward motion which preserved their 
union, and placing such amidst the con- 
ditions of air, earth, water, and food, 
there would thence arise a definite por- 
tion of perpetuated combined sensations, 
of which knowledge of ends, selection of 
means, perception of moral relations, 
direction of motion, would be among the 

most important. He created organs 

which might be the means of transfusing 
those qualities into minor portions of 
mind, by whose junction finite per- 



WITH ORGANIZATION 



401 



ception might take place ; qualities like 
in kind, but not in degree, to his own, 
which already united and filling infinity, 
could stand in need of no organs in 
order to their determination. — In like 
manner, (if I may venture an imperfect 
illustration) we, when we would apply 
the powers of heat, light, or electricity, to 
some circumscribed end, adapt there- 
unto those forms of artificial arrange- 
ment not required by the original essences, 
and which exist at large in the universe, 
uncircumscribed by space or duration. 

It is an attribute of Deity, therefore, 
which affords the subject matter and ca- 
pacity for all changes ; he is the beginner 
and director of motion, matter, *mind, and 
consciousness — universal, and eternal, 
and necessary, in the comprehension of all 
possible qualities ; whilst each individual 
being, considered as apart from him, 

* i. e. Mattel^ antecedently to our perception of 
solidity and resistance ; the original principles pre- 
vious to the undergoing any change which might 
determine it to appear under the form of either pri- 
mary or secondary qualities to animal senses. 



402 UNION OF MIND, &C. 

must be regarded as containing in its 
degree, some portion of its celestial 
origin, though incapable of diminish- 
ing the plenitude of his infinity, or sub- 
tracting from the splendour of his in- 
communicable majesty. 



403 



ESSAY XIII. 

ON THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS, AND 
THE INTERACTION OF MIND AND 
BODY. 

Although an increased attention has 
been given to the doctrine of the as- 
sociation of ideas as being sufficient to 
account for most of the operations of 
mind, yet its nature has been looked upon 
as too simple and philosophical to re- 
quire much scrutiny; whereas, that very 
power of association appears to me the 
most difficult of comprehension in na- 
ture ; for how shall any given idea be 
supposed as associated with some other 
idea, which idea is not yet supposed to 
be in existence ; one idea only present 
in the mind, a single simple perception, 
merely, cannot suggest an after per- 



404 INTERACTION 

ception, for the suggestion is the per- 
ception of the suggested idea itself. 

The association of ideas can truly 
therefore, be nothing more than a com- 
pound idea ; than one being of thought, 
— a conception of different qualities in 
unison. As a state of mind, as a given 
sensation, it must be immediately united 
with the action and with the state of 
the material organs which excite it, 
and coalesce therefore as one with it : 
thence merely forming one being, one 
given state of being. 

When such relates to the putting a 
design in execution, it must unite within 
it, perception and will, and whatever 
material qualities co-exist with those 
affections of mind ; yet it is the mental 
qualities of knowledge, and choice, 
which begin and direct the motions 
towards the end in question.* 

* In cases of design there had been no matter 
nor action at all without it in each of those 
cases ; and therefore there had been no phenomena 
whatever -present for our physical atheists to ex- 
amine ; whereas in cases of design when these are ad- 



OF MIND AND BODY. 405 

This united state of matter and mind, 
which together comprehend knowledge 
and will, being given, is a given state 
of conscious being, and as such must 
be abstractedly considered of as at 
rest ; for if it were in motion it would 
be an altering state of given being which 
is a contradiction. 

Therefore perception and design of 
mind begin, and direct motion on 
matter ; the qualities are together ; the 
mind perceives its design, and directs 

mitted a posteriori by arguments from analogy ; there 
must exist two species of action, 1st, The occult be- 
ginning and direction of motion on matter, inconse- 
quence of the perception and desire to attain certain 
ends, with which the experience of theists acquaints 
them in some instances, and their understandings 
conclude to exist when presented to them by forcible 
analogies ; and 2ndly, those physical propellants in 
every step towards them which theists and atheists 
alike agree are necessary, as physical means to their 
appropriate ends, and which resolve themselves into a 
continuance of those motions on different independant 
kinds of matter, which finally result into some use- 
ful end. Theists say that such are parts of the 
whole causes necessary towards them ; and atheists 
say, they are the whole that are wanted. 



406 INTERACTION 

Its motion ; but the mysterious law, or 
natural power which is a material pro- 
perty and executes the motion, is hid- 
den from its observation, although it 
should react upon it, whether by pain or 
pleasure, in each conceivable variety. 

Now as like causes have like effects, 
the essence of the beginning of motion 
amongst bodies, must I think be the same 
as that between mind and matter; — mo- 
tion of one body may carry motion to 
another, — that is, qualities must meet 
to interfere, but the quality which 
goes by the name of impulse, or impact, 
and resists the impenetrability of mat- 
ter, must I conceive be always the same 
proximate cause when considered as a 
physical cause — for let it be remembered 
that although we are conscious of per- 
ceiving qualities, and directing motion, 
yet we cannot be conscious of the mere 
physical part of the cause which is in 
action, because the material part which 
is united to consciousness is necessarily 
in itself unconscious. 

But there appears to me no mystery 



OF MIND AND BODY. 407 

in this union ; nor indeed in any ; all 
things are united, and form one whole in 
their mutual interactions according to 
their natures. Time is necessary to 
continue existence but not to the action 
of causation considered independantly 
of such continuity. 



408 



ESSAY XIV. 

OX THE REASON WHY OBJECTS APPEAR 
SINGLE ALTHOUH PAINTED ON TWO 
RETINAS, AND WHY THEY APPEAR 
ERECT ALTHOUGH THE IMAGES BE 
INVERTED ON THEM. 

It has long been a matter of great 
surprise to me, that so much obscurity 
should hang over all attempts to explain 
the fact of our seeing objects single 
when there are two pictures of an 
object, one on each retina : for upon 
examination of the only reason why 
we distinguish one object from another 
in any case, it may be plainly per- 
ceived, that it entirely arises on ac- 
count of a colour different from that of 
the object itself forming a line of de- 



SEEING OBJECTS SINGLE. 409 

mar cation around its edges; and that 
therefore, it would be impossible in the 
nature of things, but that two or 
twenty, or any number of objects 
painted upon as many retinas could be 
seen other than single, provided the 
same line of demarcation alone is painted 
on them. For what is it makes the 
visual figure of an object, but a line 
of demarcation between it and some 
surrounding object of another colour? 

Now, when the sense of colour is 
precisely the same, however often re- 
peated, (if the repetition be but at one 
and the same moment of time,) there 
can be but the sense of that colour alone ; 
for there is no line of demarcation 'pre- 
sented which can give the notion of 
two objects. 

If there be more than one object 
painted upon each retina, as many will be 
perceived by the mind, because there 
will be a line of demarcation painted be- 
tween them, but there cannot be dupli- 
cates of these perceived; because al- 
though upon each retina there is painted 



410 SEEING OBJECTS SINGLE 

a line of demarcation between two or 
more objects, and so the same is pre- 
sented to the mind ; yet there is no line 
of demarcation presented between the dupli- 
cates, which could possibly render four 
or more objects to the mind. 

If that circumstance which alone 
forms a sense of the distinction of figure, 
is not presented upon either retina, how 
shall there be any means of its per- 
ception because there exists two re- 
tinas? 

The puzzle arises from our con- 
ceiving in the imagination of the space 
between the eyes, existing between the 
images of the two objects; but this 
space and the figure of it does not pre- 
sent itself upon the retina. The two 
objects on the retinas, can only then 
have the nature of a superposition of 
figure ; the feeling to the mind is one, 
and the line of demarcation which shows 
figure can be but one. 

On the other hand, when a different 
mass of colouring is painted upon the 
two retinas, objects may be seen as two 



ALTHOUGH PALNTED TWICE. 411 

or more though single ; because there 
will necessarily appear to the mind some 
extra colouring between the edges of 
the figures, which is the only circum- 
stance as has been said, that gives the 
idea of two figures of a similar kind. 
Dr. Reid has employed a great deal 
of reasoning to show first, that where 
objects are painted upon what he terms 
corresponding points of the retina, there 
is single vision ; and when upon 
points which do not correspond there 
is double vision; — and secondly, to re- 
solve the connection of these facts into 
" an original law of our constitution." 
Now it is evident from what I have 
said, that when objects are painted 
upon corresponding points,, — that is 5 a 
similar*point of colouring taken as a 
centre in each retina; — it is a law, 
(as it is called,) i. e. it is in the very 
nature of things, not of our constitu- 
tion, that they must appear to be single 
— because the circumstance which can 
at any time present two similar figures 



412 SEEING OBJECTS SINGLE 

does not take place, namely, the pre- 
sentation of extra colouring between the 
edges of the two figures. If for in- 
stance, in any ordinary case, without 
reflecting upon the retinas, and the 
painting of images on them, two 
black spots are seen, they will appear 
thus, (••) that is an interval of 
a different colouring will appear be- 
tween the two spots ; but if 500 spots 
are painted of the same colour, upon 
as many retinas, without such an inter- 
val of different colour between them, 
upon any of the retinas, there can only 
be seen one spot, for then the effect, the 
sense of two spots cannot take place, 
because the cause, i. e. the different 
colouring between them, does not take 
place. 

A similar mistake as to the sim- 
plicity of the phenomena takes place 
when the mystery is presented of ob- 
jects being painted inverted on the re- 
tina, and yet seen as erect ; there ap- 
pears a contradiction in nature, that 



ALTHOUGH PAINTED TWICE. 413 

on the one hand, the painting on the 
retina should be the cause of vision, 
and represent the relative position of 
external objects as they exist to the 
touch, and yet the painting of these 
objects be a variety from that relative 
position. Now the real fact is, the 
painting of objects, though they be in- 
verted, does not alter the painting of 
their relative positions ; the ivhole co- 
louring of all within the sphere of 
vision, maintains precisely the same 
position of things towards each other : 
but it is the appearance of an opposite 
position of things, i. e. an opposition of 
the relative colouring of things, which 
only can yield the idea of inversion 
of images : — Thus a candle would ap- 
pear to be topsy turvey upon a table, if 
the flame appeared to touch the table, 
and the bottom of the candlestick 
pointed upwards towards the ceiling ; but 
if the bottom of the candlestick main- 
tains its relative position to the table, 
and the flame the same relative position 



414 SEEING OBJECTS ERECT 

to the heavens, and the table the same 
to the earth, and the earth the same to 
the table; then the whole, — from the 
earth to the heavens, being painted in 
an inverted position upon the retina* 
cannot possibly occasion any sense of 
inversion of images ; — because the sense 
of the soul must be to perceive the 
whole relative position of objects, pre- 
cisely in that relation of parts they 
appear to have to touch and motion. 

Dr. Reid says, " When I hold my 
" walking-stick in my hand and look at 
" it, I take it for granted, that I see 
" and handle the same individual object ; 
" when I say that I feel it erect, my 
" meaning is, that I feel the head di- 
" rected from the horizon, and the 
" point directed towards it ; and when 
" I say that I see it erect, I mean that 
" I see it with the head directed from 
" the horizon, and the point directed 
" towards it. I conceive the horizon 
"as a fixed object both of sight and 
" touch, with relation to which objects 



BY INVERTED IMAGES. 415 

" are said to be high or low, erect or 
" inverted, and when the question is 
" asked, Why I see the object erect 
" and not inverted ? it is the same as to 
" ask, Why I see it in that position it 
" really hath ? or, why the eye shows 
" the real position of objects, and 
t( doth not show them in an inverted 
" position ?" The whole answer is too 
long to quote, it may be seen, sec. 12, 
chap. 6, of " Inquiry into the Human 
Mind." 

Suffice it to say, that it is an in- 
genious labour to account for a fact 
not appearing as a contradiction to 
nature, which fact never takes place — 
namely, " that the (visible) horizon is 
taken as a fixed 'place in relation to which 
objects are erect or inverted;" for when 
the whole is within the sphere of 
vision, then the horizon is equally 
turned upon the retina ; and the stick 
maintains on it the same relative posi- 
tion ; — whilst the soul can only have 
the sense of one piece, (or canvass,) of 



416 SEEING OBJECTS ERECT. 

relative colouring, which upon motion, 
or touch being applied to the corres- 
ponding external varieties, will reply 
to those actions in the same relative 
proportions. 



THE END, 



LONDON : 

IBOTSON AND PALMER, PRINTERS, SAVOY STREET, STRAND. 



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